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U.S.-China relations, difficult in the best of times, have lurched in a dangerous direction since 2009. Against the backdrop of a weakened global economy and 
sharpened ideological tensions, there has been a disturbing new atmosphere of crisis 
in East Asia over the last two years, with incidents occurring in greater frequency and 
sowing serious doubts about the sustainability of the “long peace” that this region has 
enjoyed for decades. Indeed, any one of the following incidents could have escalated into 
a serious regional crisis: the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan; the collision 
between a Japanese coast guard cutter and a Chinese fishing trawler and the ensuing 
Chinese restrictions on the export of rare-earth minerals; and a string of confrontations 
between Chinese patrol ships and vessels from both Vietnam and the Philippines. 
Taken together, these incidents starkly illustrate the fundamental fragility of interna-
tional security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region and the troubling failure of 
the United States and China to adequately manage vexing regional challenges. In the 
United States and elsewhere in the West, the pervasive view is that Beijing is “feeling its 
oats”—eager to reap the strategic benefits of its dynamic economy even as Washington 
confronts major difficulties at home and abroad. Not surprisingly, Chinese observers 
are inclined to view these tensions differently. Difficulties with many neighboring states, 
such as Vietnam, are seen as encouraged and abetted by Washington, which is viewed 
as all too eager to exploit regional differences as a way to “contain” China’s rise. With-
out significant course corrections in both capitals, the United States and China seem 
destined to follow the path of intensified rivalry that may even lead to the possibility of 
large-scale armed conflict. As Henry Kissinger has recently written, this path is “the road 
to disaster.”1
Facing such difficult circumstances, some observers in the United States are inclined to 
exert new and extraordinary efforts for the purposes of enhancing military deterrence. 
Aaron Friedberg, for example, argues that the “U.S. position in Asia must appear so 
strong and so resilient that Beijing will ultimately choose to stand down rather than risk 
everything.”2 By contrast, this assembled volume describes a much more hopeful and 
cooperative approach. Surveying global security over the last two decades, the collection 
makes it apparent that both sides of the Pacific frequently articulate surprisingly similar 
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security concerns—such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
piracy, environmental crisis, humanitarian disaster, ethnic strife, and economic disloca-
tion—all of which are issues that sit under the “large tent” of nontraditional security 
(NTS) concerns. To be sure, traditional security threats remain a regional concern. But 
scholars, practitioners, and leaders in international security—including recently retired 
secretary of defense Robert Gates—are all focusing new energy on issues that are decid-
edly different from classic strategies of interstate conflict and zero-sum outcomes.3 Un-
fortunately, relatively few academic studies have fully explored the potential for overlap 
in American and Chinese interests with respect to NTS.
An especially noteworthy contribution to the field of international relations and one 
that takes the U.S.-China cooperation problem with due seriousness is Michael Swaine’s 
recent America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century. Ac-
cording to Swaine, “America’s strategy toward China will need to place a much greater 
emphasis on cooperation instead of rivalry.”4 Moreover, Swaine argues not only that NTS 
cooperation between the United States and China could build the trust necessary to 
tackle more challenging problems but also that “without strong U.S.-China cooperation, 
such transnational threats will prove virtually impossible to manage.”5 Thus, successful 
U.S.-China cooperation is not simply imperative for Asia-Pacific security but will also be 
key to global governance more generally.
The present volume reflects a commitment to develop international maritime coopera-
tion between the United States and China through academic dialogue—and also to the 
careful examination of unique Chinese perspectives on critical issues related to NTS. It is 
the result of the China Maritime Studies Institute’s annual conference in Newport during 
May 2010, which involved the participation of almost a dozen Chinese specialist pre-
senters, who were able to exchange ideas with their American counterparts. It is worth 
noting that despite a major effort to invite wide PLA Navy participation in this confer-
ence, the Chinese navy ultimately declined to attend, because of political difficulties in 
the bilateral relationship. Despite this initial setback, the conference was quite successful, 
as the insightful chapters that follow will demonstrate. For their help in planning the 
initial conference, I wish to acknowledge the major assistance of Mr. Dalton Alexander 
and Lt. Cdr. Edward Fiorentino, as well as Naval War College faculty members Professor 
Andrew Erickson and Professor Kathleen Walsh.
The volume is unique in several respects, and not only because it offers both Chinese 
and American perspectives side by side. First and foremost, the assembled papers offer 
a glimpse into the rapidly developing and wide-ranging Chinese-language discussion 
about NTS issues and their role in Beijing’s future foreign policy. A plethora of Chinese 
citations attest to the careful efforts that have been made to synthesize this important 
literature, heretofore largely inaccessible to Western scholars. In addition, the volume 
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includes both the views of policy insiders and also the ideas of individuals outside of 
government. Indeed, many of the authors do not shy away from challenging current 
policies. What this volume is not is a rote recitation of “happy talk.” The analyses are 
clear-eyed about certain limits with respect to NTS capabilities and sensitive regarding 
the implications of certain divergent views on NTS issues for the bilateral relationship 
overall. The assembled papers broadly assess the full scope of the bilateral NTS rela-
tionship and simultaneously dive deeply into crucial case studies, in such vital areas as 
counterpiracy and peacekeeping. Finally, as befits the work of an institute focused on 
maritime studies, there is a distinct focus on maritime issues, including a chapter on 
maritime counterterrorism, without ignoring key developments ashore that are crucial 
components to addressing any NTS challenges and to furthering the bilateral relation-
ship as a whole.
A strong consensus at the conference and among the chapters that follow emerges that 
new Chinese interest in and capabilities for NTS operations offer a vital strategic op-
portunity to enhance U.S.-China security cooperation. The chapters also reveal that 
while American and Chinese viewpoints on NTS issues are hardly congruent, they are 
surprisingly complementary. It is therefore hoped that this volume will help to build the 
foundation of a more cooperative pursuit of Chinese and American national interests 
and of international security more generally.
1. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2011), p. 528.
2.  Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: 
America, China and the Struggle for Mastery in 
Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), p. 275.
3.  See, for example, Julian B. Earnes, “Win Today’s 
War, Gates Says,” Los Angeles Times, 14 May 
2008.
4.  Michael D. Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engag-
ing a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 2011), p. 18.
5.  Ibid., p. 7.
Notes

In China, many new changes in the minds of leaders and also within society have finally made the nontraditional security (NTS) concept acceptable, even as Chinese 
features are inevitably etched in it. Today the NTS concept amounts in China to much 
more than academic terminology but also forms a genuine policy guideline, one that 
directly affects China’s foreign policy. Although the NTS concept in China represents 
the state’s special attention to comprehensive strategy, its development is also clearly 
the result of China’s learning from the outside world since 1978. Initially, such learn-
ing was involuntary, nonstrategic, and reactive. During the decade and a half since the 
adoption of NTS concepts, development of the concept was pursued mainly as a means 
to achieve other goals, one of which was to reduce U.S. political pressure and to render 
futile American hostility. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, the situation changed 
abruptly. Thereafter, American pressure was much reduced, the strategic space for China 
grew swiftly, and China’s attitude toward the concept of NTS finally shifted in favor of 
volunteering to participate in NTS efforts as a key dimension of a systematic strategy. 
China may have learned about NTS from European or other regions, but Washington’s 
disposition—either friendly or hostile—was consistently the primary factor in the devel-
opment of China’s strategy. The U.S. factor continues today to be an extremely important 
variable in any examination of China’s approach to NTS.
China’s Approach to NTS
As early as 1989, China first employed environmental diplomacy by hosting a multina-
tional conference to discuss environmental protection through global cooperation, even 
though there was no genuine domestic requirement to pursue that issue. Beijing saw that 
conference as a breakthrough in the political “blockade line” of the United States and 
saw it as a good model for other potential activities. This episode reveals the reactive 
nature of the very origin of China’s approach to NTS issues. In most cases, China could 
do no more than make declarations, rather than propose constructive plans, because it 
lacked the requisite specialized knowledge.
A subsequent stage, the eight years from 1992 to 2000, was the foreshadowing of today’s 
NTS, in that the phrase “new security view” came into being in official literature. During 
Yu Wanli and Xiao He
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this period Chinese policy makers felt an acute threat from the United States, based on 
such crises as the Yinhe incident in 1993, the naval confrontation in the Taiwan Strait 
in 1996, the bombing of the People’s Republic of China embassy in Belgrade in 1999, 
and the Hainan Island incident in 2001. Facing such serious challenges from the United 
States, China decided to deter American hegemony by enhancing its relationships with 
other states. The “new security view” was first mentioned at the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 1995, and then at conferences with Central 
Asian countries. However there was no exact definition of such new ideas until the Ge-
neva Conference on Disarmament in 1999. During that conference, Chinese president 
Jiang Zemin pointed out that the core principles of the new security view were “mutual 
trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.” Moreover, he emphasized, “history tells 
us we can neither secure our nations nor realize worldwide perpetual peace guided by 
the old security view, which was based on military alliances and arm races.” The new 
security view, therefore, focused on denying the utility of military violence and empha-
sized the importance of international cooperation, not transnational or substate actors.
The NTS concept was first introduced to China in 1994, but it was not until 1999 that 
the first academic paper concerning NTS was published.1 In June 2001, Beijing promot-
ed the NTS concept at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, on the one hand 
displaying its attention to cooperation in counterterrorism, antiextremism, and antisepa-
ratism issues, but on the other hand seeking new allies to resist growing U.S. deterrence 
measures. To some extent, before the September 2001 attacks the new security view and 
NTS were both aimed at encouraging any process that would restrain U.S. power.2
But the September 11th terrorist attack changed the whole situation. Beijing entered a 
third stage of thinking about the role of NTS, as it realized that NTS cooperation with 
Washington not only was possible, but also could be extremely beneficial to China. After 
the attacks, China quickly decided to grasp the opportunity to enhance its relationship 
with the George W. Bush administration. In October, China agreed to add antiterrorism 
issues to the agenda of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings and 
published a declaration in support of Bush’s actions against terrorism. China then cast an 
affirmative vote on United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1368, which gave 
legitimacy to U.S. military actions in Afghanistan. These policies were clear departures 
from China’s previous stances, and China soon reaped the reward for its cooperation. In 
August 2002, the United States officially listed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a 
terrorist organization. 
Beginning at that time, the concept of NTS appeared with increasing frequency in 
China’s formal, official statements. At the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2002, for 
instance, China stressed the importance of NTS in its Position Paper of China’s New 
Security View. Then, in November, the Sixteenth Party Congress Report of the Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP) stated that “traditional security and nontraditional security are 
intertwined,” and in December, China’s National Defense 2002 mentioned NTS, even as-
serting that nontraditional security was an important task for national defense. 
Simultaneously, the content of NTS concepts expanded. In 2003, the severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic constituted a warning to all Chinese concerning the 
vulnerability of China’s public sanitary system. In that year, China and ASEAN held a 
special summit to discuss prevention of an epidemic, and through newspaper and televi-
sion reports on the summit the term “nontraditional security” became familiar not only 
to Chinese leaders but also to ordinary Chinese citizens. Chinese people began increas-
ingly to discuss many new aspects of “security,” such as social security, energy security, 
food security, environmental security, and financial security. In the Chinese Government 
White Book: China’s Path of Peaceful Development (2005–2006), Chinese leaders con-
nected reduction of terrorism, financial risk, and natural disasters to the maintenance 
of world peace, security, and stability through cooperation. Now the concept of NTS is 
trendy, to be sure, but nevertheless also genuinely urgent.
Definitions and Chinese Tendencies
NTS issues originate primarily from within a state’s social structures rather than through 
another state’s hostile intention or actions. NTS issues, moreover, do not threaten 
national sovereignty or integrity; rather, they create victims among ordinary citizens or 
groups in society. When the NTS problems expand to other countries, they primarily 
endanger foreign individuals and groups. 
From the very beginning, China’s government accepted this concept selectively and 
revised it according to its own thinking. Though the Chinese government embraces 
NTS sincerely, its leaders never try to abase the position of the state, either practically 
or theoretically. Beijing is always extremely uncomfortable when it finds itself alongside 
nonstate actors, especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). On the one hand, 
Chinese leaders admit that NTS issues are so complex that they require international 
cooperation. On the other hand, Beijing has the confidence to handle domestic NTS 
issues on its own. This approach is explained, of course, by the fact that China is highly 
sensitive on issues related to its sovereign authority. The Chinese government tries its 
best to put all kinds of social forces into official tracks. For instance, the government  
required that all donations for rebuilding the town of Yushu after a serious earthquake 
be distributed by one, semiofficial organization. All other, direct methods of dona-
tion were forbidden. For the same reason, China will not accept a hard international 
verification system on any issue, such as reduction of carbon emissions. In addition to 
these most important characteristics, China’s perspectives on NTS are constructed on 
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two tracks, step by step, in both the domestic and international contexts, and especially 
within the context of China-U.S. relations. 
Securitization in China
In Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde 
describe an interesting concept—“securitization.”3 Securitization is the process through 
which public issues become security issues that require the special attention of the state. 
Securitized issues must always be handled and resourced by the government. Therefore, 
securitization is politicization, since security represents the highest interest of politics. 
However, there is no objective standard to judge what is actually a security issue and 
what is nothing more than a social construct of the whole society. 
Since 2002, when the Chinese government began to use NTS terminology, every indus-
try and department of the government has wanted to connect itself with this security 
issue. At first this process was relatively slow and focused on issues of national scope. In 
2003, for instance, China became a net importer of petroleum, and thereafter concerns 
were frequently voiced about “energy security.” The concept expanded in 2004, when 
China imported eight million tons of wheat to satisfy its domestic requirements. This 
stimulated the Chinese government to emphasize the importance of “food security.” The 
Chinese food company Wahaha accused the French competitor Danone of endangering 
Chinese “economic security” and called for industrial protection—prompting some Chi-
nese newspapers to react with sarcasm (“We find cookies and beverages have become 
national security issues this morning”) and despite the facts that China’s self-sufficiency 
rate of grain is always nearly 95 percent (much higher than the approximately 40 percent 
in Japan) and in 2007 the Chinese government approved a policy to create biofuels from 
food crops.4 
At the same time, the concept of the “Malacca Dilemma” (in reference to the critical-
ity and apparent vulnerability of the Straits of Malacca for Chinese imports) became 
pervasive in the Chinese press, a dilemma backed by two pillars—gigantic, state-owned 
oil companies and the PLA Navy. On one side, oil companies warned the central gov-
ernment to grasp a more stable foreign crude-oil supply and build more continental 
pipelines. On the other side, the PLA Navy advocated construction of fleets to protect 
energy lanes, including the Malacca Strait. These two players, along with the hard-line 
press, successfully established the “Malacca Dilemma” concept in the minds of Chinese 
society, hiding the facts that the price of oil in international futures markets can never 
recover the real costs of such pipeline projects and that future Chinese fleets would not 
be capable of protecting ships transporting oil to China. 
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Ironically, it is China’s “public security” apparatus that has been most fully tested by 
these tendencies toward securitization. Educated by the SARS crisis and other related 
incidents, the Chinese people are increasingly willing to struggle for their own rights and 
interests in the name of “securities.” In the next decade or two, China will likely enter 
a period of frequent social conflict.5 Building a system that can maintain social stabil-
ity and security is a vitally important goal for China, because the NTS problems inside 
China are just as serious as those external to China.
China-U.S. Interaction in NTS Issues
Washington prefers to talk about single-issue areas rather than to employ the umbrella 
term “nontraditional security,” in part because the NTS concept was born with a certain 
anti-U.S. complexion. As mentioned above, China, conversely, was glad to use the NTS 
concept and emphasize its growing importance, in quiet reproach to Washington. But 
even if the United States is uncomfortable with the terminology, it must agree that 
nontraditional security issues have contributed quite a lot to the China-U.S. relation-
ship. From China’s viewpoint, there are three main characteristics of interaction with the 
United States in the domain of NTS issues.
First, the Chinese people and government have the impression that trade is one of Wash-
ington’s most important national goals. For instance, beginning in the late 1990s the U.S. 
Department of State made China an important target for cooperation in environmental 
diplomacy. This cooperation was focused on encouraging China’s Environment Ministry 
to purchase American equipment and technology in large amounts. Whether or not the 
U.S. government relaxes its trade restrictions on high-end technologies continues to be a 
good litmus test of Washington’s true attitude toward China.
Second, in China’s official public statements the politicization of trade and monetary 
negotiations between China and the United States is unfortunately portrayed as the 
main threat to China’s economic security. The endless discussion and debate in the 
United States concerning whether to label China a currency manipulator strains China’s 
patience and angers its citizens. Due to the transparency of various U.S. legal procedures, 
ordinary Chinese people get a relatively clear picture of America’s intentions and meth-
ods, some of which are inevitably harmful to China’s interests. Therefore, conspiracy 
theories about the U.S. government usually prevail in China.
Third, the United States has altered its method of persuading China to accept and main-
tain the present international order. In the past, the primary method was to convince 
China to be a “responsible stakeholder,” as Robert Zoellick put it. After 2001, even by 
American standards China was taking more and more responsibility, had changed 
its attitude toward international nonproliferation, and had adopted export-control 
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regulations on missile, biological, and chemical materials. Still, in 2005 Zoellick warned 
that China could not achieve energy security by pursuing oil deals with countries that 
the United States considered troublesome and indicated that the approach would only 
result in conflict with the United States.6 
Now, in addition to continuing to encourage China to be responsible, the United States 
has begun to accept China’s unique interests. Although Deputy Secretary of State James 
B. Steinberg’s fall 2009 speech on “strategic reassurance” still reminds China to “reassure 
the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the 
expense of the security and well-being of others,”7 it also provides a clear promise to sup-
port China’s development. In a word, Washington is trying to publicize China’s successes 
in following American counsel. It seems as though Washington will finally accommo-
date China’s interests in the long-term and to some degree share resources and leader-
ship with China. Thus, China has obtained oil business in the Gulf of Mexico and Iraq 
and copper interests in Afghanistan, reflecting that the United States has begun to treat 
China as a responsible leader, not just a responsible player. It is evident that cooperation 
on NTS issues has at various times improved the China-U.S. relationship.
Respective Priorities
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Deputy Secretary Steinberg have articu-
lated U.S. NTS priorities.8 First, confronting the global economic crisis is the core chal-
lenge of the Barack Obama administration, and accordingly the Sino-American trade 
imbalance and related currency issues remain a point of bilateral contention. A second 
major priority, of equal importance to the economic issues, is the goal of strengthening 
the global nonproliferation regime. Washington requires Beijing’s support in the UN to 
block Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Third, the Obama administration is 
advancing technologies and promoting cooperation to mitigate climate change, espe-
cially after the Copenhagen Conference, in which China and the United States gained 
mutual understanding but failed to reach any specific accords. 
In addition to these three goals, in the past few years the U.S. government has increas-
ingly emphasized the importance of the “global commons”—including the seas, air, 
space, and cyberspace. For instance, the United States has led regional cooperative 
efforts to counter piracy in Southeast Asia and views them as a success case. Now it also 
encourages many countries, including China, to protect East Africa’s international sea-
lanes. Recently, the United States has viewed China’s behavior in the South China Sea as 
reflecting a preference toward exclusive access and hence has reacted swiftly. This has 
caused several new contradictions between Beijing and Washington. The openness of 
the global commons is seen by some in the United States as the organizing principle by 
which to cope with all NTS issues and thus indispensable to U.S. national interests.
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From Beijing’s perspective, the most important NTS issue is undoubtedly economic 
security, which is endangered not only by the global financial crisis but also by the 
significant pressure exerted on China by the U.S. government, and especially Congress. 
Moreover, economic growth in China has recently encountered two serious challenges. 
The first is, as the latest financial crisis illustrates, that the Chinese economy is too 
dependent on exports. Just as the U.S. government says, China needs to complete its 
economic restructuring and develop its domestic market, which should be large and 
dynamic enough to sustain long-term economic growth. The second issue is that when 
an economy grows, the cost of such growth increases ever more quickly. Such costs are 
closely tied to three critical NTS issues in China.
First is the problem of maintaining China’s “overriding stability,” which consumes more 
and more resources, since any single social problem may cause a crisis of confidence in 
the Chinese government and even result in massive and violent upheaval. Budget reports 
demonstrate that in 2009 China’s financial expenditure on public security increased 
47.5 percent over 2008, to 128.7 billion yuan.9 Second, as wealth and industrial capacity 
grow, the need for energy and other key inputs increases, even as China can no longer 
satisfy this demand by itself or through various oil pipelines. Therefore, China has been 
required to cooperate with many remote countries to ensure its energy security, includ-
ing countries as unpopular with America as Sudan and Iran. Also, the fact that China’s 
import of energy and raw materials is dependent on maritime transport makes sea-lane 
security a new core interest of China. This significant development largely explains the 
efforts of China’s fleet off Somalia’s coast. Third, it may be said that the threat of global 
warming is less urgent to China but that the low efficiency, high energy consumption, 
and high pollution rate of China’s industries are certainly of urgent concern. China 
shows great interest in cooperation on clean energy and other technologies that can 
improve efficiency while decreasing energy consumption and pollution. China’s attitude 
toward carbon emission reduction is sincere, although it believes that such attempts 
should decrease and not increase the cost of China’s continuing economic development.
To be sure, American and Chinese priorities with respect to NTS issues are not exactly 
congruent. But just as former ambassador Jon Huntsman said, “our leaders recognize 
this, which is why they concentrated on getting to know one another better and defin-
ing our priorities together.”10 This suggests that neither China nor America can pursue 
its own goals by damaging the other’s interest in NTS issues, because of the “balance 
of financial terror” that exists between the two countries. It also suggests that through 
cooperation both can achieve much more than they can through independent actions. 
Perhaps China and the United States cannot reach a consensus, now or in the foresee-
able future, on such issues as weapons sales to Taiwan or meetings with the Dalai Lama, 
but the imperative for wider cooperation is becoming nonetheless ever more obvious. 
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Huntsman routinely repeated during his tenure as ambassador that “we have to delink 
our differences on the bilateral track from our cooperation on the global track.” This 
statement seems both realistic and reasonable. 
Prospects for China-U.S. NTS Cooperation
Although suspicion and anger continue in the South China Sea between Beijing and 
Washington, maritime strategy, which is closely related to several key NTS issues, re-
mains one of the most promising realms for China-U.S. cooperation. This cooperation is 
very important, because there is no sound military-to-military communication system, 
even as contacts between units of the U.S. and Chinese navies are becoming increasingly 
frequent. The consequence of that situation is that more and more maritime contradic-
tions arise in the maritime domain and hostility between the two navies grows. During 
the Obama administration alone, several serious incidents have occurred, including the 
USNS Impeccable incident and U.S. naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. The main cause of 
such crises is that mutual understanding regarding naval strategy is simply inadequate.
China’s stance is that its development of asymmetric naval power, such as advanced 
antiship cruise missiles and submarines, is totally defensive and focused on preventing 
Taiwan’s possible separation. Chinese navy commanders have a clear understanding that 
the Chinese navy is much weaker than that of the United States. Therefore, American 
requests to Chinese leaders for more transparency seem rather hostile. Chinese military 
leaders believe the United States has no need to worry about the Chinese navy unless the 
United States wants to invade the Chinese coastline or limit Chinese naval power.
It is perplexing that the defensive weapons of the Chinese navy are portrayed as more 
dangerous than the aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. The development of anti- 
intervention weapons by China has been termed an “antiaccess” capability by the United 
States, which suggests that China prefers to create areas that exclude access by the United 
States. The expedition of the Chinese flotilla to the Gulf of Aden has not stimulated the 
“China threat” theory but has received wide affirmation and praise, but the Chinese dec-
laration that included the South China Sea issue among China’s core interests resulted in 
rapid diplomatic countermeasures by Washington.  
Overall, in naval strategy China has always underestimated the determination of the 
United States to protect the global commons and its “free for all” principle, while the 
United States has failed to persuade China to accept its view toward the seas or to 
dismantle China’s underlying suspicions regarding the sincerity of Washington’s positive 
attitude toward a powerful Chinese navy. To overcome this mutual suspicion requires 
cooperation in both traditional and nontraditional security issues, and the latter looks 
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more easy and realistic, as Beijing focuses on the bilateral track and Washington focuses 
more on the global track. 
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has described the four broad charac-
teristics of the global commons, which are of vital importance to the U.S. comprehensive 
civil and military capabilities: 
 • They are not owned or controlled by any single entity.
 • Their utility as a whole is greater than if broken down into smaller parts.
 • States and nonstate actors with the requisite technological capabilities are able to ac-
cess and use them for economic, political, scientific, and cultural purposes.
 • States and nonstate actors with the requisite technological capabilities are able to use 
them as a medium for military movement and as a theater for military conflict.11 
This rendering of the global commons makes them useful and important not only for 
the United States but also for China. However, the United States can benefit much more 
than China from the global commons—the seas, space, or cyberspace. Therefore, to 
convince China, the United States first needs to encourage the improvement of China’s 
capabilities—especially its blue-water navy, which does not pose a threat to the U.S. 
Navy. Such encouragement will demonstrate America’s sincerity to the Chinese govern-
ment and ordinary people, and a more powerful navy will likely cause China to recon-
sider the values of a “free use” principle, similar to the process by which China turned to 
the “free trade” principle. 
Second, the United States should encourage China to increase its participation with 
respect to maritime NTS issues, such as the antipiracy mission. As the table indicates, 
although piracy has decreased in certain areas, such as Southeast Asia, since 2008, 
overall acts of piracy have flourished. There still remains an imperative to get China 
Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Far East 4 11 10 2 3 0 18
Southeast Asia 185 162 112 86 77 62 32
South Asia 87 32 37 53 30 23 22
Middle East 3 5 12 7 11 ? 15
East Africa 29 15 53 29 66 42 153
West Africa 64 58 27 32 54 61 32
Latin America 71 44 25 29 21 17 28
Other 2 2 0 1 1 1 6
Total 445 329 276 239 263 206 306
Source: International Maritime Organization. Year to date, Jan. 1–Sept. 30, 2009. 
Acts of Piracy by Region and Year
+
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more involved in this issue, and this participation will encourage China’s naval force to 
become ever more transparent. On this point, the United States has praised the actions 
of Chinese squadrons in the waters off Somalia several times and in different cases. 
Washington should continue this policy and, to some degree, share leadership on this is-
sue with China rather than deliberately damaging China’s prestige by provoking conflicts 
between China and its maritime neighbors.
Another promising issue is cooperation to achieve energy security, which has gone posi-
tively between China and the United States in recent years. As James Steinberg notes, 
“When the President visited Beijing last November, we had adopted a package of mea-
sures including a new clean energy research center, an electrical vehicles initiative, and a 
renewable energy partnership.”12 As Steinberg’s summary shows, cooperation on energy 
issues should be based on two pillars. The first is on the transfer of technology, which 
can bring revenue to the United States; the second concerns the construction of a new 
energy-distribution network based on the mutual recognition of the other’s interests.
Though plans to build various oil pipelines have never been abandoned by China and 
some of them have indeed been realized, China still cannot overcome the influence 
of both Russia and the United States to achieve more complete access to Caspian Sea 
energy resources. China’s somewhat zero-sum, unilateral approach to enhancing its oil 
security not only fuels American wariness regarding China’s strengthening ties with 
The Chinese navy has embraced the concept of nontraditional security. In particular, the continu-
ing Chinese counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have given the PLA Navy much needed 
blue-water experience, including practice with boardings, as illustrated here.
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oil-producing countries like Iran and Sudan but damages the prestige of the Chinese 
government in some cases, as in the Darfur crisis. China needs to decrease the risks and 
costs of its attempts to enhance its energy security.
Washington seems to recognize that only sharing oil resources with China can provide a 
stable basis for Sino-American strategic cooperation. Shared business with Saudi Arabia, 
which is the most important U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf region, and also with Mexico 
and Iraq, is a good model. If this trend can be sustained, cooperation on the energy issue 
will significantly strengthen the Sino-American relationship. This is especially true since 
the issue of the “balance of financial terror” must be confronted by both states. Perhaps 
on this firm foundation, trust between these two countries can finally be established, 
further enabling constructive cooperation on traditional security issues.
The Revival of Traditional Security
In the first term of Obama’s presidency there have been periods of tension and of ease in 
the China-U.S. relationship. Periods of tensions are always driven by traditional security 
issues, such as the territorial disputes along China’s maritime periphery. Fortunately, 
however, these tensions are not the main current. The trend toward cooperation in 
the bilateral relationship remains the norm, and many observers see this kind of swing 
between tension and cooperation as in itself normal. 
The Chinese government is quite willing to take responsibility in international affairs 
and to improve relations with other countries concerning NTS. But this requires Beijing 
to take some risk. For instance, after the serious earthquake and the tsunami in Japan, 
China’s significant overtures received a rather cold reception in Japan; this initiative 
to cooperate was not necessarily viewed as a success. Nevertheless, both China and 
America need to deepen and enlarge their cooperation on NTS issues. The death of Bin 
Laden was seen as definite good news in China, more sincerely than it would have been 
years before, as terrorist incidents in Xinjiang occur more frequently. Still, there can be 
further cooperation on counterterrorism issues. 
Moreover, the recent accident involving a Chinese high-speed train reminds the Chinese 
people that the gap between developed states and China is still wide and that there 
remain many things to learn. A more powerful China will need the United States even 
more. For instance, when China dispatched the missile frigate Xuzhou to Libya to rescue 
its citizens in danger, it became clear that future such rescue missions will require the 
help, tutelage, and cooperation of the U.S. Navy. Now that the Chinese navy is equipped 
with an aircraft carrier, there are new opportunities to advance NTS cooperation beyond 
the economic issues.
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The growth of China’s role on the global stage, while in process for nearly two decades, seems to have accelerated in recent years. The global financial crisis of 
2008–2009 had the effect of promoting even more China’s global position as a coun-
try able to avoid the worst of the crisis and appear as a relatively stable economic and 
financial partner for the world. China’s high-profile participation in the G-20 summits 
in Washington (2008) and in London and Pittsburgh (2009) were a kind of “coming 
out” party for Beijing and its augmented global role. President Barack Obama’s state visit 
to China in November 2009 resulted in a remarkably wide-ranging and detailed joint 
statement, covering the full sweep of U.S.-China relations.1 But in 2010 and 2011, many 
observers in the West and in East Asia sensed that China was beginning to throw its 
newfound weight around too much, overreaching and asserting its interests in unhelpful 
ways around its periphery—such as in the South China Sea—and around the globe. This 
is all the more reason for analysts to take stock of China’s growing role and the evolution 
of China’s security policy that undergirds it. Is it justifiable to say that today is a period 
of “new directions” for Chinese security policy? If so, what are the drivers that shape 
these new directions, and how are these new directions manifested? What are some of 
the interesting research and policy implications posed by such new directions?
A Look Back at the Evolution of China’s New Foreign and Security Policy
Since the mid-1990s, China has taken up positions on regional and global security mat-
ters that are more consistent with broad international norms and practice than in the 
past. China’s approach to regional and global security affairs has become increasingly 
proactive, practical, and constructive. Through a combination of pragmatic security 
policies, growing economic clout, and increasingly deft diplomacy, China has established 
productive relationships throughout Asia and around the globe, including new partner-
ships in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and South America. These devel-
opments have unfolded at a time, since the early 2000s, of strategic preoccupation on 
the part of the United States: prosecuting major military operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, conducting a global counterterrorism campaign, and digging out of the financial 
meltdown and economic recession of 2008–2009. American preoccupation, in turn, has 
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opened even greater strategic space for China to expand its influence within the region 
and indeed at global levels.
This “new direction” in Chinese foreign and security policy is well established and 
traces its roots to the early 1980s and the strategic verdict reached at the time by Deng 
Xiaoping—that the world was tending toward peace and development, the possibility of 
a world war was remote, and China could expect a stable international environment in 
which it could carry out much-needed domestic development. Despite many shifts in 
the international environment since that time, the basic Chinese approach to foreign and 
security policy has rested on the same assumption, that the overall tendency of world 
affairs is toward peace and development, increased multipolarity and economic global-
ization, and a general easing of tensions. 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, while not explicitly stated as such, China’s strategic 
assumptions and principles began to gel more distinctly into recognizable goals. These 
fundamental goals provided the underlying motivations for China’s new security diplo-
macy. First, the Chinese leadership generally sought to maintain a stable international 
environment in order to defuse instabilities, especially around its periphery, so Beijing 
could focus on critical economic, political, and social challenges at home. Second, Chi-
na’s new security diplomacy obviously aimed to augment China’s wealth and influence, 
but in a way that tried to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful and mutually beneficial 
intent. Beijing had come to understand the security-dilemma dynamic and wished to 
avoid alarming its neighbors; instead, it promoted the notion of a “harmonious world.” 
Third, the new security diplomacy sought to counter, co-opt, or circumvent what Beijing 
perceived as excessive American influence around the Chinese periphery while avoid-
ing overt confrontation with the United States, all with the aim of shaping its security 
environment in ways consistent with Chinese interests. 
Consistent with these three goals, Beijing’s new approach was readily apparent in its 
more constructive policies across a range of security issues, including such activities 
as participating in regional security mechanisms and confidence-building measures, 
improving its nonproliferation and arms-control policies at home and abroad, expand-
ing its peacekeeping and counterterrorism activities, taking a slightly more flexible ap-
proach to issues of sovereignty and intervention, and showing some greater willingness 
to shoulder more responsibilities as an emerging great power. According to Liaowang 
(Outlook), the Chinese Communist Party weekly general-affairs journal, 
Compared with past practices, China’s diplomacy has indeed displayed a new face. If 
China’s diplomacy before the 1980s stressed safeguarding of national security and its 
emphasis from the 1980s to early this century was on the creation of an excellent environ-
ment for economic development, then the focus at present is to take a more active part in 
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international affairs and play a role that a responsible power should on the basis of satisfy-
ing the security and development interests.2
Beijing’s New Assertiveness?
Compared to its past diplomacy, China’s foreign and security policy since the mid-1990s 
has demonstrated a remarkable shift in direction across a host of important issues. The 
question going forward is whether this trend will continue, slow, or possibly reverse, 
or whether even more dramatic “new directions” are in store. Over the course of 2010 
and 2011, for example, many observers noted that China pursued a more “assertive” 
and “abrasive” posture both at home and abroad. But these policies, while worrisome, 
probably do not signal a major new shift in direction for China, at least for the near to 
medium term. 
Rather, the fundamental factors motivating China’s generally more constructive foreign 
and security policy remain in place. First, China’s security diplomacy is still largely 
shaped by a need to maintain stable and productive external relations in order to ensure 
socioeconomic development at home. Second, China’s security diplomacy still aims to 
reassure its neighbors of the country’s peaceful intentions as Beijing recognizes the need 
to maintain stable relations around its periphery in order, again, to foster continued 
development at home. Third, Chinese security diplomacy still seeks to counter but not 
openly confront what Beijing sees as excessive American influence around the Chinese 
periphery. 
China’s domestic economic, social, and political development challenges have intensified 
in many respects in recent years precisely as a result of ongoing economic growth and 
heightened social and political expectations within parts of the Chinese population. The 
income gap in China between rich and poor continues to expand, greater and greater de-
velopment pressures are building on Chinese resources, and the need to import foreign 
capital, goods, and technologies continues to grow. Increased social and economic devel-
opment has apparently not quelled resentment among some of China’s less advantaged 
populations, including workers, farmers, and some ethnic and religious minorities, as in 
Tibet and Xinjiang. 
Moreover, the increasing impact of “nontraditional” security concerns on Chinese 
national interests also suggests that Beijing will continue its generally more practical and 
constructive security diplomacy.3 Chinese leaders and strategists—traditional guard-
ians of state sovereignty, typically reluctant to consider bilateral or multilateral steps that 
might lead to “meddling” in others’ internal affairs—have nevertheless increasingly ac-
knowledged that the spread of transnational security problems has blurred state borders. 
Moreover, there is increasingly an understanding in China that these challenges affect 
Chinese security. Many of the most challenging issues the Chinese leadership will face 
20 china maritime studies
over the coming years are transnational in nature: the impact of globalization on China’s 
domestic economy; environmental degradation, water shortages, and energy access; 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, and other infectious diseases; proliferation of 
nuclear technologies and materials; and what Beijing calls the three evils—terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism—as well as other types of transborder crime, such as drug 
trafficking, gunrunning, smuggling, and piracy. Dealing with these challenges to China’s 
national interests will demand that Chinese security diplomacy continue to take a col-
laborative approach.
Nontraditional Security Challenges:  
Chinese Contributions to Peace Operations
One area of activity where China has shown far greater willingness to address nontra-
ditional security concerns is engagement in peace and stability operations.4 China now 
deploys more than twenty times as many peacekeepers to United Nations (UN) peace 
operations as it did in 2000. China ranks among the top fifteen countries contributing 
personnel to UN peace operations and since the mid-2000s has consistently provided 
more troops, police, and observers to them than any other permanent member of the 
UN Security Council. By engaging more deeply in peacekeeping and providing en-
gineers, transport battalions, and medical units, China contributes critically needed 
material assets—and perceived legitimacy—at a time when multilateral peacekeeping is 
severely overstretched.
Chinese “blue helmets” operating in Africa. Beijing is the leading contributor of troops to United 
Nations peacekeeping operations among the permanent five (P-5) states in the UN Security 
Council.
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China has also increased its engagement in other activities related to peace and stabil-
ity operations. As part of an overall effort to “go out to learn,” People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) officers have been sent to take part in professional training and exchanges on 
peacekeeping operations in countries including Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Estonia, 
Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand. Chinese officers have also participat-
ed, either as observers or as active participants, in peacekeeping training exercises orga-
nized under the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP) 
initiative, as well as those sponsored by the British defense and security establishments. 
The PLA has requested some foreign military counterparts to provide it additional help 
and more rigorous peacekeeping training programs.
China has also organized and hosted a number of international seminars on peacekeep-
ing affairs. For example, since 2004 it has hosted the annual United Kingdom–China 
Seminar on Peacekeeping Operations. China has also arranged similar seminars with 
Norway and Sweden. The International Committee of the Red Cross has provided 
seminars and predeployment briefings on international humanitarian law for Chinese 
peacekeepers.5 In 2007 the Chinese Office of Peacekeeping Affairs sponsored the first 
China–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) peacekeeping seminar in Bei-
jing. More recently, at the 2009 China-ASEAN High Level Defense Dialogue, senior PLA 
officials reiterated the country’s commitment to cooperation on peacekeeping, including 
training.6
China has also significantly increased its engagement in joint military exercises with for-
eign militaries in recent years, frequently focusing on nontraditional security issues. The 
first such exercises, referred to as “joint counterterrorism exercises,” were collaborations 
between China and its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 
October 2002 and 2003. These were followed by similar counterterrorism exercises held 
with Pakistan and, shortly afterward, in August 2004, with India. In September 2006, 
Chinese and Tajik troops carried out a joint military exercise, named Co-ordination 
2006, in which they simulated a hostage-taking scenario. Strike 2007, a two-week joint 
counterterrorism training exercise involving sixty specialized Chinese and Thai troops, 
was held in July 2007 in China’s Guangdong Province. China and Mongolia held their 
first joint military training exercise, Peacekeeping Mission 2009, in June and July 
2009. The Chinese white paper on national defense issued in March 2011 states that as 
of December 2010 the Chinese military had held forty-four joint military and training 
exercises with foreign counterparts.7
China has also increased its participation in joint naval activities and other naval deploy-
ments abroad for humanitarian purposes. In recent years it has held bilateral exercises 
with the navies of Australia, Canada, France, India, Pakistan, Thailand, the United 
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Kingdom, and the United States. Furthermore, in December 2008 China announced 
that it would cooperate with the multinational antipiracy force in the Gulf of Aden and 
deployed its first ships to the region. In September 2009 military officials from Australia 
and the United States announced that they would invite China to take part in trilateral 
military exercises, initially focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.8 Ac-
cording to the March 2011 white paper, as of December 2010 the Chinese navy had com-
pleted a total of seven deployments to the Gulf of Aden area, involving eighteen ships, 
and provided protection for more than 3,100 ships under Chinese and foreign flags.9 In 
2010, the newly built naval hospital ship, whose Chinese name means “Peace Ark,” un-
dertook an eighty-eight-day humanitarian mission with stops in Africa and South Asia, 
the first such deployment for the Chinese navy.
This increased activity related to peace and stability operations, as well as increased 
humanitarian activity by the Chinese military, is driven by the broad motivations behind 
China’s new security diplomacy over the past fifteen years. In addition, Chinese security 
forces benefit from practical experience gained through participation in different types 
of operations, overseas training opportunities, and close cooperation with other coun-
tries’ forces. 
Looking Ahead: Implications for Research and Policy
This brief overview does not suggest that there will be dramatic “new directions” in 
Chinese security policy anytime soon. But it does suggest a continuation in the trend 
that has been noted over the past ten to fifteen years, because of a solid appreciation by 
Chinese leaders that their country’s key interests, and particularly its need to continue 
development trends at home, will increasingly require more constructive and active 
engagement abroad. This will include an increased need to understand and to approach 
more flexibly the nontraditional challenges that affect Chinese security. 
If this assessment is correct, some of the next big questions for research and policy will 
be how and whether China will continue to pursue this relatively constructive approach 
to its foreign and security policy. Many impediments and uncertainties still lie ahead for 
this approach—the more assertive and abrasive policies and actions seen from China in 
2010 and 2011 reflect this uncertainty. 
First, an even more active role for China on the world stage has long been constrained 
by its own nearly unassailable maxims calling for the country to eschew international 
leadership and skirt controversial decisions in international affairs. Most often cited is 
Deng Xiaoping’s well-known “twenty-four-character strategy” of the early 1990s, which 
continues to hold sway today. While its precise English translation is a matter of some 
debate, the overall thrust of Deng’s admonition to Chinese leaders is to avoid taking the 
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lead, keep a low profile, steer clear of trouble, and quietly focus on China’s own capabili-
ties. Deng’s statement was later slightly modified and abbreviated to an eight-character 
slogan that remains a widely used guideline for internal party and governmental deliber-
ations: “tao guang yang hui, you suo zuo wei” (keep a low profile and bide our time, while 
also making some contributions). Deng is also widely quoted as saying that “even if in 
the future China is a well-developed and strong nation, we should never seek to lead, 
never seek hegemony, never seek spheres of influence, never take sides with factions in 
world politics, never seek interference in the internal affairs of other states.” While these 
strategic guidelines are debated in China, and some adjustments may be made to them, 
they serve as potent principles that will often restrain a more proactive Chinese foreign 
and security policy. 
Second, China’s willingness and ability to take part in bolder action on the international 
stage, unilaterally or with others, will continue to be limited by the pressing priorities of 
the country’s internal and developmental problems, as well as by the inherent insecurity 
the leadership feels as it struggles to keep China’s high-speed trajectory on course with-
out losing control. Phenomenal dynamism, rapid transformation, and the steady boil of 
social and political unrest characterize the nation’s domestic situation. Nationalism too is 
on the rise in China, with more and more “netizens” and elites calling on their leaders to 
be more assertive in leveraging the country’s economic might toward securing Chinese 
interests and regaining China’s “rightful” place among the world’s most powerful nations. 
As the CCP frequently takes credit for China’s rising status in recent decades, the Chi-
nese leadership has become a victim of its own success and needs to proceed cautiously 
on the international stage.
The combination of remarkable economic growth, integration with a globalizing world, 
and the citizenry’s increasing demands makes China a formidably complex country to 
govern. The leadership fears that leaving citizens’ demands unchecked could lead to 
greater instability and a further loss of centralized sociopolitical control—hence the 
tough crackdowns across a wide spectrum within China over the last two years. Indeed, 
the remarkable social and political changes under way in much of the Arab world since 
early 2011 have encouraged an even tighter internal grip by Chinese authorities.
The Chinese leadership faces a difficult conundrum. On the one hand, increased en-
gagement abroad is seen as an important pathway to help foster development at home. 
But at the end of the day, domestic challenges will always receive the topmost priority 
and may ultimately limit the willingness of China’s leadership to engage actively the out-
side world. At a minimum, foreign policies will be shaped all the more by their impact 
on domestic stability.
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Third, China’s ability to be engaged more proactively on the international stage will also 
be constrained by the nature of its political system and governmental structure. Major 
decisions in China are taken through a deliberative and measured consensus-building 
process in which decisions once reached are difficult to change. As Deborah Seligsohn, 
a Beijing-based adviser for World Resources Institute, has noted, Chinese leaders are 
not truly “politicians” in the same sense as their counterparts in Western countries or, 
for that matter, in India, Brazil, or South Africa. Rather, they are bureaucrats, unaccus-
tomed to on-the-fly deal making or the crafting of breakthroughs face to face with world 
leaders over the heads of their staffers, as was seen most clearly during the global climate 
summit in Copenhagen in 2009.
At the same time, important decisions in China are increasingly affected by a growing 
number of more powerful stakeholders, making consensus building all the more difficult 
and fragile, hence less open to adjustment by top leaders. The interests of government 
commissions and ministries, major financial and investment institutions, state-owned 
conglomerates, and municipal and provincial locales must all be taken into account. 
Fourth, China’s predominant focus on state-to-state relations will limit its ability to 
operate more flexibly in an increasingly complex and less state-centric world. In a world 
where many of the most important security actors and security challenges are nonstate 
or substate in nature, China will need to develop more sophisticated diplomatic tools 
to deal with them. It is not clear as yet how effective Beijing can be in such an environ-
ment. All governments face this problem in varying degrees, but among the world’s 
major powers China may be the least experienced and most reluctant to engage nonstate 
actors. 
Fifth, Chinese foreign and security policies will also be shaped—but probably not ulti-
mately determined—by how Beijing interprets the actions and policies of its neighbors, 
especially those in East Asia, and particularly those allied with the United States. China 
likely will remain committed to reassuring its neighbors about its peaceful intentions 
and to avoiding an overt confrontation with the United States. Nevertheless, in recent 
years tensions between China and its neighbors, as well as in U.S.-China relations, have 
been on the rise, especially over maritime issues, such as freedom of the seas, territorial 
claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and U.S. military operations in the 
airspace and waters near China. The United States and others in the region must care-
fully calibrate their actions and policies with regard to these issues—at times even coor-
dination would be advisable—in order to encourage continued constructive approaches 
from Beijing and to avoid inciting an assertive backlash or other potentially destabilizing 
and dangerous reaction. This will not be an easy balance and ensures that underlying 
tension in the region will remain a factor constraining an even more constructive Beijing 
on issues of concern in East Asia and beyond.
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These constraints—in spite of positive advances in China’s new security diplomacy over 
the past ten to fifteen years—will have implications for China’s willingness and ability to 
meet rising international expectations that it should make a more constructive contri-
bution to a range of nontraditional security challenges at the regional and global levels. 
Failure to close the expectations gap could not only increase tension between China and 
Western powers but further weaken the international community’s ability to tackle a 
host of big problems: righting the global fiscal imbalance and achieving global economic 
recovery, mitigating climate change, ensuring development in the global South, address-
ing proliferation concerns in Iran and North Korea, resolving ongoing and looming 
regional conflicts (such as in Afghanistan), combating the spread of infectious diseases, 
tackling organized crime and illicit trafficking networks, and averting the fallout from 
weakening states like Yemen, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Accordingly, China’s major international partners, including the United States, should 
have realistic expectations about Beijing’s willingness and ability to be even more flexible 
and proactive in its foreign and security policy. Also, China’s international partners will 
need to invest far more time and resources in understanding and interpreting Chinese 
domestic pressures, internal politics, and foreign-policy decision making. Debates and 
differing points of view are far more prominent and accessible in China today than in 
the past. Chinese leader Hu Jintao’s 2009 emendation of Deng’s original twenty-four-
character slogan—Hu calls for an effort to try “more actively” to make contributions on 
the international scene—probably signals a recognition of the international community’s 
growing expectations of China and is worth further exploration and elaboration. 
In focusing on nontraditional security issues in official discussions with Beijing, Wash-
ington can accomplish three important goals. First, it can expand areas of common 
ground with Beijing and enlist Chinese assistance in combating regional and global 
challenges. Second, to the degree that Beijing addresses transnational threats emanating 
from within its own borders and seeks Washington’s assistance in doing so, American 
and Chinese interests will benefit. Third, a focus on transnational challenges helps foster 
a broader, more internationalist, and more interdependent perspective in Chinese lead-
ership circles, which in turn may constrain future unilateralist or nationalist tendencies 
as China grows stronger.
Overall, there lies a great deal of unexplored common ground between the United States 
and China on matters of nontraditional security. Given the fundamental motivations 
that will likely continue to drive China’s security diplomacy and the increasing impor-
tance of nontraditional security challenges to the interests of China and the United 
States, it is reasonable to be cautiously optimistic that the two countries will devote 
greater resources to addressing jointly the transnational security problems they face. 
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Notes
The study of nontraditional security (NTS) threats has become trendy in China in recent years. To the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) this study is closely linked 
with another concept, military operations other than war (MOOTW), a concept that 
was once popular in U.S. military research but that was dropped in 2006.1 Indeed, PLA 
efforts to cope with NTS threats are closely linked to the use of military forces in non-
combat missions. In 2008, the General Staff Department set major categories of opera-
tions against NTS threats, in which eleven scenarios of action were envisaged. Almost all 
of them are designed to meet the challenge of NTS threats. International humanitarian 
assistance (IHA) operations are ranked highly among the General Staff Department’s 
priorities. The categories of actions are operations related to emergency rescue, closing 
borders and suppressing border riots, counterterrorism, putting down domestic turmoil, 
engaging in international peacemaking, safeguarding China’s maritime interests, and 
securing sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for Chinese commercial shipping. Today 
such operations are fully integrated into the “preparation for military struggle” of the 
PLA Navy (PLAN).2 
On the other hand, although NTS threats—such as terrorism, natural disasters, and the 
structural shortfall of energy supplies, to name a few—have become routine for China, it 
is still the traditional security threats that preoccupy the minds of CCP and PLA leaders. 
Yet under a relatively benign assessment of China’s overall external environment, Hu 
Jintao has ordered the PLA to strike a dialectical balance between actions against tradi-
tional and those against nontraditional threats, based on his call for the PLA to carry out 
multiple new missions in dealing with multiple security threats.3 This has motivated the 
PLA to study and build capabilities enthusiastically to counter NTS threats. 
The PLA Navy has factored NTS challenges into its planning for its overall transforma-
tion (整体转型) by adjusting its maritime strategy for the third time since 1987. It made 
significant revisions to meet the increased demand to secure China’s strategic sea-lanes. 
Now, an open-ended range of economic interests prompts the PLAN to carry out a wider 
range of missions in an unlimited geographic setting.4 Clearly PLAN transformation 
is still empowered by the “point” scenario (Taiwan). However, the most likely Chinese 
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naval actions will for the foreseeable future be against NTS threats. Therefore, the PLA’s 
efforts to enhance capabilities against NTS threats have been structured into its overall, 
capability-based transformation aimed at deterring conflict with major powers. Prepara-
tion for MOOTW is thus embedded in the PLA’s preparation for real war, and this pro-
vides new dimensions for PLA modernization. The PLA Navy’s Somalia counterpiracy 
operations are a good case study through which to analyze PLAN practices in dealing 
with NTS threats. The central question is how capabilities against both traditional and 
NTS threats are integrated under the guidance of war preparation for the decades ahead.
The PLA Navy’s Multiple New Missions
Naval NTS operations are fundamentally externally oriented, whether for the purposes 
of humanitarian aid or for securing China’s development interests. This is in contrast 
with other military services, whose NTS operations are largely for maintaining domestic 
political and social stability. Therefore, the PLAN takes China’s MOOTW from land to 
sea with the following characteristics: fast to act, extending over long distances, having 
institutionalized operational procedures and force organization, and association with 
relevant civil sectors and other PLA services. China’s capability to conduct overseas IHA 
operations is limited, and Beijing’s low-profile diplomacy often proscribes PLA partici-
pation in these kinds of activities. PLAN IHA operations happen rarely. Therefore, the 
Gulf of Aden escort mission offered a good opportunity to catch up with the trend of 
A Chinese navy air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) deploys from the stern of a new amphibious 
assault ship during a recent deployment to the Gulf of Aden. Such advanced capabilities afford 
new opportunities for enhanced Chinese military roles in nontraditional security. LCACs, for 
example, are extremely useful for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
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major powers. To this end, the PLAN has created an emergency command structure, a 
set of regulations and plans (预案) to direct these operations, and a high-powered inte-
grated civil-military communication and transportation system.
MOOTW: The Naval Dimension. The PLAN’s overseas tasks are diversified, ranging 
from peacemaking to humanitarian assistance (HA), SLOC protection, law enforcement 
in disputed areas, and the safeguarding of rights in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
Therefore, China’s maritime operations against NTS threats are oriented more toward 
potential combat than NTS operations within the homeland and thus tend to be more 
sensitive. The line between MOOTW and genuine combat action is sometimes narrow. 
As a result, the navy’s effort toward MOOTW readiness is more closely tied to its overall 
war preparation. In answering Hu’s declaration that “MOOTW has a special function 
in improving the PLA’s war preparation and fighting capabilities,” the navy is using 
MOOTW as a touchstone to evaluate its overall combat readiness.5
According to Vice Adm. Tian Zhong (田中), commander of the North Sea Fleet, naval 
NTS operations are designed to protect China’s maritime interests, which can be clus-
tered in three categories: core interests (sovereignty related, such as Taiwan); important 
interests (SLOC-safety related, such as oil transportation); and ordinary interests (such 
as maritime IHA). Functionally, naval NTS can be confrontational, especially against 
hostile encroachment of China’s sovereignty. Such actions can be carried out through 
operations demonstrating Chinese naval presence, including maritime or aerial patrols 
and monitoring, tailing, and expelling vessels. The objective of these operations can 
be to test the adversary’s bottom line, express China’s security concerns, or display the 
navy’s resolve. In a way, this is preventive military diplomacy, employing a relatively low 
level of “hard power.” The next level of naval confrontation, short of armed conflict, is 
maritime deterrence, which is concretely embodied in such actions as purpose-specific 
naval exercises and targeted weapons tests. These naval activities are of a confrontational 
nature but are still short of war and are mounted against a political background that 
aims to generate heavy military pressure against hostile elements. In carrying out these 
actions it is important that the navy be firmly determined but also skillful in avoiding 
unwanted escalation. The PLAN should dare to show strength while at the same time 
exercising total process control.6
Additionally, the PLAN considers naval MOOTW to have specific features: geographic 
open-endedness that embraces the global reach of China’s merchant ships; routinized 
operations (常态化), rather than one-off, or ad hoc, missions; close connection to the 
country’s foreign-policy strategies and diplomatic needs; international cooperation (such 
as IHA operations with other naval powers); legitimization by proper international and 
domestic authorization; and selectivity, with careful cost-benefit evaluation based on the 
mission’s value, material constraints, and possible global and domestic backlash. This is 
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an incomplete list of guiding principles that any naval NTS operations would consider. 
As a novice in the MOOTW business, the PLAN has a lot more to learn before it can 
become a mature player.7 
Enriching the PLAN’s Maritime Strategy. The PLAN’s unexpected participation in anti-
piracy and other NTS initiatives has enriched its maritime strategy. Adm. Liu Huaqing’s 
1987 blue-water maritime strategy aimed to make the PLAN a powerful regional navy.8 
To a certain extent, NTS threats to China’s economic security have created new dimen-
sions in the navy’s strategic formulation, directing its geographic attention toward other 
oceans—for example, the Indian Ocean—twenty years earlier than originally thought. 
Necessary adjustments to Liu’s original vision have been in order. These operations 
marked the beginning of a new approach for the PLAN, an approach that required it to 
undertake multiple missions to meet multiple threats. To this end the navy articulated 
a new conceptual goal, namely, to attain the capabilities of a regional navy. The expan-
sion of the PLAN’s mission set was driven by China’s new geopolitical and geoeconomic 
imperatives.9
This notion guides the nature of the PLAN’s transformation. It is strategic in several as-
pects. First, although the word “regional” refers geographically to China’s adjacent waters 
(the East and South China Seas), in naval operational terms it covers “all maritime areas 
[全海域] that have a key bearing on China’s national security and fall within the PLAN’s 
effective reach.”10 Hence this is a flexible notion, with a specific concern for SLOC safety. 
Second, MOOTW serves as the linkage between the navy’s long-term change and its 
immediate missions short of war. The idea of regional naval power no longer reflects 
simply a focus on combat capabilities vis-à-vis major naval adversaries. It deals also with 
NTS challenges, such as maritime terrorism and piracy. SLOC safety is thus integral to 
China’s concept of “sea rights” that are crucially important to Beijing’s emerging concept 
of sea power.11 The idea of sea rights does not have any geographic limit; it legitimizes 
the PLAN’s effort to achieve a degree of freedom of action in global waterways.12 Third, 
the geographic openness has broadened China’s priority of maritime defense, formerly 
understood as territorial defense. Now SLOC protection has gained great currency in the 
navy’s strategic thinking.13
The concept offers a new perspective from which to analyze China’s naval strategy. 
China’s maritime interests far exceed the PLAN’s geographic reach. Aside from the 
United States, the major powers confine their routine naval activities within regional 
settings in peacetime but are prepared if necessary to go anywhere to safeguard national 
interests. This offers a roadmap for China’s naval transformation.14 What it means is 
that the PLAN as a regional navy should have prescribed geographic limits for its usual 
activities but should possess sufficient power-projection capabilities to deal with hostile 
scenarios outside this geographic purview. Only with such capabilities can the PLAN 
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claim the status of a true blue-water navy.15 Therefore, naval capabilities are more impor-
tant than a theoretical depiction of the geographic areas within which a navy should be 
present. Logically the notion of regional naval power unifies concepts of time, space, and 
capability. In the case of the PLAN, this involves the phases of its naval development out 
to 2020 (time), China’s long sea-lanes (space), and the necessary hardware and software 
to achieve China’s maritime objectives (capabilities).
The probability that the PLAN will engage a major power in a traditional sea battle is 
low. Yet NTS operations may occur with high frequency. Most NTS actions overseas 
are linked to SLOC challenges, which until recently had not been adequately addressed. 
Traditionally, China’s anxiety concerning a major SLOC disruption was focused chiefly 
on the possibility of a naval blockade by major powers, with the probability of interdic-
tion in the final segment of the shipping lanes to China—the western Pacific.16 Today, 
however, threats mount in the early stage of shipment—such as the choke points in the 
Indian Ocean and beyond—and are often presented by nonstate actors. The PLAN’s 
decision to undertake the Gulf of Aden escort operations reflects its doctrinal adjust-
ment and the new requirement for force-structure developments to accommodate it. 
War preparation for the Taiwan scenario is significantly different from the protection of 
sea-lanes. For the former, amphibious capability is crucial; for the latter, forward pres-
ence and expeditionary fleets are essential. Combat doctrines, capability requirements, 
and weapons programs have to encompass both scenarios. While the former continues 
to enjoy priority, the PLAN has put more attention to and resources against SLOC chal-
lenges, which mainly take the form of NTS threats to China. These have led the navy 
into the deep oceans and helped it integrate its capability building, blue-water training, 
and increasing combat experience. 
The PLAN realizes that a military response to a traditional challenge to SLOC security is 
largely a nonoption. The PLAN has no countervailing power against the superpower if 
the latter mounts a standard SLOC blockade against it. Also, naval operations are not the 
best solution to maritime NTS threats by nonstate actors. Diplomacy and international 
cooperation are the most cost-effective ways to manage such challenges, and military 
protection of SLOCs is always a last resort in Beijing’s hierarchy of choices. Moreover, 
a major SLOC disaster is still a scenario more imagined than real, as long as the United 
States takes care of global SLOC security for itself and as long as its allies and littoral 
states cooperate in safeguarding regional waterways. China has benefited and continues 
to benefit from this multilateral mechanism.17 Under such circumstances, China’s SLOC 
strategy is two-pronged: seeking cooperation with the littoral states and accelerating 
naval building to acquire expeditionary capabilities. In the long term, the expedition-
ary fleets will be centered on aircraft carriers, but such capabilities will take a long time 
to become mature. Any immediate SLOC operations would fall to Chinese submarines, 
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which could mount reverse deterrence against the enemy’s maritime transport. The first 
is the main policy thrust and is being pursued proactively. The second is more of a hedg-
ing strategy, pursued in a low-key manner.18 
This is by nature a kind of interim strategy to deal with the fact that the PLAN has no 
credible escort capability in the deep oceans. The ultimate goal of the navy is to possess 
its own escort fleets to protect its SLOCs from the Indian Ocean into China’s domestic 
ports. Logically, Beijing hates to have Washington control its economic lifelines indefi-
nitely. Building powerful high-sea fleets is the only way to minimize China’s dependence 
on the United States for its SLOC security. Here, aircraft carriers are the symbol of the 
PLAN as a genuine blue-water navy. Yet the symbol is a symbol, not built for the pur-
pose of achieving operational effectiveness against the powerful U.S. Navy. Therefore, 
the PLAN is unlikely to build carrier groups beyond a minimum number. The political 
leadership has not even made a decision to construct another carrier.19 The PLAN will 
not enter an arms race with the U.S. Navy, but it will be firm in reducing American abso-
lute naval superiority through increasingly capable asymmetric weaponry.
IHA Operations, SLOC Security, and PLAN Transformation 
The PLA’s mission in the Gulf of Aden is the first combat expeditionary mission since 
Zheng He’s fleet sailed more than six hundred years ago.20 As of late 2011, nine Chinese 
missions have participated in the operations, and twenty-seven warships have been dis-
patched; they have escorted 316 groups of 3,681 commercial ships and prevented eighty 
piracy attempts.21 The response of other states to China’s signal of willing participation 
in international security operations has been positive.22
An Opportunity Too Valuable to Miss. The Chinese antipiracy mission clearly has many 
motives. The nature of the piracy threat to human lives may qualify the Gulf of Aden 
operations as an international humanitarian move, and the PLAN prefers to define it 
as such.23 But except for a few joint rescue exercises with foreign navies, the PLAN had 
never launched any true IHA operations, because of a lack of political will and a paucity 
of requisite capabilities. The navy does contribute to domestic HA and disaster-relief 
operations. For instance, in 2008 China conducted 1,784 maritime rescue operations, 
saving 19,595 lives, with a success rate of 97 percent.24 But although PLA vessels oc-
casionally picked up fishermen in the South and East China Seas during a storm, China’s 
near seas were the farthest at which the PLAN conducted these operations, and that only 
on an ad hoc basis. 
In the Gulf of Aden, the HA objective is not China’s top concern, even though the PLAN 
conducts its operations there sincerely. Moreover, this mission is not primarily a SLOC 
action, as the best the pirates can do would be no more than a slight disruption to the 
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navigation of a small number of merchant ships. The SLOCs there remain open, of 
course, despite the pirates’ harassment. The PLAN mission has been justified by some 
as a move to improve the country’s international image as a responsible global power. 
Yet the improvement may be only marginal, as piracy is not a major issue of concern for 
the majority of the world’s population, and China’s expeditions have generated instinc-
tive worry among China’s maritime neighbors. Indian concerns in particular may have 
somewhat offset any goodwill generated by Beijing’s contributions to global SLOC 
security in the Indian Ocean.25 
Therefore, what exactly motivated the PLA to mount such an expensive mission against 
a relatively minor threat? Clearly the PLAN’s objectives are not confined to escort activi-
ties alone, as indicated by its enormous gains from the operations. In fact, the PLAN 
long sought such an opportunity. Soon after the first pirate attack on Chinese ships in 
the Gulf of Aden in May 2008, strategists in the PLAN Academic Research Institute (海
军学术研究所) and the PLA National Defense University began discussing the feasi-
bility of an escort mission there. After the completion of various new ship designs, the 
PLAN could not wait to test its new “teeth.” A naval consensus on escort was discussed 
by Maj. Gen. Jin Yinan (金一南) in an interview broadcast in November 2008.26 The 
Central Military Commission (CMC) quickly approved the navy’s plan.27 In the mean-
time, Chinese diplomats worked frantically to acquire an invitation from the Somali 
government for the escort mission. Beijing announced on 20 December 2008, only four 
days after UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1851 was passed, that a three-ship 
detachment would be dispatched to the Gulf of Aden. The rapid decision process re-
flected the navy’s eagerness to grab this opportunity, with unprecedented CMC support.
What is interesting is the very short interval between Beijing’s announcement and the 
actual departure of the first task force ten days later. It is likely that preparation for the 
deployment predated the announcement, but it could not have begun too early, since 
the central decision was not made until late November 2008.28 The preparation—such as 
the selection of combatants, study of the relevant information about a vast and strange 
ocean, logistical arrangements, and liaison with littoral states en route—is by nature 
time-consuming. This short period between decision and action is visible proof of the 
progress the PLAN has made in its ability to undertake rapid mobilization, maintain 
routine combat readiness, and provide material and information support for emergency 
action.
A Capability-Enhancement Mission. The Gulf of Aden mission is highly valuable for the 
PLAN’s military transformation, given its lack of deepwater combat experience. Long-
range overseas visits by major PLAN combatants have averaged four a year, but none 
of these have been combat deployments to test battle readiness. Indeed, the PLAN has 
sought a proper opportunity to leverage its blue-water power for a long time.29 “Proper” 
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here means a situation in which the sailors, as newcomers on the high seas, would not be 
subject to excessively tough battle conditions but would face encounters close enough to 
real engagements that they could taste an atmosphere of war. Clearly, high-seas counter-
piracy operations were ideal as an “entry to the game.” 
Involving Personnel in a Combat Situation in the Deep Oceans. The PLAN has not been in 
a combat situation in the deep oceans since its last, small-scale clash with the Vietnam-
ese in the South China Sea in 1988. While the Somalia escort is basically a police patrol, 
the PLAN is well prepared should the action evolve into armed conflict with pirates.30 
Indeed, exchanges of fire have already occurred on numerous occasions. For instance, by 
the end of the first two years of the mission, the escort fleet had engaged pirates twenty-
one times with live fire and thereby saved thirty commercial ships.31 What is more valu-
able for the sailors is the fact that they have to be on twenty-four-hour alert for the better 
part of four months during each deployment. On many occasions, for instance, un-
known ships have suddenly appeared near the PLAN escorts, presenting a challenge to 
the sailors. Yang Wu (杨武), deputy head of the special operations unit embedded in the 
9th Subfleet, disclosed that his sailors were under a three-second firing-readiness order.32
Moreover, it is common for helicopters to have to take off urgently at night and under 
difficult weather conditions. Unlike other major powers that have trained their troops 
in conditions of actual warfare, the PLAN has had to do it in simulation and in non-
combat settings. The NTS mission in the Gulf of Aden tests the PLA’s readiness, not 
only through real antipiracy actions but more so through exposing human resources to 
near-combat situations. For instance, the hours and sorties of helicopter pilots in a four-
month rotation in the Gulf of Aden far exceed their whole year’s flight time at home. 
This is especially true when, because of their increased rapid-reaction capability, the he-
licopters are hurriedly sent to dangerous spots. In the first mission the sailors stayed on 
board for about four months without touching land and under rather tough conditions.33 
A Test of the Basic Composition of the Future Naval Task Group. Task forces of relatively 
small flotillas have been designated as the PLAN’s basic deep-sea campaign formation in 
future wars.34 These formations would be composed of a number of specialized war-
ships, such as area-air-defense vessels, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) warships, supply 
ships, and submarines, most likely nuclear powered. These formations will be centered 
on aircraft carriers when carriers become operationally available in a decade or so. The 
PLAN’s Somalia task group provides a basic form on which future expeditionary fleets 
can be organized. The first batch was an example. It consisted of Destroyers 169 and 171, 
as well as Replenishment Ship 887. Destroyer 169 is the flagship of the South Sea Fleet. It 
possesses the PLAN’s best command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and most effective ASW capabilities, 
and it is specialized for sea-control missions. Destroyer 171 is one of the two surface 
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combatants operating the Chinese analog to the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system. Replenish-
ment Ship 887 is the PLAN’s largest and newest logistical vessel (twenty-two thousand 
tons), designed for long-range supply. These constituted the core components for the 
task force. Such ships, when joined with a few additional specialized warships, such as 
ASW and air-defense frigates and nuclear attack submarines, could form a standard 
deep-ocean maritime battle group.
Military Diplomacy and Cooperation. The PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden have been 
in constant communication with other escort fleets, especially from Russia, the United 
States, NATO, and South Korea. They have thus gained good access to intelligence infor-
mation, telecommunications, and radar signals shared by advanced navies.35 This mul-
tilateral effort to safeguard the SLOCs helps the PLAN enhance international coordina-
tion and cooperation. Its regular contact, for instance, with Combined Task Force (CTF) 
151 provides an opportunity to continue bilateral ties temporarily suspended because 
of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. More practically, only through participation in interna-
tional NTS operations will the PLA become competent in helping to formulate the rules 
of the game in the global arena. Moreover, the exchange of ship visits provides PLAN 
frontline commanders rare opportunities to learn how other navies handle near-combat 
situations. Since December 2009 the escort fleet has conducted over a dozen joint naval 
exercises with other navies in the Gulf of Aden.36
Managing Battlefield Situations. The most valuable benefit for the PLAN is the constant 
combat tests the escort fleet receives in dealing with questionable approaches by foreign 
warships. Some of these are innocent enough, but many of them are ill intentioned. For 
instance, the Chinese fleet has been followed by “unidentified spy planes, surface ships, 
and submarines” throughout the journey from Chinese waters to the Gulf of Aden. 
These vessels try to pick up the PLAN’s communication signals, the pattern of coor-
dination between ships in the formation, and their contact-management behavior. In 
fact, to Chinese naval officers the escort mission itself can be viewed as quasi electronic 
warfare, ASW warfare, and air-defense warfare. For instance, the PLAN fleet engages 
approaching contacts with its advance indication and warning (IW) systems to gather 
signals information. Such engagement is valuable in that it is “real combat,” with which 
no confrontation between “Red” and “Blue” forces in an internal exercise can compare. 
It is “war without smoke,” as it is called.37 Moreover, the combat readiness of participat-
ing warships has been enhanced by the unprecedented challenge of long-range logistical 
supply, real-time C4ISR connection with PLAN headquarters in Beijing, and combat 
situations against hostile opponents. In short, the PLAN has benefited greatly from 
participation in the international efforts against the pirates.
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Future Capability Building for NTS Operations
IHA and other forms of NTS operations have required a new, additional focus for the 
PLAN’s weapons-development programs. Weak HA capability has been a “short board in 
the bucket.” Although the Taiwan scenario still tops PLAN action plans, NTS operations 
like those in the Gulf of Aden may be the navy’s primary concern at particular points 
in time and require specific, strengthened capabilities for IHA to cater to its immedi-
ate hardware and software demands.38 This mission-led weapons development adds a 
new dimension to the PLAN’s overall capability-led transformation and helps to fill in 
blanks in the naval arsenal. The following are selected key items in the navy’s capability-
enhancement efforts for future NTS missions.
Enhanced C4ISR Architecture. Currently the PLA and the navy do not have specialized 
command-and-control centers for NTS missions.39 The navy’s Gulf of Aden command 
model is typically the traditional one for a standard, limited, maritime regional war, a 
model that follows the naval headquarters–special detachment format.40 For instance, 
both the CMC and naval headquarters have representatives in the forward command 
team of the escort fleet. This command model is appropriate for strategic operations, but 
as the Somalia mission is basically tactical and has become routine, a question has been 
raised as to whether it is necessary to place it under such centralized control. Clearly, 
once the rules of engagement are set, the commander of the escort mission could assume 
most responsibilities. This would improve command efficiency.
Enhancing C4ISR capability continues to enjoy priority as a development goal as the 
PLAN expands its global reach. But the Gulf of Aden mission is actually leading the way. 
The warships participating in the PLAN’s Somalia operations are all capable of real-time 
vertical and horizontal communications—that is, with headquarters and among them-
selves—a key criterion for their selection for the mission. Also, the two-layer command 
chain—naval headquarters and the escort fleet—enables the ships to be on twenty-four-
hour combat duty, with a seamless communications network in full readiness.41 This sets 
the direction of technological advancement for the navy’s future C4ISR improvement. 
For instance, the on-board satellite-based communications facilities will be integrated 
with the Chinese Beidou GPS. Data-link systems will be constantly upgraded in order 
to quicken the pace of reaction, improve IW in combat situations, and broaden the 
connectivity of hardware and software equipment. The goal is to make expeditionary 
warships capable of network-centric warfare against both traditional security threats and 
NTS challenges.
New Platforms for NTS Operations. As NTS operations are a relatively new task for the 
PLAN, the weapons-development programs have only recently factored in mission- 
specific requirements. The major surface combatants that have so far been deployed 
not congruent but quite complementary 37
are, in a way, unnecessarily sophisticated for antipiracy missions and less than opti-
mally effective for IHA. Rear Adm. Du Jingcheng (杜景臣), the commander of the first 
squadron, reported to the naval headquarters after returning home that the functional 
range of the weapons on board Destroyers 171 and 169 had been too narrow, poorly 
matching the needs of antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This revealed a large 
gap in the navy’s inventory for multiple tasks.42 Moreover, the large ships’ operational 
cost was too high. Many of their facilities were fragile and not of much use, representing 
an enormous waste of resources. Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo (尹卓) raised the idea of building 
simplified Type 054 frigates to cater to IHA and antipiracy operations. These frigates 
would have a smaller displacement of three thousand tons, fewer weapons systems—
such as missiles—and enhanced special equipment for HA and other NTS tasks. In 
order to cut cost, their construction standards could be set as half military, half civilian.43 
Yin’s suggestion is in line with the PLA’s new armament requirement for MOOTW. The 
importance of a dedicated inventory lies in the fact that NTS threats, such as Somali or 
Malaccan piracy, are long lasting. Cheaper warships may relieve the top-tier destroyers 
so the latter can concentrate on more traditional combat missions. Currently, most of the 
escorting ships in the mission are Type 054 frigates.
China has been especially weak in IHA capabilities, but this is now changing. One il-
lustrative example concerns the PLAN’s nonparticipation in the Southeast Asia tsunami 
rescue effort in December 2004, when its Type 886 hospital ship, the largest one in the 
world, and Type 071 amphibious ship (an LHA, twenty thousand tons) were both still 
under construction. Today the PLAN can undertake the IHA mission with much more 
confidence. Nonetheless, the PLA will remain selective in undertaking IHA, because of 
its high cost and China’s diplomatic sensibilities. After all its major surface combatants 
have rotated through the mission and once its escorting ships have stayed for a decent 
period in the Gulf of Aden, it might be time for the PLAN to seek an “exit.” Instead, 
deploying the hospital ship for IHA missions could be a low-budget move that achieves 
a solid humanitarian effect. It would also extend China’s soft-power influence to a region 
that is sensitive about China’s military activities. The two voyages of Hospital Ship 886, 
to Somalia and to Latin America, reflected this strategic calculus. Hospital Ship 886 is 
the flagship of a subfleet for emergent medical services. Its entry into service is seen  
as a major breakthrough in the PLAN’s medical-support capability for blue-water  
operations.44
One alternative would be to turn an amphibious assault ship into a rescue platform in 
time of crisis. Yet, at the moment, the PLAN does not have a sufficient number of ocean-
going amphibious ships. The Type 071 has filled a gap, but the navy needs at least a 
squadron of them to meet minimum requirements. The acquisition of large amphibious 
ships and helicopter carriers by the Japanese and the Koreans has stimulated the PLAN 
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to seek similar capabilities that are good not only for expeditionary purposes but also 
for IHA missions. It can be expected that the navy’s new phase of surface shipbuilding 
would make it a major task to construct up to five Type 071s and possibly three Type 081 
LPHs as well.45
Seeking Forward Presence for Logistical Supply. The routinized Gulf of Aden operations 
exposed a serious weakness in the PLAN’s blue-water expeditionary capabilities—the 
lack of forward presence for logistics. The crews of the first detachment never had a 
chance to rest on land during their four-month mission. Although the navy started to 
arrange port visits beginning with the second group, the sailors are permitted only one 
rest period on land. European sailors are allowed breaks on shore after just fifteen days 
at sea. This situation continues to stretch the physical endurance of PLAN sailors to the 
extreme. Moreover, the current mode of having a supply ship accompany the warships is 
much more expensive than port calls, and the PLA has only three large supply ships ca-
pable of sustained deep-ocean missions. This is why the replenishment ships Weishanhu 
and Qiandaohu have to accompany the flotillas repeatedly. That Japan acquired a base in 
Djibouti rekindled PLAN discussion about the desirability of having a forward foothold 
near Somalia.46 Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo’s remarks on the need for a forward base caused a 
stir among international defense analysts but were dismissed by the Ministry of Defense 
as unlikely.47 Yet, interestingly, Yin seems to have received overwhelming public support.
Today, PLAN Gulf of Aden operations have become routinized, but logistical arrange-
ments remain ad hoc. There is a mental gap in the minds of leaders between the foreign-
policy need to convince the world that China’s Gulf of Aden mission is not a step toward 
expansionism and a naval operational requirement for effective logistical support. The 
current solution requires Chinese sailors to pay a physical price for the mission. Rear 
Admiral Yin’s thoughts reflect an emerging naval consensus that a more sensible logisti-
cal arrangement has to be found for the escort fleet. Col. Wu Fan made a good point 
in regard to the policy conservatism with regard to PLAN port visits. The argument 
against frequent port visits was based on a concern about possible negative responses 
from locals. However, the PLAN later discovered that the locals actually welcomed the 
Chinese sailors.48 It is likely that some arrangements along this line will be made for the 
PLAN and that this will serve as a pattern for future Chinese IHA missions, especially 
those that last for lengthy periods. The question now is basically about the right timing 
to try this approach.49
Conclusion
NTS operations will be a permanent feature of the PLA’s transformation. The Chinese 
navy’s IHA operations will enjoy temporary emphasis, as is seen in the Gulf of Aden 
escort missions, and the Chinese fleet may even stay in the Gulf of Aden for a long time, 
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In recent years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become increasingly con-cerned with nontraditional security threats. Not surprisingly, greater focus on nontra-
ditional security by China’s political leaders has been followed by growing attention to 
this category of threats by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). What is driving 
Beijing’s interest in so-called nontraditional security challenges, and what has this meant 
for the PLA? What is the significance of this turn to nontraditional security for the PLA? 
What does it mean for the United States?
Before beginning an analysis of what is driving China’s turn toward nontraditional 
security challenges, it is important to try to pin down exactly what Chinese political 
and military leaders mean by “nontraditional security.” There seems to be no readily 
available single formal or widely accepted Chinese-government or PLA definition of 
nontraditional security.1 Different academic and official publications give examples of 
what constitutes nontraditional security threats (非传统安全威胁) or nontraditional 
security issues (非传统安全问题). According to the 2008 defense white paper, nontra-
ditional security threats include terrorism, natural disasters, economic insecurity, and 
information insecurity. Interestingly, “separatist forces” are particularly singled out as 
significant “threats to China’s unity and security.” For China, separatism is synonymous 
with terrorism and extremism—the three are grouped together and are dubbed “the 
three evils.”2 Separatism is identified in the sentence immediately prior to this laundry 
list of nontraditional security threats in the 2008 defense white paper.3 Previous white 
papers discussed nontraditional security challenges. The term “nontraditional security” 
was first used in the 2002 iteration; the threats mentioned in the document were terror-
ism, transnational crime, environmental degradation, and drug trafficking. The 2004 
iteration added the following nontraditional issues: “energy security, financial security, 
and epidemic diseases.” Other analysts have included other threats such as piracy, prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal immigration, and transnational 
crime, as well as “Internet hacking, the shortage of water resources, fishery conflicts, 
[and even] traffic congestion.”4 The 2011 triple Japanese tragedy of an earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear meltdown only served to highlight the potential for such nontradi-
tional security threats on Chinese soil.
Andrew Scobell and Gregory Stevenson
The PLA (Re-)Discovers Nontraditional Security C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 F
O
U
R
42 china maritime studies
While there is no common definition, there are at least four key characteristics of 
nontraditional security that most Chinese scholars, analysts, and strategists agree on. 
First, nontraditional security threats are transnational in scope, with both domestic 
and international components; as a result, the “line between internal and external is 
blurred.”5 Second, Chinese researchers consider nontraditional security threats to be 
extremely volatile and unpredictable; Beijing is especially unnerved by them.6 Third, 
nontraditional security challenges are “nonmilitary threats”; indeed, they “go beyond 
the military sphere” and manifest themselves in political, economic, or social domains.7 
Fourth, nontraditional security threats are often “interwoven and interactive [交织互动] 
with traditional security threats.”8
Back to the Future?
In a sense this attention to nontraditional military missions represents a return to the 
PLA’s traditions of functioning as more than just a fighting force. It was Mao who ad-
monished the soldiers of the worker and peasant army to be more than just war fighters. 
In addition to preparing to wage armed struggle, they were charged with being economi-
cally and educationally productive, as well as with pitching in to assist whenever and 
wherever they were needed. According to military writer Song Puxuan, “For a long time 
now, we have only been accustomed to taking nonwar military action as something we 
should do as our duty and for no reward, as a means of dealing with special situations, 
and as a friendly means of participation, and . . . [have not] resolved to bring it into the 
domain of skills. [Moreover], theoretical research [in nonwar military action] is rela-
tively lagging, and in some aspects is ‘blank.’”9 
In the twenty-first century, three main roles have been identified for the PLA. First and 
foremost, the primary function of China’s military is war fighting. This entails being 
ready for combat operations. Since 2002 the main war-fighting scenario for the PLA has 
been identified as “local war in conditions of informatization” (see the figure). 
In fact, this is an extremely generic scenario that encompasses a wide variety of contin-
gencies, including almost any specific scenario less than all-out war—in other words, any 
conflict requiring less than full national military mobilization. “Informatization” (信息
化) is used to mean leveraging new technology in a number of ways: building networked 
Evolution of PLA Doctrine
2002 Local War in Conditions of Informatization introduced, and nontraditional security concept highlighted
2004 New Historic Missions identified
2006  Diversified Military Tasks outlined
2008  Military operations other than war articulated
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command-information systems, joint operations command-and-control systems, battle-
field information support, and logistical and equipment-support information systems. 
The second function of China’s military is deterrence. In contemporary Chinese strategic 
thought, making good on the PLA’s deterrent function encompasses a wide variety of 
activities, including rhetoric and action.10 The third function is to perform “diversi-
fied military tasks” (多样化军事任务). This third function, in its current formulation, 
is relatively new and was only explicitly identified in 2006. The Diversified Military 
Tasks are a clarification of the New Historic Missions outlined by President Hu Jintao 
in December 2004. However, the prefix “new” is really a misnomer, because none of 
these missions are really new for the PLA.11 The New Historic Missions are an important 
restatement of existing missions. The PLA has always had the missions of defending the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and supporting economic development. 
The 2008 defense white paper states that the Diversified Military Tasks have the New 
Historic Missions as their “focus,” with Local War in Conditions of Informatization as 
the “core.” The New Historic Missions charge the PLA with maintaining “maritime, 
space and electromagnetic space security”—representing a significant expansion of 
military responsibilities—as well as conducting military operations other than war 
(MOOTW). The phrasing clearly establishes a hierarchy of importance about these  
duties.
Drivers
There are a number of drivers behind this growing attention to nontraditional security 
concerns. The primary impetus comes from CCP leaders. Fundamentally, this atten-
tion is motivated by the insecurity of China’s ruling elite, driven by fears regarding the 
natures and scopes of the most dangerous threats to their security. At the same time, 
China’s leaders are looking to cement ties between the party and army, and Beijing is 
determined to promote a positive and benign image internationally. 
First, Beijing’s embrace of globalization since the late 1990s has heightened alarm over 
the serious challenges that globalization poses to China as a country and to CCP rule. 
According to one scholar, “Since the 1990s, China has been frequently hit by nontra-
ditional security threats.” While such threats “are not new for China,” their magnitude 
and severity “have remarkably increased thanks to globalization and liberalization.”12 
While traditional security threats have diminished or at least become less urgent in the 
eyes of Chinese leaders, nontraditional security threats loom larger and more pressing. 
According to Gen. Xiong Guangkai, such twenty-first-century events as 9/11, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and the Southeast Asian tsunami underscore that 
“nontraditional security threats are becoming ever more prominent.”13 The heightened 
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awareness of nontraditional security threats coincided with the publication in 1999 of 
the controversial book Unrestricted Warfare. Perhaps, rather underscoring the worri-
some threat of a rising China, the book is better understood as highlighting concerns 
among many Chinese over their own country’s increasing vulnerability to nontraditional 
security threats.14 
Beijing is fearful of globalization, although it has concluded that China has no choice 
but to embrace it if the country is to perpetuate the economic boom and continue its 
great-power rise. A series of systemic shocks in the late 1990s—the Asian financial crisis, 
the audacious protest by Falun Gong followers outside the inner sanctum of the CCP 
in Beijing, the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, American 
reluctance to support swift Chinese admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and the inflammatory rhetoric of Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui—forced Beijing to 
reassess its strategy and priorities. But in the end, CCP leaders decided that retreat was 
not an option.15 As a result the PRC security establishment, including the armed forces, 
was directed to deal with a wide array of nontraditional security threats both at home 
and abroad.
Second, the attention to nontraditional security missions is an important means by 
which to stress the links between the CCP and the PLA. The army belongs to the party. 
Beyond this effort is an ongoing effort to conflate the party and the state.16 A close look 
at the New Historic Missions reveals that this is so. The army’s most important mis-
sion is to defend the party. Attention to nontraditional security missions is a key way to 
highlight the traditional bond between the CCP and the PLA. Moreover, attention to 
nontraditional security missions highlights the PLA’s central role in China’s “peaceful 
development,” with both key internal and external dimensions. The PLA’s missions go 
beyond defending China’s sovereignty with armed force if necessary. The PLA is also a 
force for good—helping Chinese people recover from natural disasters and promoting 
the cause of world peace, wearing the blue helmets of the United Nations. Through these 
efforts, Beijing strengthens the centrality of the PLA and the supreme authority of the 
CCP within the nation and the state.
Third, the focus on nontraditional security missions is packaged in such a way as to 
make it part and parcel of Hu Jintao’s personal contribution to military doctrine. The 
New Historic Missions were formally announced by Hu in December 2004 in an address 
to the Central Military Commission.17 Each successive paramount Chinese political 
leader is expected to make a noteworthy contribution to strategic thought. Hu Jintao is 
now associated with the New Historic Missions and “scientific development.”
Fourth, the attention to nontraditional security missions is part of a larger Beijing effort 
to stress that other countries do not need to fear China’s growing military power. This 
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is a concerted public-relations campaign to focus on noncombat missions and promote 
them as areas for cooperation. PLA attention to nontraditional security threats has been 
emphasized to foreign audiences. For example, during Gen. Xu Caihou’s visit to the 
United States in October 2009 he repeatedly emphasized the nontraditional security 
challenges that have confronted the PLA in recent years. He particularly emphasized the 
military’s efforts in dealing with domestic challenges, including humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief in responding to the May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province.18 
The PLA’s Response to Nontraditional Security Challenges 
Transnational challenges since the late 1990s have heightened Beijing’s concern over 
nontraditional security threats. Ultimately, the response of China’s armed forces has 
been to incorporate nontraditional security challenges into doctrine under the rubric of 
MOOTW.
Placing the PLA at the forefront of countering nontraditional security threats is a way 
to provide impetus for military modernization in peacetime. Moreover, the absence 
of an imminent threat of armed conflict lessens Beijing’s sense of urgency driving the 
double-digit annual growth in defense spending. However, an unprecedented period 
of sustained prosperity in post-1949 China means that there are substantial party-state 
resources available for military modernization.
Especially with the improvement in relations across the Taiwan Strait since the election 
of Kuomintang presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008, the likelihood of a 
Chinese capabilities for expeditionary military operations are rapidly increasing, as suggested by 
this aerial deployment of an armored personnel vehicle. This advance in capabilities will serve 
international security, especially if the PLA continues its new focus on nontraditional security 
and begins to operate more closely with other militaries, including that of the United States.
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confrontation between Beijing and Taipei has diminished considerably. If the PLA can 
demonstrate its usefulness and value to the party, the people, and the nation in times 
of peace, that is strong justification for continued defense outlays. Since savvy military 
leaders know the mantra “Policy is what gets funded,” support of policy is merely smart 
politics. As a result there has been a noticeable trend in hyping by soldiers from various 
services the important roles their particular branches play in nontraditional security 
missions.
Within the PLA the attention to nontraditional missions has been met with mixed feel-
ings, varying according to the particular constituency. Among many in the military’s 
higher echelons there is a feeling that China is unlikely to face a war in the near term.19 
With this assessment comes a willingness to focus attention on non-war-fighting mis-
sions. The caveat, of course, is that war fighting should not be ignored and that nontra-
ditional security missions should not detract from the PLA’s combat readiness. 
In addition, the focus on nontraditional security threats and the PLA’s efforts to address 
them are seen as excellent ways to refute the “China threat theory.” Beijing is unhappy 
with fears voiced abroad that its growing military power poses a threat to its neighbors 
and other countries. Chinese leaders recognize that their country confronts a significant 
public-relations problem where military modernization is concerned, although it is very 
rarely explicitly or bluntly addressed. Adm. Tian Zhong, concurrently commander of 
the Northern Fleet and deputy commander of the Jinan Military Region, alludes to this 
problem in a 2008 article in a prominent Chinese military journal. The objective of the 
PLA Navy, Tian writes, is not solely to enhance its operational capabilities but also to 
serve a soft-power function: “The navy must strengthen its management of weaponry, 
display our country’s ability in operations to defy the might of other navies, and display 
the image of a peaceful rise and the image of a mighty and civilized military.”20 
Moreover, the recent visible attention to MOOTW appears largely targeted at foreign 
audiences. One illustration of this is that the MOOTW acronym is prominently dis-
played, along with a peace symbol, on the English-language web page of the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND), while neither the English acronym nor 非战争军事行动 is 
used on the Chinese-language page. The MND’s Chinese-language website simply uses 
the term 军事行动 (military operations).21
Additionally, some in the PLA may view military efforts aimed at nontraditional security 
threats as a way to acquire useful operational experience in absence of war. Of course, 
MOOTW cannot simulate combat operations, but they can nevertheless provide valu-
able training opportunities at a time when actual war-fighting experience is not possible. 
The U.S. armed forces are able to capitalize on the Long War and on ongoing and recent 
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to gain valuable operational experience. 
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Operations in peacetime are no substitute, but some missions can offer significant real-
world experience beyond mere training exercises. For the ground forces, participation in 
multinational peacekeeping operations in trouble spots around the world has proved im-
mensely educational. For the PLA Navy, the antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden since 
late 2008 has provided a wealth of operational experience for Chinese mariners and has 
forced the PLA Navy to confront the challenges of projecting and sustaining naval power 
thousands of miles from the flotilla’s home port.
Some analysts may downplay the significance of the operational experience gained 
by the PLA in dealing with nontraditional security threats. In the post–Cold War era, 
American military personnel have frequently been dismissive of the value that MOOTW 
experience provides to military units. This thinking, while certainly present within the 
PLA leadership, appears much less entrenched than it is among the leaders of the U.S. 
armed forces.22 This is because Chinese soldiers, sailors, and airmen have not had any 
significant combat experience in decades. 
In lieu of firsthand war-fighting experience, the PLA closely watches the combat opera-
tions of other armed forces. U.S. military capabilities in C4ISR are what Chinese soldiers 
aspire to and have been seeking to acquire. But the PLA has had no opportunity to test 
its evolving infrastructure and networks or to develop doctrine in order to integrate 
these systems in actual wartime operations. 
The closest approximation to this kind of experience for the PLA is MOOTW. Thus, this 
experience is far more valuable for Chinese military personnel than it would be for their 
American counterparts. The PLA can make relatively larger gains from such experience 
than the American military might; more importantly, an increase in MOOTW may give 
the PLA experience more closely approximating that of its regional counterparts, such as 
the armed forces of Japan, South Korea, and India. The PLA has dealt with the daunt-
ing challenges of moving forces in adverse weather conditions when normal modes of 
transportation are unavailable or have been disrupted (e.g., the 2008 Wenchuan earth-
quake and snow emergency), supporting naval flotillas as far afield as the Gulf of Aden, 
and gaining experience, as PLA units conduct peacekeeping operations in such foreign 
climes as Africa. 
The navy is perhaps better poised than the PLA air or ground forces to surge ahead 
on the crest of the nontraditional-security wave. Twenty-first-century concerns about 
piracy, terrorism, and threats to energy security and trade seem to favor a greater role 
for maritime forces. In fact, the PLA Navy seems to be the service branch most enthu-
siastic about MOOTW and best positioned and organized to exploit the concept for 
service interests. The navy has sought to highlight the central contribution that sea 
power can make in countering the multiple nontraditional security threats confronting 
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China. Admiral Tian began his 2008 article with the following lead-in: “The 17th Party 
Congress Report states: ‘Raise military capabilities to deal with many different security 
threats, and accomplish diversified military tasks’; [moreover, the report] emphasizes in 
international relations managing ‘mutual trust, strengthening cooperation, strengthen-
ing peaceful means but not war methods to solve international disputes.’ The Navy can 
conduct strategic, comprehensive, and international military duties in vast maritime 
expanses to perform the New Historic Missions.” Tian touted the “special characteristics” 
of the naval dimensions of MOOTW and the capabilities required.23
Moreover, the PLA Navy is stressing the importance and relevance of naval moderniza-
tion to enhancing its ability to manage China’s nontraditional security threats. Rear 
Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, recently told the 
Xinhua News Agency, “With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy 
wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major 
sea lanes. In order to achieve this, the Chinese navy needs to develop along the lines of 
bigger vessels with more comprehensive capabilities.”24 
Implications for the United States
For the United States, China’s heightened interest in and concern about nontraditional 
security threats provide valuable opportunities for expanding military-to-military 
cooperation. There has already been cooperation in such areas as search-and-rescue 
exercises, but there is still enormous untapped potential. This engagement will allow 
each side to learn more about the other and build basic but important levels of mutual 
understanding, confidence, and trust. However, while the successful U.S. operation to 
neutralize Osama Bin Laden carried out in Pakistan in mid-2011 might appear a prom-
ising entrée into enhancing counterterrorism cooperation between the United States 
and China, this is not necessarily so. The operation was very impressive in Chinese eyes, 
but it also highlighted the capabilities of the U.S. military to undertake a similar opera-
tion inside any country in the world, including China. For China’s civilian and military 
leaders, the operation itself and what appeared to be complete American disregard for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another country were actually quite alarming 
and disconcerting. Meanwhile, in the United States, the China angle of the Bin Laden 
operation focused on reports that China had been permitted by Pakistan to examine the 
stealth technology of the U.S. helicopter that had had to be abandoned at the scene.25 
Additionally, monitoring PLA initiatives and operations dealing with a host of nontra-
ditional security challenges offers key opportunities to learn about evolving operational 
capabilities. 
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Notes
Conclusion
The PLA has rediscovered its tradition of nontraditional security missions. Nontradi-
tional security threats have loomed larger than traditional ones during the past decade. 
At least since the 1990s, the CCP leadership has decided it has no choice but to embrace 
globalization. The PLA has been grappling, particularly since the mid-2000s, with the 
task of finding an appropriate response. In wrestling with MOOTW, Chinese soldiers 
have pondered in very concrete terms the roles that the military can realistically play 
in countering nontraditional security challenges. The CCP, meanwhile, has used this 
element domestically to stress the sacred link between the party and the army and, exter-
nally, to emphasize China’s peaceful rise and the PLA’s role as a cooperative force for 
good in the world.
50 china maritime studies
20.  田中 [Tian Zhong], “海军非战争军事行动的特
点、类型及能力建设” [Special Characteristics, 
Categories, Capabilities of Naval Military Opera-
tions Other than War], 中国军事科学 [China 
Military Science], no. 3 (2008), p. 26 [emphasis 
supplied].
21.  See www.mod.gov.cn, website of the Ministry of 
National Defense. 
22.  See Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D.”
23.  Tian, “Special Characteristics, Categories, Capa-
bilities of Naval Military Operations Other than 
War,” p. 25.
24.  Quoted in Edward Wong, “Chinese Military 
Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” New York 
Times, 24 April 2010, p. A3.
25.  On the Chinese reaction to the U.S. operation, 
see, for example, Pan Guoping, “US Action 
Violates International Law,” China Daily, 19 May 
2011, online in English, transmitted by Open 
Source Center, CPP20110519968043.
Since 1990, China has been taking part in UN peacekeeping operations with its noncombat military forces and civilian police.1 China’s increasing support to interna-
tional peacekeeping is a major driving force of the great transformation of international 
peacekeeping in the twenty-first century. China’s peacekeeping role can be understood 
as Beijing’s early experiment in undertaking more international responsibilities and even 
the benign projection of power by a rising nation. 
Peacekeeping has become a priority in Beijing’s foreign policy. As an expression of 
China’s attachment of great importance to the peacekeeping issue in its foreign policy 
since 1998, China’s National Defense, the annual white paper, views peacekeeping as an 
important part of China’s “international security cooperation.” China’s “low key” foreign 
policy of “noninterventionism,” adopted after the end of the Cold War, tried to avoid 
entanglement in the world’s crises and troubles, but participation in peacekeeping causes 
China actually to face the challenge of the others’ “internal” conflicts.
Participation in peacekeeping is one path for China’s use of newly obtained national 
power. No doubt, although many problems have arisen in the process of China’s eco-
nomic development and modernization, China’s national power has been steadily rising. 
China is gradually adapting to evolving peacekeeping norms and rules in the era of 
“second-generation peacekeeping.” Its attitudes toward peacekeeping have been chang-
ing according to changed “external” circumstances and demands.
The reach of China’s peacekeeping engagements and operations today is truly global. 
At least three Chinese ministries of the central government have been responsible for 
engagement with international peacekeeping: Foreign Affairs (foreign policy on peace-
keeping), Defense (military peacekeepers), and Public Security (police peacekeepers). 
China has now become a major supplier of quality peacekeepers. As a “factory” for pro-
ducing peacekeepers or as a global public good for international peacekeeping coopera-
tion, China has established two training centers: the Beijing-based Defense Ministry’s 
Peacekeeping Center, opened in June 2009, and the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL [UN 
Civilian Police] Training Center (CPCTC), established in August 2000 in the Beijing 
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suburb of Langfang. The Langfang center is considered the largest and most modern-
ized peacekeeping base in the international community, equipped mainly on the basis 
of China’s “own innovations and researches.”2 In addition, a new question of a capacity 
divide may emerge: China’s relatively better trained and equipped peacekeepers sharply 
contrast with what some analysts have warned are “relatively poorly equipped UN 
troops from the traditional peacekeeping nations,” such as those from the South Asian 
nations.3 China is acknowledged internationally as a leading contributor of “personnel 
to UN peacekeeping operations, providing more troops, police and observers than any 
other permanent member of the UN Security Council.”4 China has altogether sent more 
than ten thousand peacekeeping personnel on twenty-four UN peacekeeping missions, 
including the more than 2,100 currently deployed. Peacekeeping is a new form of China’s 
aid to the needy.5 China is currently adjusting its aid policies.6 
China strictly defines peacekeeping as applicable only to UN or UN-related peacekeep-
ing. There is currently no Chinese consideration of participating in non-UN or non-
UN-related peacekeeping.7 
UN peacekeeping operations should comply with the UN Charter and all the basic prin-
ciples that are proven effective, including neutrality, consent of parties concerned and 
nonuse of force except for self-defense, etc. China supports the enhancement of the UN’s 
peacekeeping capacity and welcomes the Secretary-General’s proposal on the establish-
ment of strategic reserves and civilian police standby capacity. . . . Resources should be 
consolidated and limits of capacity respected and potential of the existing mechanisms 
fully tapped. The limited UN resources on peacekeeping should be rationally and effec-
tively utilized.8 
This paper will address lessons learned from China’s experience with peacekeeping to 
date, constraints on China’s future efforts of this type, the role of regional organizations, 
and governance in such operations. It will conclude with some discussion of both Chi-
nese potential leadership and the scope for future China-U.S. peacekeeping cooperation. 
Background
A number of factors readily explain Beijing’s support of UN peacekeeping operations. 
First and foremost, today’s China is no longer a critic of the existing international system 
but a more positive and conscious participant in it, in order to develop itself economi-
cally.9 The possibility of a Chinese challenge to U.S. dominance, discussed widely in 
Western discourse, has been ruled out by Chinese decision makers. Second, China 
needs to act to make a contribution to the international community. Participation in 
peacekeeping is seen as a way of strengthening China’s international contribution. “After 
receiving benefits from the international system, we have obligations to contribute to the 
international community and international system.”10 
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Third, international peacekeeping, well supported by the Chinese public, is making a 
contribution consistent with Chinese capabilities (力所能及). However, some Chinese 
commentators have suggested a revised principle—that China can do more, in order to 
undertake more responsibilities (更大责任). Fourth, the continuation of China’s export-
led and resources-driven economic-growth model makes for the emergence of a hot 
debate on China’s “overseas interests” and “the protection of such interests” (海外利益
保护). A conflict-stricken world, particularly as regions of Africa, is a threat to China’s 
increasing overseas interests.11
Fifth, Hu Jintao has recently called for ethical principles to play a larger role in Chinese 
foreign policy, which has previously emphasized only economic development. He un-
derscored the need for China’s foreign policy to reflect China’s “moral appeal” (道义感
召力).12 Sixth, UN peacekeeping is consistent with Beijing’s overall embrace of multilat-
eralism, though China does not always welcome multilateral approaches—for example, 
concerning the South China Sea dispute. Finally, international peacekeeping has devel-
oped in China as part of the overall effort to modernize the armed forces. As part of this 
wider effort, China should build up a world-class navy like other established big powers, 
or at least like other rising powers, such as India. But it is still worth noting that China’s 
Ministry of Defense recently replied to a question of China’s overseas military base by 
stating that China has no plan to build up overseas military bases.13 However, the debate 
is mainly not about whether or not the Chinese military should be modernized or “revo-
lutionized” but about how China uses its new military forces. The political leaders have 
made clear that China needs to “strengthen all aspects of the army,” to make it better 
These Chinese armored personnel carriers, operated by Chinese “blue helmet” peacekeeping 
soldiers, were deployed to Sudan. They are illustrative of the new capabilities, and also the 
high level of professionalism that Chinese peacekeepers bring to any mission. Beijing has also 
recently set up the most advanced training facilities for UN peacekeeping troops in the world.
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able to win “informationized local wars” and respond to “multiple security threats.”14 
China repeatedly tells the world that its strengthened military will contribute to world 
peace by multilateralizing itself. For example, “a naval force with advanced armaments 
and enhanced capabilities will contribute more to UN-led antiterrorism, antipiracy and 
disaster-relief missions.”15
China’s foreign-policy doctrine is a combination of the continuation of the “low key” 
foreign policy and the new exploration of adaptation to a changed world. In this respect, 
the increase of China’s international responsibility is a key issue. At this point, the issue 
has been much debated internally within China without reaching a clear conclusion.
Lessons from China’s Experience with International Peacekeeping
Lesson 1: International learning is not an easy or short process. China has learned a lot 
about how to coordinate constructively and harmonize the national interest and the 
international interest. In the UN, because of the existence of complex big-power politics, 
China has had to battle for its narrowly defined national concerns, such as the Taiwan 
issue, which has affected China’s voting behavior. For example, in 1999, due to Taiwan’s 
“established diplomatic ties with Macedonia,” China vetoed the renewal of a mandate 
for the United Nations peacekeeping force in the Former Yugoslav Republic. China had 
no other option but to use the veto power for safeguarding its sovereignty rights. In 
recent years, as China’s engagement with peacekeeping has deepened, China no longer 
simply uses the veto power at the Security Council. To some degree, overconcentration 
on China’s own concerns had lowered China’s role in representing the interests of the 
international community in general and the developing world in particular.16 A more 
progressive and pragmatic view has developed, allowing China to participate meaning-
fully, for example, in the UN peacekeeping mission recently in Haiti, which had no 
diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
Lesson 2: International peacekeeping is both politically sensitive and logistically difficult. 
In deciding on peacekeeping missions and their inputs, politically, China has to be cau-
tious. Logistically, China has to assess the effectiveness of the mission in saving lives and 
resources. China has noticed that its peacekeeping missions may be easily interpreted 
by some parties in civil wars as a neo-imperialist intervention by a non-Western, rising 
power.17 
Lesson 3: China has long concentrated on “easy” parts of the UN peacekeeping missions, 
but this policy is being reexamined. Focusing on clear issues, such as humanitarian relief, 
has allowed Beijing to avoid intrusion into sensitive sovereignty issues that sometimes 
generate violent conflict. Now, China is being pressed to take part in more difficult parts 
of the mission but is not fully ready to do so.18 Still, China’s nonintervention principle 
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is now being revisited and revised.19 Nevertheless, Beijing is always too cautious. China 
refuses to be a well prepared and equipped international leader in peacekeeping. Deng 
Xiaoping’s “not-take-lead” (不带头) dictum is still valid in China’s efforts in supporting 
peacekeeping. 
Lesson 4: There is little evidence to suggest that China will take the initiative to reform 
UN peacekeeping. International scholars have called for the emergence of new concepts, 
doctrines, rules, and theories of peacekeeping. Of course, they argue wishfully that 
such things must be “with Chinese characteristics.”20 China should adopt and internal-
ize common international theories and practices of peacekeeping, as the practice of 
peacekeeping is far from perfect; China should develop new approaches and strategies to 
contribute to it.
Lesson 5: China is still mainly practicing the principles and norms of “first generation” 
peacekeeping. These norms include consent of the parties, neutrality, nonuse of force, 
and unarmed peacekeeping. The ideas help maintain a peacekeeping consensus with the 
developing world, but China’s reluctance to embrace more advanced peacekeeping para-
digms, such as peace-enforcing and the “responsibility to protect,” creates a principled 
gap with other state players of peace missions, especially the West, in the evolution of 
peacekeeping. 
Lesson 6: China’s engagement with non-UN peacekeeping is relatively weak and limited. 
China has not joined any non-UN peacekeeping operations, operated by such mul-
tilateral military and political organizations as NATO. The Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), sponsored by the United States in 2004, is an example of a non-UN 
program.21 Possibly, in the future, a number of regional organizations, such as the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ASEAN, may operate such programs. China 
should broaden and deepen its peacekeeping engagement to include non-UN peace-
keeping operations.
Constraints on Chinese Peacekeeping 
China’s engagement with peacekeeping perhaps helps internationalize its military and 
police. In other words, China’s military and police, which had generally not undertaken 
external operations since the end of the Cold War, have now broadened their worldviews 
to familiarize themselves further, from an institutional standpoint, with this relatively 
new area of international security and have accumulated needed international experi-
ence to standardize the Chinese force. 
As a truly developing country with huge domestic imperatives, problems, and vulner-
abilities, China must still undertake only limited responsibilities—surely and inevita-
bly, in terms of its ability to deliver international public goods. But if China decides to 
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sustain its role in peacekeeping, financial limits should not be an unresolvable problem. 
The real limits to growth of China’s peacekeeping efforts are mainly not financial but 
political. 
The sovereignty principle clearly decides the limit of China’s peacekeeping depth. Today, 
Chinese leaders realize that most peacekeeping activities are essentially international 
interventions into domestic conditions. Thus, China is liberating itself from such doc-
trinal constraints, seeking a more flexible or revised attitude regarding sovereignty and 
nonintervention. Actually, China now pursues a conditional and constructive interven-
tion to some degree, in various cases.22 
The gap between China and the Western countries over a key norm—“responsibility to 
protect” (R2P)—as the alternative to nonintervention in peacekeeping has narrowed. 
But to China the norm is still questionable. At least, there are implicit or explicit differ-
ences between China and the West over interpretation. The report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) delivered the principle, and 
initially China disagreed and even opposed it. Later on, China’s attitude to the norm 
significantly changed, which once again showed that China’s general attitude toward 
peacekeeping continues to evolve. China echoed the international community in declar-
ing, “No reckless intervention should be allowed. When a massive humanitarian crisis 
occurs, it is the legitimate concern of the international community to ease and defuse the 
crisis. Any response to such a crisis should strictly conform to the UN Charter and the 
opinions of the country and the regional organization concerned should be respected. It 
falls on the Security Council to make the decision in the framework of the UN in light of 
specific circumstances that should lead to a peaceful solution as far as possible. Wher-
ever it involves enforcement actions, there should be more prudence in the consider-
ation of each case.” China worries that overemphasis of R2P and the use of force cannot 
fundamentally solve the various domestic conflicts.23
In some places (Congo, Sudan/Darfur, and other African spots in particular) that are 
geostrategically crucial, controversial, and complicated, China’s peacekeeping role has 
become more difficult. China has to consider the geopolitical and diplomatic costs of 
such peacekeeping operations. China needs to be more effective in its political com-
munications and public diplomacy to convince the host country and international 
stakeholders to be free of any strategic concern or doubt as to China’s motivation in 
peacekeeping participation. A key question is: Do the United States and other traditional 
peacekeeping powers welcome China’s expanding and leading role in peacekeeping? For 
this, China needs to increase its mutual trust and confidence building with others. 
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Regional Organizations
China’s role in UN peacekeeping is increasingly evolving through the frameworks of 
regional organizations. China hopes that regional organizations will play a larger role in 
peacekeeping. An apparent advantage for China is its familiarity with troubled regions 
and their regional organizations. China realizes that one of the fundamental contem-
porary trends of the world now is regionalization. So, China has gradually developed its 
system of regional policies, including China’s European Union (EU) policy, its Africa 
policy, and its Asia policy as newly identified and added important dimensions of 
China’s foreign policy. China has been keeping good relations with regional organiza-
tions in the developing world, such as the African Union (or AU, which has great politi-
cal will to play in its own regional peacekeeping but lacks capacity) and recently ASEAN, 
not to mention the SCO, which is a major stakeholder in the stability and reconstruction 
of Afghanistan. An inclusive international/UN peacekeeping solution to finish the U.S. 
and NATO missions in Afghanistan may actually be a good arrangement for future de-
velopment. Therefore, friendliness and other advantages (e.g., proximity) make China’s 
peacekeeping role in such regions relatively easier. 
China has encouraged UN-AU enhanced cooperation for delivering effective support 
for Africa in the field of peacekeeping activities: “Currently, about 75 percent of the UN 
peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, and about 70 percent of the UN peacekeeping as-
sessed contributions are spent in Africa. The African Union is playing an ever important 
role in preventing and resolving the conflicts in Africa. The United Nations should con-
tinue to strengthen its partnership with the African Union in the area of peacekeeping 
operations and help Africa improve its capacity-building for peacekeeping operations.”24
On the Darfur issue, China proposed and supported a joint operation between the 
United Nations and the African Union. As an outcome, through China’s mediation, the 
African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was created. In the 2009 
Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, China 
further committed itself to provide assistance and enhance cooperation with the UN and 
AU in the prevention, management, and resolution of regional conflicts in Africa. China 
promised to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, strengthen cooperation 
with countries concerned in the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and support countries 
in their postwar reconstruction processes, as well as to deepen cooperation with African 
countries in peacekeeping training and exchanges and in the further building of peace-
keeping capacity in Africa.25 
The SCO also could play a role in future peacekeeping missions. The organization 
does not mention the term “peacekeeping” in its communiqués, declarations, or state-
ments, but one Chinese scholar, Zheng Hao, a former visiting fellow at the Brookings 
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Institution, has proposed that the SCO take up a peacekeeping role in Afghanistan’s 
postwar and post-NATO reconstruction process.26 
According to its newly approved charter, ASEAN is the only regional/subregional secu-
rity community (the so-called ASEAN Security Community) in Asia. In 2004, Indonesia 
has proposed the formation of a Southeast Asian peacekeeping force that could one 
day help settle disputes like those in Aceh and the southern Philippines. The UN has 
welcomed the proposal.27 Such a peacekeeping force, however, may be unlikely, as within 
ASEAN it remains difficult to reach consensus. ASEAN’s “internal” security coordina-
tion is a precondition to any role played by a non-ASEAN member, such as China, in 
regional peacekeeping. If there is no ASEAN invitation, China is unlikely to send peace-
keeping troops to the subregion.
Local Governance
By peacekeeping, China plays a unique governance role—strengthening local capaci-
ties after a conflict or war. China’s role in rebuilding postconflict countries has already 
illustrated one of its potential roles in international peacekeeping, helping improve local 
governance.
The UN emphasizes “complex peacekeeping operations,” a number of postconflict 
peace-building and domestic reconstruction processes—confidence-building measures, 
power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening of the rule of law, human 
rights protection, economic and social development, and the building up of infrastruc-
ture—as more important than traditional, simple peacekeeping. China’s membership in 
a new UN body, the Peacebuilding Commission, shows that it also endorses peace build-
ing and its institutionalization.28 
China’s role in Afghanistan can be viewed from the local-governance perspective. There 
is no Chinese peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan. However, there has been an inter-
esting Chinese internal debate (triggered by NATO’s exploration of cooperation with 
China for stabilizing Afghanistan) on whether or not to contribute peacekeeping forces 
there. In the foreseeable future, China will not send such troops. Nevertheless, China is 
involved in Afghanistan. China attended all Afghanistan-related international confer-
ences, including the Kabul International Conference in July 2010, which was the first 
such meeting held on the Afghan soil. As a neighbor of Afghanistan, China is a major 
donor, providing development assistance to Afghanistan’s reconstruction. According to 
the Chinese foreign minister, China provided a total of more than nine hundred million 
renminbi of grant assistance and canceled $19.5 million of Afghanistan’s mature debts 
between 2002 and 2009. We have built seven projects for Afghanistan, including the 
Jomhuri Hospital (Republican Hospital), rehabilitated the Parwan irrigation project, 
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provided fifteen batches of assistance materials, trained 781 Afghans from various pro-
fessions, and received ninety-four Afghan students through government scholarships. In 
March 2010, China announced that it would provide another 160 million yuan of grant 
assistance to Afghanistan, to be used on infrastructure, medical care, health, and educa-
tion programs. 
China has increased the scale of personnel training for Afghanistan. In 2010, China 
trained over two hundred Afghan officials and technical personnel. During 2011, China 
increased the number of government scholarships to Afghanistan from thirty every 
year to fifty. This will bring the total number of Afghan students studying in China on 
various scholarships to around a hundred. China overcomes difficulties and continues 
to build assistance projects in Afghanistan that benefit the local communities. The presi-
dential multifunction center built by China has been completed, and work has started on 
its auxiliary projects. We will build a national technology, science, and education center 
for Afghanistan and a teaching building and a guesthouse for Kabul University. China 
has given Afghanistan preferential tariff treatment to support its economic development. 
In 2009, Beijing and Kabul exchanged letters on zero-tariff treatment for certain Afghan 
exports to China, more than four thousand items.29
Traditionally, peacekeeping is predominantly done by “hard power”—military and po-
lice peacekeepers. Today, peacekeeping includes more soft dimensions of power, in local 
political, economic, and social governance processes. Providing effective development 
assistance to countries like Afghanistan should be seen as an innovative aspect of peace 
missions. 
Leadership for China in Peacekeeping
Leadership undertaken by either established powers (especially the United States) or 
emerging powers (especially China) is key to secure the success of global governance 
and peace. Gill and Huang observe, “Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among 
the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peace-
keeping Operations”; “Chinese personnel are increasingly involved in mission leadership 
and decision making”; and that “China’s high profile in peacekeeping reinforces both the 
perceived legitimacy and the effectiveness of UN peace missions.”30 Considering China’s 
position in the UN and in the conflict-stricken world, these Chinese achievements and 
its performance may lead to a much-needed international peacekeeping leadership—
Chinese leadership.
So far, China has refused to adopt boldly a leadership position in peacekeeping. But 
China has repeatedly declared that it is a “responsible great power” (负责任大国). I 
predict that China will be a special leader in international peacekeeping. Peacekeeping 
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leadership does not contradict China’s overall low-key foreign policy but rather helps 
ease tension between a rising China and the others, as peacekeeping participation is a 
“soft” use of China’s growing power. Also, peacekeeping leadership helps strengthen  
Chinese-Western mutually complementary cooperation. Regarding personnel, for ex-
ample, the shortage of qualified and available peacekeepers is always a common  
problem, but China can supply many more than can others.  
On China’s general role in the world, the West sends contradictory signals. The West 
asks for, presses for, and encourages China’s bigger role, and China promises such a 
role.31 But China’s leadership or potential is easily perceived, judged, and misunderstood 
as a challenge to the Western liberal order. Questions arise: As China explores new 
ideas for the reform of international peacekeeping, would this lead to Chinese-Western 
mutual accommodation or greater suspicion? If China plays a future role as a peacekeep-
ing leader, will the West fully accept that role and not be afflicted by the fading of its own 
traditional leadership? 
China-U.S. Cooperation
The second Chinese-American joint statement by Presidents Hu Jintao and Barack 
Obama, issued on 17 November 2009 in Beijing, reported, “The two sides also discussed 
the importance of UN peacekeeping operations in promoting international peace and 
security.”32 This is a positive and hopeful development, because peacekeeping enriches 
and redirects China-U.S. relations. What is the Chinese-American common ground with 
respect to peacekeeping? How can the two states cooperate under the framework of UN 
peacekeeping? 
U.S. airborne troops patrol together with Chinese People’s Armed Police in Haiti during January 
2010 after the devastating earthquake. While unusual at this point, the two militaries should 
expand this form of cooperation in order to meet extensive nontraditional security challenges in 
the twenty-first century.
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On 29 January 2010, Chinese media, including the official Xinhua News Agency, promi-
nently covered a rare moment: “China, US Peacekeepers Conduct Joint Patrol in Haiti.”33 
This may be an early harbinger of Sino-American cooperation in this regard.
On 19 January China and the United States issued the new joint statement during Presi-
dent Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington. The statement focused on a specific peace-
keeping issue—the independence of South Sudan: “Regarding Sudan, the United States 
and China agreed to fully support the North-South peace process, including full and 
effective implementation of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The two sides 
stressed the need for all sides to respect the result of a free, fair, and transparent referen-
dum. Both the United States and China expressed concern on the Darfur issue. . . . Both 
the United States and China have a continuing interest in the maintenance of peace and 
stability in the wider region.”34
Peacekeeping may play a positive role in facilitating “cooperative, comprehensive and 
positive China-U.S. ties.” Given the current difficulties of China-U.S. military-to- 
military exchanges, the two sides can reach consensus to see peacekeeping as a relatively 
easier and softer area that can foster deepened China-U.S. security cooperation. There 
are still obstacles that could slow down China-U.S. military-to-military exchanges, but 
the conduct of peacekeeping cooperation can help promote these exchanges. 
The ongoing reform of UN peacekeeping operations is a good opportunity to forge  
Chinese-American joint leadership in order to realize the ideal of Charting a New Hori-
zon for UN Peacekeeping.35 For this, China and the United States can cosponsor pro-
grams, including international conferences on the reform of UN peacekeeping practices.
China and the United States may continue to diverge over some principles and para-
digms of peacekeeping, but the differences should not be exaggerated. Chinese scholars 
think peacekeeping is a form of protecting and improving universal human rights. 
China’s embrace of humanitarianism in the form of multilateral peacekeeping and peace 
building should also be helpful in narrowing China-U.S. differences over human rights.36 
A good start on bilateral peacekeeping cooperation would be joint sponsorship of a 
peacekeeping training program.
In his first visit to Afghanistan, on 28 March 2010, President Obama said, “Our 
strategy includes a military effort that takes the fight to the Taliban while creating the 
conditions for greater security and a transition to the Afghans; but also a civilian effort 
that improves the daily lives of the Afghan people.”37 China will not send its troops or 
open its border for assisting the military mission in Afghanistan, but it plays a civilian-
governance role in the strengthening local economic and social development. The 
United States should affirm China’s special contribution as Afghanistan’s neighbor. 
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So actually there is already tacit, yet important Chinese-American cooperation on the 
difficult Afghanistan issue.
Conclusion
China has learned many lessons from its participation in peacekeeping. It has become a 
major “responsible stakeholder” in the transformation of international peacekeeping. In 
the future, with the overcoming of constraints on and difficulties in undertaking more 
international responsibilities, peacekeeping will be a continuously dynamic sector in 
helping further develop China’s relations with the international community.
Global peacekeeping currently lacks global leadership. China is exploring a proper 
leadership role as a new form of contribution commensurate with its new power and 
consequent moral obligations. But the nation still conducts a cautious, or careful, foreign 
policy, in order to not be misunderstood strategically as a challenge to American world 
leadership. A better China-U.S. division of labor—coleadership in peacekeeping—is 
crucial not only to strengthen China-U.S. military cooperation but to transform further 
the current practice of peacekeeping.
Notes
1.  Su Yincheng, “中国‘蓝盔’享誉世界” [Chinese 
“Blue Berets” Have Won Praise from the World], 
People’s Daily, 2 April 2010, p. 20.
2.  Wang Yizhou, “中国维和应‘创造性介入,’” 
[China’s Peacekeeping Should Constitute 
“Constructive Involvement”], 中国报道 [China 
Report], no. 2 (2010), p. 59.
3.  Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Regional Groups 
and Alliances,” in The Oxford Handbook on the 
United Nations, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam 
Daws (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), p. 
227.
4.  Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, China’s Expand-
ing Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy 
Implications, SIPRI Policy Paper 25 (Solna, 
Swed.: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, November 2009).
5.  Wang Yizhou, “China’s Peacekeeping Should 
Constitute ‘Constructive Involvement,’” p. 59.
6.  Pang Zhongying, “China’s Changing Foreign Aid 
Principle,” 瞭望 [Outlook Weekly] (Beijing), 30 
August 2010. 
7.  Wei Yanwei (Deputy Director of Peacekeep-
ing Affairs, Ministry of Defense) (remarks at 
Peacekeeping International Symposium, Beijing, 
29 November 2009), Xinhua. 
8.  People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, China’s Position Paper on UN Reforms  
(Beijing: 8 June 2005).
9.  章百家 [Zhang Baijia] (Deputy Director, Com-
munist Party of China [CPC] History Research, 
Central Committee of the CPC), “中国外交成
长历程中的观念变迁: 从革命的、民族的视角
到发展的、全球的视野” [Ideational Change in 
Chinese Diplomacy: From the Revolutionary and 
Nationalist to the Evolutionary and Global], 外
交评论 [Foreign Affairs Review], no. 3 (2009). 
10. 马小军 [Ma Xiaojun] (Central Party School), “一
个世界性大国的贡献与责任” [A World Power’s 
Contribution and Responsibility], China Report, 
no. 2 (2010).
11.  For example, Zhou Qi, “新维和观与中国国
家利益” [New Peacekeeping Ideas and China’s 
National Interest], 求索 [Explore], no. 3 (2005).
12.  Hu Jintao spoke at the eleventh National  
Ambassadorial and Envoy Conference; see  
politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/9687405.html. 
13.  Cui Xiaohuo, “Navy Has No Plan for Overseas 
Bases,” China Daily, 11 March 2010.
14.  Wen Jiabao, Government Work Report to the Na-
tional People’s Congress (Beijing: 5 March 2010). 
15.  Cui, “Navy Has No Plan for Overseas Bases.”
not congruent but quite complementary 63
16.  赵磊 [Zhao Lei], 建构和平: 中国对联合国外交
行为的演进 [Constructing Peace: Evolution of 
China Diplomatic Behavior toward the United 
Nations] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2011), p. 234.
17.  Wang Yizhou, “China’s Peacekeeping Should 
Constitute ‘Constructive Involvement,’” p. 59.
18.  Zhao Lei, Constructing Peace, p. 218.
19.  Pang Zhongying, “China’s Nonintervention 
Question,” Journal of Global Responsibility to 
Protect 1, no. 2 (March 2009).
20.  Wang Yizhou, “China’s Peacekeeping Should 
‘Constructive Involvement,’” p. 59.
21.  On GPOI, see Gill and Huang, China’s Expanding 
Role in Peacekeeping, pp. 22–23.
22.  See Pang, “China’s Nonintervention Question.”
23.  Pang Sen, 联合国维和中国在行动 [In UN 
Peacekeeping, China Is in Action], China Report, 
no. 2 (2010), p. 45.
24.  Ambassador Liu Zhenmin (statement at “Open 
Debate of the Security Council on UN Peace-
keeping Operations,” New York, 5 August 2009).
25.  Declaration of the Sharm-el-Sheikh Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Fourth 
Ministerial FOCAC Conference (Sharm al-
Sheikh, Egypt: 9 November 2009), available at 
www.focac.org/.  
26.  Zheng Hao, The Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion and NATO: Possible Collaboration on Af-
ghanistan Reconstruction (New York: Brookings 
Institution, 2009). 
27.  “Indonesia Proposes Southeast Asian Peace-
keeping Force,” Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, 21 February 2004, www.aseansec.org/.
28.  People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, China’s Position Paper on UN Reforms. 
29.  “Remarks by H. E. Yang Jiechi, Minister of For-
eign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at 
the Kabul International Conference on Afghani-
stan,” 20 July 2010.  
30.  Gill and Huang, China’s Expanding Role in  
Peacekeeping. 
31.  Peter Mandelson, “We Want China to Lead,” New 
York Times, 11 February 2010.
32.  White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
“U.S.-China Joint Statement: Beijing, China,” 17 
November 2009, available at www.whitehouse 
.gov/.
33.  “China, US Peacekeepers Conduct Joint Patrol in 
Haiti,” China Daily, 29 January 2010.
34.  White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
“U.S.-China Joint Statement,” 19 January 2011, 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/.
35.  United Nations, A New Partnership Agenda: 
Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping 
(New York: Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations 
and Dept. of Field Support, July 2009), available 
at www.un.org/.
36.  Dr. Yuan Zhengqing (remarks at Conference 
on Global Challenges and Global Governance, 
Beijing, 17 March 2010).
37.  White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Re-
marks by the President to the Troops: Clamshell, 
Bagram Airfield,” 28 March 2010, available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/.

Numerous surveys have appeared in recent years on China’s growing role in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. These analyses provide valuable insights 
into China’s changing foreign- and security-policy decision making and cite myriad 
reasons that might underlie Beijing’s new approach to UN peacekeeping. Some more 
recent analyses have begun to look more specifically at China’s role in select UN mis-
sions in order to provide greater fidelity in understanding Beijing’s evolving role in NTS 
operations. This analysis follows the latter approach, by examining specifically China’s 
role and interests in the series of UN missions to East Timor since 2000. It seeks to 
identify the rationales cited for China’s continued engagement in this unprecedented UN 
peacekeeping mission as well as the implications for future Chinese participation in such 
operations. 
The UN’s peacekeeping efforts in East Timor, now the independent state of Timor-Leste, 
date back more than a decade (see the table). After centuries as a Portuguese colony, fol-
lowed by decades of Indonesian occupation, the East Timorese were given an opportu-
nity in 1999 by the Indonesian leadership to decide via referendum whether to become 
an autonomous region remaining under Indonesian rule or an independent state. The 
first UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) deployed for the purpose of supporting 
this referendum process. However, following the vote, which was by a large majority in 
favor of independence, widespread militia-led violence broke out and threatened further 
chaos, raising the specter of a new failed state. To prevent this and help restore order, the 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) mission, led by neighboring Australia, 
deployed shortly after the vote and quickly restored stability. A new UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) mission took temporary sovereignty over East 
Timor, with Timorese concurrence, in order to help rebuild the state and ready it for 
independence, which came in 2002. 
The latter mission, authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, would be one of only 
a handful of recent UN missions charged with taking over temporary sovereignty of a 
nation-state in order to restore it to full functionality. Subsequent UN missions have 
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furthered these efforts to establish a well-functioning, sovereign, independent state of 
Timor-Leste while weathering a series of interim security and stability setbacks. Insur-
gent uprisings in 2006 and subsequent clashes led Australia—at the behest of the govern-
ment of Timor-Leste (GoTL)—to head up an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to 
reestablish order and stability, especially following the assassination attempts in 2008 
on the president and prime minister. China has been part of the UN Security Council–
sanctioned efforts from almost the beginning of this story. But why would China seek to 
become involved in such a complex, long-term, and unprecedented peacekeeping opera-
tion? Moreover, what does China’s participation in this particular series of peacekeeping 
missions suggest about contemporary Chinese foreign policy more generally?
Major Themes in PRC Peacekeeping Activities in East Timor / Timor-Leste
Chinese peacekeeping forces have been involved in East Timor / Timor-Leste operations 
since the start of the Transitional Administration in 1999. Though not sending mili-
tary combat forces to the region, Beijing has deployed continuous detachments of UN 
civilian police (CIVPOL), including armed riot police, as well as military observers and 
liaison officers, along with several administrative staff personnel. 
In evaluating both English- and Chinese-language sources, a number of common 
themes stand out, with distinct nuances evident in the latter, that could provide a deeper 
Chinese Participation in UN Missions in East Timor / Timor-Leste
Source: United Nations, Government of Australia, SIPRI. 
Notes: 
a. Non-UN missions: INTERFET and ISF.
b. Political mission—UNOTIL (UN Office in East Timor); 2010 PRC contributions to UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste), 22 civilian police; 2 military observers (MILPER). 
Mission Years Type PRC Participation
UNAMET Jun.–Oct. ’99  Peacemaking  n/a
INTERFETa  Aug. ’99–Feb. ’00  Peace enforcement (non-UN)  n/a
UNTAET  Oct. ’99–May ’02  Peacekeeping  CIVPOL
  Peace enforcement  ADMIN
  Peace building
UNMISET  May ’02–May ’05  Peace building  CIVPOL
UNOTILb  May ’05–Aug. ’06  Peacekeeping  CIVPOL
  Peace building
ISFa  May ’06–present  Peace enforcement (supports UN) n/a
UNMITb  Aug. ’06–Feb. ’12  Peace building  CIVPOL
   MILPER
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understanding of Beijing’s approach in this case. The following is an overview of four 
overarching arguments cited for China’s extensive involvement in the United Nations’ 
long-term peacekeeping efforts in East Timor.
Theme 1: A Changing International and Regional Security Environment
A common theme found in studies examining China’s enhanced post–Cold War par-
ticipation in UN peacekeeping operations is change in the international and regional 
security environments. A 2009 Swedish Defence Research Agency (SDRA) survey of 
major studies on Chinese peacekeeping activities identified the following as commonly 
cited key security- and foreign policy–oriented rationales for growing PRC involvement 
in UN peacekeeping operations:1 
 • Shared security interests with the rest of the world
 • China’s rising comfort level in the peacekeeping regime
 • Changes in Beijing’s foreign and security policy
 • Beijing’s concerns about its international reputation
 • Efforts to counterbalance perceived U.S. hegemony, while keeping a low profile
 • China’s drive to isolate Taipei diplomatically
 • Prevention of security threats from failing states. 
After thirteen Chinese sailors were killed in a criminal attack along the Mekong River in October 
2011, Beijing quickly responded by creating a small task force of lightly armed river vessels oper-
ated by the Ministry of Public Security to patrol the volatile upper sections of the river in coop-
eration with neighbors including Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. This is an important example of 
the new focus on nontraditional security issues in Chinese foreign policy.
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As this general list suggests, China’s growing acceptance of UN peacekeeping activities 
was in part likely a function of new opportunities due to China’s rising international 
power and stature, as well as of newly arising challenges, such as failed states and terror-
ist enclaves, that threatened Beijing’s changing, more comprehensive national-security 
interests. In the specific case of East Timor, China’s decision to take a more active ap-
proach and support the initial UNTAET mission might also conceivably have been tied 
to a series of extraneous events with national- and regional-security repercussions for 
China. These included the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the then-still-
strained status of U.S.-China relations, and the accidental bombing in 1999 by American 
aircraft of China’s mission in Belgrade, as part of a NATO-authorized (as opposed to 
UN-authorized) military intervention.2 It is as yet unclear whether or how any or all of 
these events might have impacted decisions made in Beijing to intercede in East Timor 
as part of the UNTAET mission, but both English- and Chinese-language studies of Chi-
nese peacekeeping decisions suggest a change in strategy or policy due in part to changes 
in the security environment. 
Notably, for instance, both English- and Chinese-language sources emphasize the 1999 
period and the Timor mission as collectively being a critical turning point in Chinese 
policy making vis-à-vis participation in UN peacekeeping. As Chinese scholar He 
Yin notes, “1999 marked the beginning of a new era for China’s active participation in 
UNPKO [UN peacekeeping operations]. . . . China for the first time signaled that an 
UNPKO with an enforcement-featured mandate like that of UNTAET could be politi-
cally acceptable.” Chinese-language sources highlight similar strategic interests. For 
instance, a 2007 analysis by Niu Zhongjun states, “Because of the complexity of the East 
Timor questions, our participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor . . . 
should be viewed as a major foreign policy decision, illustrating China’s disposition to 
use the UN as the main tool to cope with international conflicts.”3 Niu goes on to say, 
“Although China dispatched civilian observers for the first time ever to participate in the 
peacekeeping activities to support the UN’s transitional authority in East Timor, actually 
the scale was not so small, so that up to this point the personnel involved are up to two 
hundred. . . . This deed illustrates China acting as a responsible great power, and thus 
China received universal praise in the international community.”4
Also considered in Chinese-language articles and after-action lessons-learned analyses, 
however, are the mission parameters, which at first appeared to be relatively straightfor-
ward but ultimately proved quite complex. Nonetheless, China’s participation continues 
and appears to be viewed as a success, by both PRC and UN authorities. A volume 
reviewing Chinese lessons learned highlights several key parameters—“cooperation of 
the Indonesia government”; “a relatively benign security environment . . . [where] there 
are relatively few guns, and land mines are not major problem”; “vigorous support of the 
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international community”; and “the clear-cut nature of the aid activities”—as critical to 
consideration of PRC participation in the East Timor operations.5
Also according to Chinese-language sources, China’s regional security interests formed 
a key factor in deciding to become engaged in Timorese peacekeeping, as highlighted in 
the following:
 • “East Timor is a small country that is quite a distance from our country, but consid-
ered from the perspective of our foreign policy, it occupies a position that cannot be 
ignored.”6 
 • “East Timor . . . is located proximate to where sea transport lines pass from the In-
dian Ocean through the Torres Strait to the Pacific Ocean, a strategically important 
position.”7
 • “Developing friendly relations with East Timor from the earliest possible point is also 
beneficial to consolidating the momentum for China-ASEAN relations.”8
 • “Regarding military affairs, in July 2002 the Defense Minister of East Timor . . . 
visited China, suggesting a new high level of importance to the PRC–East Timor 
relationship.”9
Not surprisingly (although it is not emphasized as prominently in English-language 
analyses), Beijing also appears to have taken PRC-Indonesian relations into account in 
deciding whether and how to be engaged in Timorese peacekeeping, being careful not to 
undermine long-term prospects for enhanced Sino-Indonesian relations. Niu Zhongjun’s 
analysis of the Timor mission specifically notes an emphasis on building PRC-Indonesia/
Timorese relations dating back to a 1990 visit by Li Peng, then premier, to resume rela-
tions with Indonesia (severed since 1967) and repeated visits by President Jiang Zemin 
in the late 1990s, including during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Niu notes, “The 
East Timor peacekeeping issue not only did not block the development of Chinese-
Indonesian relations, but on the contrary in large measure accelerated the rapproche-
ment between the two countries. This stands as one of the major successes of Chinese 
foreign policy.”10 Moreover, according to Chinese-language assessments, shared history 
of ideological and cultural connections between the Indonesian, Timorese, and Chinese 
peoples appear to have served as an additional element of decision making.11 
Theme 2: Changing International Peacekeeping Norms
The second rationale cited for China’s expanding role in international peacekeeping, 
specifically in East Timor, is what appears to be a subtle change in China’s long-standing 
foreign policy principles governing international interventions in an era of changing 
international peacekeeping norms. As noted in the SDRA survey, China’s overseas activi-
ties have long been guided by the “principles of non-interference and sovereignty . . . and 
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China’s opposition against the use of force.”12 Given this, the U.S. Department of Defense 
annual report for 2011 notes: 
Prior to 2002, Beijing generally avoided participation in UN peacekeeping operations 
(PKO), due to lingering skepticism of the international system and a long-stated policy of 
non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. China’s participation from 1991–1993 
in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia marked a notable exception to this policy. 
China’s attitude towards UN PKOs has changed dramatically over the past decade, par-
ticularly since Hu Jintao promulgated the New Historic Missions in 2004.13 
Indeed, most studies on Chinese peacekeeping highlight Beijing’s growing flexibility 
on the need to protect Westphalian norms and principles as well as an apparent grow-
ing acceptance of more extensive UN authority over traditional state sovereignty when 
faced with overwhelming challenges to state power and regional stability. Yet it remains 
uncertain exactly how supportive Beijing is when it comes to condoning more extensive 
peace-building and peace-enforcement activities, in this or other UN peacekeeping 
missions. On the basis of discussions with PRC interlocutors, it is possible that think-
ing in Beijing might have even retreated from a more expansive, comprehensive view of 
UN peacekeeping. Yet the emphasis among English-language sources on such normative 
changes suggests a relatively passive acceptance by Beijing of more interventionist norms 
permitting UN peacekeepers to play roles traditionally reserved to state sovereigns. This 
perspective, however, notwithstanding possible recent changes in outlook, comes into 
question in the case of East Timor. According to some English- and Chinese-language 
sources, Beijing might in fact have taken a more activist approach in deciding to send 
peacekeepers to East Timor. An early article by Bates Gill and James Reilly, for example, 
raised the prospect that Kosovo, in which NATO intervened in 1999 just prior to the 
East Timor referendum, might have played a part in Chinese decision making, a notion 
reiterated even more strongly in a recent Chinese-language analysis hinting that Beijing’s 
decision was influenced by an opportunity to develop a new norm, or form, of interven-
tion.14 According to the latter:
The NATO air attack against the Yugoslav Federation was undertaken under the pretext 
of a humanitarian intervention, and this situation had obvious similarities with the East 
Timor issue. Therefore, the East Timor issue in East Asia could also have followed the 
same path as the problematic Kosovo intervention. This was the chief reason that our 
country has taken an active role in participating in the peacekeeping activities in East 
Timor.15 
Whether and to what degree the Kosovo precedent had any influence on Beijing’s deci-
sion making when it came to intervening in East Timor remain unclear. One Chinese 
interlocutor insists definitively that there was absolutely no connection whatsoever.16 
Yet this prospect raises a more fundamental question of whether East Timor represents 
a leap forward in China’s peacekeeping-policy decision making, as suggested earlier, 
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and thus is a precursor to China’s future involvement, or was in fact an exception due 
to historical timing. Whether this case was an exception, a new norm for Beijing, or 
something in between, a greater understanding of Chinese decision making is necessary 
to understand fully China’s current and future roles in UN peacekeeping efforts.
Theme 3: PRC Economic Interests
A third theme commonly cited among English- and Chinese-language analyses of Chi-
nese peacekeeping involvement in East Timor is that of economic interests. These span 
a range from trade and investment regionally and globally to arms export opportunities, 
along with an emphasis on access to strategic resources, particularly oil and gas. 
Western analyses tend to highlight the strategic-resources angle. For example, a recent 
article argues that “one of China’s primary interests in East Timor is to gain access to the 
country’s oil and gas reserves.”17 East Timor sits in an unquestionably strategic location, 
nestled northwest of Darwin, Australia, with sovereign access to valuable seabed and 
underground resources that are being sought after for joint development by numerous 
suitors, including Australia, China, South Korea, and Thailand.18 
Articles in Chinese, however, tend to emphasize in addition East Timor’s own economic 
development and its prospects for following the PRC’s economic model toward greater 
long-term prosperity. One article notes that “the East Timor side is extremely hopeful to 
study and learn from China’s development experience. . . . East Timor is one of the poor-
est countries and is one of the twenty most backward countries in the whole world. . . . 
The extreme economic poverty limits the development of bilateral economic and trade 
relations. In this situation, energy cooperation has become a potentially bright spot for 
bilateral economic and trade cooperation.”19
This last reference again brings to mind the notion that China might be interested in 
Timor peacekeeping operations, at least in part, as a means of shaping norms in the 
region, in this case economic norms. This would accord with China’s broader foreign-
policy goals of encouraging an open-door, “peaceful development” model of economic 
development, as well as foreign trade and investments that do not impose value-laden 
(read liberal democracy–oriented) conditions, in the same way that Beijing pursues its 
domestic economic reforms, foreign commercial trade interests, and overseas devel-
opment assistance. Such a strategic approach would well match China’s articulated 
long-term national and regional security interests, as well as help secure greater access 
to overseas markets and resources. The prospect of future arms exports to the region, 
as recently demonstrated by the sale of two Shanghai-class patrol boats to the GoTL, 
serves to further China’s economic interests and possibly broader regional economic and 
geostrategic access and influence. 
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Theme 4: Potential for PRC Military Training, Experience, and Exposure
Finally, as the SDRA survey highlights, most English-language studies of Chinese 
peacekeeping activities emphasize “opportunities for training of personnel and gaining 
international experience.” Yet there appears little focus on this dimension in Chinese-
language sources studied thus far. This does not mean that China could not benefit in 
these ways from involvement in East Timor peacekeeping operations, but military train-
ing opportunities are likely limited in this case, given that no Chinese military combat 
forces are involved. Any training and experience are likely to be limited in the near term 
to civilian (armed) policing capabilities. 
China is reputed also to be interested in becoming the region’s base for CIVPOL train-
ing. The experience gained in Timor-based UN peacekeeping operations is likely to aid 
that objective. China’s Ministry of National Defense and Public Security Bureau have 
established peacekeeping training centers at which Timorese military officers, including 
three dozen Timorese sailors, among others, have received training.20 Civil policing is an 
area in which Beijing is eager and able to enhance its contributions to UN peacekeeping 
and to expand regionally the use of its domestic training facilities, at a time when such 
support is in high demand by UN headquarters.
Beijing has made counterterrorism a national priority in recent years. During preparations for the 
Olympics in 2008 and for the World Expo in 2010, China sought counsel from abroad, including 
from the United States, to improve its counterterrorism capabilities.
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Outside of formal UN peacekeeping channels, there also exists the potential for en-
hanced Chinese military training, experience, and exposure via interactions with other 
nations’ military personnel involved in operations supported through bilateral or 
regional programs with the Timor-Leste government. The United States, for example, 
has supported the UN missions in Timor-Leste through a separate “U.S. Support Group 
East Timor,” which, under American command and control, supports projects that are 
typically short-term and high-impact.21 The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit and a U.S. 
Navy Seabee detachment, for instance, both engaged in HA/DR activities with GoTL 
counterparts in 2009, among other bilateral or multilateral cooperative engagement 
efforts.22 After a six-month rotated deployment, a permanent detachment of Seabees ar-
rived in February 2009 with a mission of supporting the GoTL and the country’s efforts 
to improve its infrastructure and military capabilities, and to pursue societal reforms. 
Other donor nations are providing similar forms of training and support.
China’s reasons for engaging in the Timor UN peacekeeping missions are likely some 
combination of the four rationales outlined above. Taken together, they suggest that a 
strategically important rationale exists, even if not fully explicated in the sources exam-
ined specific to the Timor case. Chinese sources emphasize that the mission is China’s 
second in the Asia-Pacific (the other being Cambodia in the 1990s) and that both are 
viewed as successful engagements of overseas Chinese activity. Peacekeeping activities 
are also listed among rationales for China’s expanding maritime capabilities; also, China’s 
bilateral assistance to Timor-Leste includes building a new presidential palace and a 
ministry of foreign affairs.23 The extent to which the Timor mission has been viewed 
in Beijing as a strategic opportunity—particularly given the limited role played by the 
United States and other Western powers in this instance, with the exception of Australia, 
which undertook the lead peacekeeping role—is hard to determine but is likely to have 
influenced China’s continued presence there.
Conclusion and Implications for Future Chinese Peacekeeping
On the basis of a preliminary assessment of Chinese peacekeeping in East Timor, four 
key conclusions and implications can be drawn. First, China’s involvement in the Timor 
peacekeeping missions constitutes a turning point in Chinese security-policy decision 
making. China’s involvement in this case in particular, an Asia-Pacific peacekeeping 
mission, constitutes only Beijing’s second deployment of peacekeepers in the region. 
It is an ongoing and still-evolving mission, and one that coincided with the beginning 
of a major increase in Chinese peacekeeping deployments worldwide, as well as with 
China’s first-ever deployment of civil police forces in a complex peacekeeping case, one 
that covers the full spectrum of peacekeeping operations in a Chapter VII mission (in 
which “all necessary means” are authorized and complex issues governing international 
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interventions—sovereignty, postcolonialization, and self-determination—are involved). 
These factors all contribute to a consensus that East Timor represents a key turning 
point in Chinese policy making. But it should not necessarily be taken as a template 
for future Chinese peacekeeping involvement. Although Chinese personnel have been 
involved through Timorese operations in nearly the full spectrum of comprehensive 
peacekeeping activities (combat excepted), Chinese interlocutors caution that this might 
represent more the exception than the rule in terms of future Chinese peacekeeping 
policy and decision making. What seems likely, however, is that Beijing will appoint 
greater priority to—and possibly be more actively and comprehensively involved in—
peacekeeping activities that arise in the Asia-Pacific region, which it sees as in its vital 
national and regional interests. 
Second, the surveyed Western, English-language sources focus on China’s role in East 
Timor peacekeeping operations as part of a macro trend accepting more comprehen-
sive forms of UN peacekeeping risks overlooking regional, bilateral, or distinct national 
interests involved. Beijing’s decision making in this particular case is difficult to discern 
a decade later and might even have changed in the interim, national, regional, and 
international security environments having all changed as well. It is not clear that Beijing 
fully accepts the new norm of more comprehensive peacekeeping missions (e.g., accept-
ing the “responsibility to protect” mandate) or that China accepted this at the time of 
initial intervention in East Timor. More dialogue on this topic—in both historical and 
contemporary contexts—is needed. 
Third, China’s role in East Timor peacekeeping is clearly viewed in Beijing as a dramatic 
success; UN observers view it also as a positive contribution—in March 2011 the GoTL 
resumed authority over all policy operations from United Nations forces. Whether or 
not East Timor becomes a template for future Chinese peacekeeping involvement (as 
UN experts seem to presume or hope), it will remain a positive example of China’s role 
in international peacekeeping. In any case, given China’s size, interests, and the expecta-
tions of the rest of the world, China’s role in UN peacekeeping is likely to grow, espe-
cially if new Asia-Pacific operations arise. Moreover, as China’s role and influence in UN 
peacekeeping activities expand, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, such developments 
could serve to salve—or, alternatively, exacerbate—sensitivities across a spectrum of is-
sues. As such, expanded peacekeeping in the region and beyond could be a high-risk but 
also high-reward option for Beijing. 
Finally, China’s expanded interests and activities in UN peacekeeping raise new possibil-
ities for U.S.-PRC security cooperation in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.24 Timor-Leste is 
a case in which the United States is also involved, though in a limited way and indepen-
dent of formal UN mission authorities. Nonetheless, there remains the potential for co-
operative engagement. Based on the overlap, limited thus far, of American and Chinese 
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aid to the GoTL and the confluence of interests in enhancing stability and security in 
this Asia-Pacific location, the potential exists for more collaborative or cooperative mul-
tilateral and confidence-building engagements involving the U.S. and PRC militaries in 
support of a more stable and secure Timor-Leste and also broader Asia-Pacific region. 
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How to mobilize traditional capabilities, including military forces, to respond to nontraditional challenges is of much concern to national leaders around the globe. 
As for China, top leaders, including President Hu Jintao, expressed this concern in the 
Seventeenth National Congress, underlining the imperative “to enhance the ability of the 
military to respond to various kinds of threats, and fulfill multiple and diverse tasks.”1 
Top PLA officers, including senior Chinese admirals, have emphasized the nontradi-
tional security threat.2 
Terrorists pose a grave threat to contemporary global society, and the prevention of ter-
rorist attacks is now one of the major fields for international cooperation. This has been 
true especially since the 9/11 attacks a decade ago. India is also a country suffering from 
frequent terrorist attacks in recent years, and this peaked with the 2008 Mumbai terror-
ist attacks, which resulted in 195 deaths and more than three hundred wounded.3 This 
paper will endeavor to elaborate on Chinese analyses of that tragic event and on lessons 
for China in countering potential terrorist threats emanating from the sea.
Nightmare at a Glance: The 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks
The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, which drew worldwide condemnation, first began on 
26 November. By the early morning of 28 November, Mumbai police and security forces 
had finally ended the carnage and secured all sites except for the Taj Hotel. An action by 
India’s National Security Guard (NSG) on 29 November (Operation Black Tornado) 
resulted in the death of the last remaining attackers at the Taj Hotel. It took three days 
for NSG commandos to overcome these terrorists. 
The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack was unique in several ways. 
First, the terrorists came to Mumbai via a sea route, sailing from Karachi on a Pakistani 
cargo vessel. They first hijacked an Indian fishing boat and murdered all its crew except 
for the captain, then proceeded to Mumbai. They killed the captain as they neared their 
destination. Coming by sea had several advantages over coming by land, allowing the 
terrorists to avoid Indian security checkpoints at the frontier or at airports; sailing on 
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an Indian vessel also enabled them to avoid arousing the suspicion of the Indian coast 
guard.
Second, the terrorists were well trained and highly organized. They seem to have known 
locations of targets even better than the responding government forces. They were work-
ing together as a unit, and they coordinated with each other using high-tech equipment. 
They used hand signals to communicate across loud and crowded spaces. Apparently 
they received instructions while conducting this attack. They were sufficiently disci-
plined to continue their attack over many hours.4 
Third, these terrorist attacks were carefully planned. This assessment includes the targets 
chosen, which were all commercial centers with high densities of people; the time of the 
attacks, which was during the peak hour at night; and the strategy of the attack, which 
was to attack the terminal first.5
Chinese Analyses of the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks
Immediately after the Mumbai terrorist attacks, a number of Chinese media paid close 
attention, addressing the following issues.
Who Were the Killers, and Where Were They From?
According to most Chinese specialists, there was a very high probability that these ter-
rorists came from within India. Li Wei, an expert on antiterrorist studies with the China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, was among the analysts 
taking this view. Shen Dingli, a professor with the Center for American Studies at Fudan 
University, was interviewed by PLA Daily and said that the root cause for terrorism lay 
in the country’s social contradictions and also its anti-Western sentiments.6 According to 
Liu Bosong, in addition to religious strife within India the external source of the killers 
was Pakistan, and that was the first country accused by India’s leaders, immediately after 
the attack.7 Not all the early speculations by Chinese analysts proved correct; later there 
was unambiguous evidence showing that those terrorists had originated in Pakistan and 
were trained there.8
What Are the Implications of the Terrorist Attacks for the South Asian Peninsula?
The Mumbai terrorist attacks cast a grey shadow over the peace process in South Asia, 
and the prospect of an India-Pakistan war seemed very real.9 The possibility of military 
conflict between India and Pakistan was a common theme among several Chinese com-
mentators, especially when both sides were reinforcing troops at the border.10
China too apparently deployed more troops to the border after the terrorist attacks, 
especially given the prospect of a war between India and Pakistan. Some commenta-
tors perhaps overestimated China’s influence in the prospect of war between India and 
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Pakistan. According to one commentator, only China, rather than the United States, 
United Kingdom, or Russia, could curb India’s belligerence against Pakistan.11 Another 
piece a month later reinforced this view, asserting that the only reason why there was 
no war between India and Pakistan after the terrorist attacks was pressure applied by 
China.12
What Lessons Can China Learn from the Mumbai Attacks? 
Much more media coverage of Chinese experts’ analysis of the Mumbai terrorist attacks 
focused on lessons China could draw from this horrific event. 
Maintaining Stability in Xinjiang. As maintaining stability is the top priority of the Chi-
nese government’s agenda, how to maintain stability in China, especially in those “hot 
spot areas,” is naturally of major concern. This was particularly true after the warning 
by the Iranian president that the Mumbai terrorist planners might plot an attack on 
China.13 Such warnings drew much Chinese expert attention to the issue of stability in 
the Uighur/Muslim-dominated Xinjiang, which is proximate to both India and Pakistan. 
In the view of Li Wei, who thinks the terrorists forces were mainly from within India, 
because of its long-standing internal religious and social conflict, China should draw the 
lesson of carefully handling potential conflicts in regions like Xinjiang.14
Capacity Building in Intelligence Collection. Quality intelligence is essential to nip terror-
ist plots in the bud. There seems to have been a paucity of coordination between the cen-
tral security agencies and the local police in Mumbai. Focusing on this problem, analysts 
in China are very much concerned with China’s counterterrorism intelligence capacity, 
and there are calls for stronger coordination and capacity building. According to a paper 
published in the Journal of the Railway Police College, the key task for counterterrorism 
is intelligence collection. China should invest more human and financial resources to 
institutionalizing the efforts in intelligence collection; mobilize mass power and build a 
civil system to counter terrorism; promote international cooperation and the pooling of 
information needed to keep our counterintelligence database up-to-date; and improve 
the quality and method of analyzing this information.15 Li Wei too comments that there 
should be a breakthrough in securing high-quality intelligence, because one of the main 
difficulties in counterterrorism is the lack of quality intelligence.16
More Intensive Coastal Surveillance. The terrorists reached Mumbai through the sea 
route, and the gap in India’s coastal surveillance was highlighted in media coverage. The 
lack of coordination between the coast guard and the navy enlarged the gap and made 
the case worse.17 The need for strong coastal surveillance is common for all countries 
with coastlines. China has a coastline of about eighteen thousand kilometers, and coastal 
surveillance is of prominent importance, especially in the light of the Mumbai terrorist 
attacks. The need for building a stronger coast guard and better coordination between 
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the Chinese navy and various national coast guard elements predated the Mumbai  
attacks. 
Stronger Counterterrorism Force Building. The Mumbai terrorist attacks also exposed 
how ill trained and equipped the local police were. Many police officers remained pas-
sive, because the terrorists outgunned them; the terrorists were better equipped, with 
modern and sophisticated weapons. Nor did Indian security forces have a well-designed 
rescue plan. Xu Hao, with the Public Security Bureau of Shanghai, writes that China 
should learn from the Mumbai terrorist attacks with respect to public security personnel 
training, especially in the aspect of the consciousness, skills, and techniques of coun-
terterrorism.18 Chi Yannian emphasizes the slow response of counterterrorism forces in 
this instance and calls for the constant readiness of counterterrorism forces throughout 
China.19
Antiterrorist Preparations in China 
Drawing lessons from the Mumbai terrorist attacks, China has been on high alert for 
possible terrorist attacks, especially during big events that catch the world’s attention. 
Security measures for the 2008 Olympics were taken throughout the country several 
months before the Games opened. According to Meng Hongwei, deputy minister of the 
Ministry of Public Security, there were three main terrorist threats to the 2008 Olympic 
Games: international terrorists, terrorists from East Turkestan or separatists from Tibet, 
China’s massive ports are the most crucial nodes of Beijing’s burgeoning economy. Safety and 
security in and around these trading hubs have evolved into a significant national priority.
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and various criminal elements. The second group, terrorists from East Turkestan, was 
accorded special priority.20
The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and Shanghai World Expo 2010
In response to those potential terrorist threats, the three forces of the PLA joined 
together with local police in guaranteeing a safe Olympics. For the PLA, the core tasks 
were mainly nontraditional security threats, with an emphasis on the potential employ-
ment of nuclear or biochemical weapons.21 The PLA Navy was responsible for insulating 
sea targets from terrorist attacks. In fulfilling this task, the navy had set up a multilayer 
observation and defense system for different sets of tasks, such as maritime patrol and 
surveillance, underwater security inspection and detection, maritime search and rescue, 
and emergencies under various circumstances.22 
The three fleets of China’s navy had their division of labor. A branch of the South China 
Sea Fleet was in charge of underwater security in the open waters around the “Bird’s 
Nest,” the Beijing National Stadium. It had a team of divers to conduct underwater 
routine inspections, removing suspicious objects.23 The East China Sea Fleet and North 
China Sea Fleet coordinated offshore security during the Olympic Games. The sailing 
competition for the Olympic Games was held in Qingdao, which is also the headquarters 
for the North Sea Fleet. Its main responsibilities included patrol surveillance, undersea 
security inspections, search, and salvage. New-type equipment was also fielded by the 
North Sea Fleet and was deployed in a field exercise. 
According to Huang Weichu, head of the nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency 
handling team and director of the disease control center of the Jinan Military Area 
Command, the employment of the new-type equipment raised the efficiency of recon-
naissance and inspection by 83 percent.24 The North Sea Fleet was also responsible for 
sailing-zone security inspections before it transferred the duty to local coast guard units 
a week before the opening of the Games.25 In addition, a frigate group of the South Sea 
Fleet held formation tactical training in a complicated electromagnetic environment, 
ensuring the security of the Olympic events in Hong Kong. Finally, a submarine chaser 
group of the same fleet also organized a defensive formation for the Olympic security 
mission.26
The coast guard units around the coastal cities also participated actively in security mea-
sures for the Olympics. According to the 1st Brigade of the Guangdong coast guard, it 
had more than a thousand patrol missions within this period and effectively guaranteed 
security along the coast of Guangdong and Hong Kong. It also had all-weather, twenty-
four-hour surveillance around the coast near Hong Kong.27 
The World Expo was held in Shanghai during 2010. Security concerns were of top prior-
ity, and lessons learned from Mumbai were important to Expo security precautions. 
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The security measures taken were different from those of Beijing’s Olympics, because 
the World Expo 2010 lasted longer, about five months, and Shanghai is a coastal city, 
with a coastline of 512 kilometers and twenty-one thousand square kilometers of sea 
area. Coastal security was accordingly a higher agenda item for this event. According 
to Hongkai Liu, Director General of Armed Policy of Shanghai and deputy commander 
for World Expo Security Headquarters, World Expo 2010 was different from most other 
world expos because of its location within the metropolitan area of Shanghai, rather than 
in rural areas or suburbs, which made security measures more complicated.28
Shanghai is a city with many big events, and the coastguardsmen there are quite skilled 
in security measures. Even so, formal training specifically for the World Expo 2010 
began as early as March 2009, and related preparatory operations were completed much 
earlier. The three forces of the PLA also joined the security forces; a joint command 
headquarters was built in August 2009 and implemented 6 March 2010.29 
Training for this event specifically focused on the prevention of destruction by terrorists 
of important targets at sea, prevention of potential explosions, and prevention of entan-
glement with local fishermen in coastal areas. New devices were deployed with Shanghai 
coast guard elements, including anti-explosive devices, interception guns, frogmen, and 
parachutists from helicopters. For the longer time span of World Expo 2010, coordinated 
efforts to draw security resources from neighboring municipalities were implemented, 
Fishermen are rescued from their sinking vessel by a rescue helicopter of the China Maritime 
Safety Administration. Beijing has rapidly improved its search and rescue capabilities, but is also 
looking for assistance from Washington in this critical area of maritime nontraditional security.
not congruent but quite complementary 83
altogether encompassing eight provinces, together with Shanghai. New ships were built, 
especially including high-speed motorboats and patrol ships. The Chinese navy’s East 
Sea Fleet coordinated with the coast guard to form an outer sea-security picket.30
Ongoing Efforts for International Coordination in the War against Terrorism
China is hardly alone in waging war against terrorists, and many international coordi-
nation efforts have been made in different programs, such as personnel training, joint 
exercises, information sharing, etc. For example, in the preparation of the 2008 Olympic 
Games in Beijing, many countries—including the United States, Israel, Britain, Australia, 
France, and Greece—joined efforts in lending expertise and assistance to ensure a safe 
and secure Olympics. There are reports that the United States exported some sophis-
ticated equipment and technology to China for the first time and even sent a “nuclear 
accident response assistance group” to China. 
Foreign experts also participated in training and mutual learning in China’s antiterrorist 
efforts focused on the maritime flank, for example, in exchanges with both East Timor 
and Malaysia. The U.S. Coast Guard cutter Rush visited China and enhanced mutual 
understanding. In 2007, Capt. Bernard Moreland, USCG, lectured at the Ningbo China 
Coast Guard Academy for a week; he was the first Coast Guard officer from the United 
States to offer lectures at the Ningbo Academy.31 China sends its security personnel 
abroad to such countries as France, Israel, Singapore, and Thailand for training.
Joint exercises among maritime forces are an important component of international 
coordination to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. China has participated actively 
in this kind of joint exercise—deploying not only the PLA Navy but also other sea forces, 
which include coast guard elements. As of 2009, there had been altogether twenty-eight 
joint military exercises conducted with PLA participation.32 
On 22 October 2003, the PLA Navy and the Pakistani navy held a joint exercise code-
named Dolphin 0310 near an estuary of the Yangtze River in the East Sea. This was the 
first naval joint military exercise with a foreign counterpart in the nontraditional secu-
rity field since the founding of the PLA Navy in 1949. The exercise included salvage on 
the sea, communications and information sharing, counterterrorism methods, and joint 
deployment. Later in 2003, a similar exercise was held with the Indian navy. China and 
Australia’s first naval exercise was held in September 2004, and then–defense minister 
Robert Hill said in an interview that more efforts on information sharing and, especially, 
information relevant to counterterrorism should be made between the two navies. Since 
that time the PLA Navy has expanded the scope of its cooperation with other navies, 
frequently focusing on common, nontraditional maritime security threats. In addition, 
China’s coast guard elements also engaged actively in international cooperation and 
mutual learning.
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Connecting Locally: Civil-Naval Joint Exercise
To respond better to the challenges of nontraditional security issues and also to meet the 
needs of quick response in case of accidents, civil and naval joint efforts are needed. PLA 
Navy and civil maritime forces have been conducting joint exercises for the past few 
years.
On 26 May 2009 the first-ever large-scale civil-naval joint salvage exercise, Lu Hai 2009, 
was held near the coasts of Fujian and Shandong. In this exercise, the Xiamen Salvage 
Call Center received a signal for help and shared this information with the nearby naval 
base, the Chinese coast guard, and thirteen other concerned departments. Altogether 
fifteen ships and one helicopter joined this exercise. On 9 July 2009 another civil-naval 
joint salvage exercise was held near the estuary of the Pearl River. Twenty-five ships and 
two helicopters from the South Sea Fleet, the South Sea Salvage Bureau, the South Sea 
Bureau of State Oceanic Administration, and Guangdong Customs joined this exercise.33
In the preparation of World Expo 2010, another civil-naval exercise, aiming at terrorist 
attacks, was held on 11 March 2010, in the East China Sea. This exercise mainly focused 
on countering possible terrorist attacks from the nearby sea and from ships passing by.34 
All those civil-naval salvage and antiterrorist exercises have built a better system for na-
val and civil forces to respond to the challenges posed by nontraditional security issues.
Conclusion: The Need for a Stronger, Multilayer “Great Wall” on the Sea
For the past sixty years, the PLA Navy has gone through several stages of development. 
This is true not only of the refinement and upgrading of equipment but more impor-
tantly of the guiding strategies of the PLA Navy. Many critics in China find that the 
PLA Navy has been preoccupied too much with near-coast responsibilities and that this 
tendency has constrained its efforts for an outgoing strategy. The Chinese navy should 
press farther out to the high seas. This seems especially urgent during the recent years, 
as China’s interests overseas radically increase.
As for the coastal areas, some critics say other enforcement forces should handle most of 
the tasks in these areas. China does not have an integrated and powerful coast guard like 
the ones in such major sea powers as the United States and Japan. In recent years, there 
has been a call for an integrated and upgraded coast guard to perform more comprehen-
sive near-coast duties, which are now performed by all “five dragons” (maritime enforce-
ment agencies). With their overlaps and redundancies in performing certain duties, 
efficiencies have been lost. 
To sum up, there is an urgent need for China to have enhanced coast guard forces to 
fulfill current challenges.35 Stronger coast guard forces are needed by Beijing also to cope 
with tensions between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, and between China and 
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Many similarities exist in the way the governments of the United States and China prepare and organize for peacekeeping (PKO) and stability operations. Owing to 
differing threat environments and perceptions, national policies (including international 
commitments and alliances), physical and geographic conditions, force structures, and 
domestic political considerations, there are also important differences in the ways each 
country executes those missions. Nonetheless, peacekeeping and stability operations are 
major missions for the armed forces of both countries. 
Perhaps the most significant similarity for both the United States and China is that 
their active-duty militaries are not tasked as the primary means of government power 
to maintain and enforce domestic stability. Other government organizations have that 
responsibility. However, both countries provide legal means for active-duty forces to 
support a variety of domestic security missions. The armed forces of both countries also 
actively prepare for, and are deployed in response to, a wide range of emergencies and 
natural disasters in accordance with national laws.
Definitions and Policy
The U.S. Department of Defense defines “peacekeeping” as “military operations under-
taken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate 
implementation of an agreement.”1 A related term, “peace enforcement,” does not require 
consent of the parties and is generally authorized by an international organization such 
as the UN, but the United States could act unilaterally if necessary or within a frame-
work approved by an international organization other than the UN.
The United States has a long history, stretching back to 1950, of participating in military 
operations after UN Security Council authorization. It also participates in peacekeeping 
and peace-enforcement missions sanctioned by other international organizations, such 
as NATO. For example, the United States currently has deployed 1,480 troops to the 
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
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The Chinese term for peacekeeping is “maintaining peace operations” (维持和平行动). 
When referring to Chinese participation in these activities, the term is usually preceded 
by noting that the activities are sanctioned by the UN (联合国维持和平行动). This 
represents the first principle of Chinese participation in PKO missions—the requirement 
for UN authorization. To date, the Chinese have participated only in peacekeeping op-
erations authorized by the UN Security Council and conducted under its auspices; some 
UN operations the Chinese have participated in have been authorized under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.
Beijing’s long-standing, declared foreign policy seeks to avoid interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries, just as it seeks to prevent other countries from interfering with 
what it considers the internal affairs of China. UN authorization provides the Chinese 
government the legal justification it seeks potentially to “interfere in the internal affairs” 
of other nations.
China’s policy toward peacekeeping operations was defined in its first white paper on 
national defense, published in 1998. In addition to emphasizing the necessity of the UN 
mandate, this statement underlined that “in peace-keeping operations, the following 
principles, which have proved to be effective in the past, should be adhered to: obtain-
ing agreement from the country concerned beforehand, strictly observing neutrality and 
prohibiting the use of force except for self-defense.”2
Over the past twenty years, as China has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping 
missions, Beijing has adhered to these principles. Currently, views about peacekeeping in 
Beijing and Washington have become closer, but they are still not completely congruent 
(as demonstrated by Chinese reluctance to participate in any but UN-sanctioned mis-
sions). A much larger difference in definitions is found in the term “stability operations.”
The Pentagon defines “stability operations” as “an overarching term encompassing 
various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in 
coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe 
and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastruc-
ture reconstruction, and humanitarian relief ” [emphasis supplied]. The key element here 
is “conducted outside the United States,” which means that the U.S. military does not 
consider actions it undertakes inside the United States as “stability operations.” Many of 
these functions could be called military operations other than war (MOOTW), peace-
keeping, peace enforcement, or nation building. U.S. military forces have been deployed 
both legally and routinely within the United States to conduct many operations that fall 
within the parameters above.
The U.S. military recently has been engaged in a variety of these actions in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. Moreover, American doctrine foresees the potential for more such missions 
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in the future. As noted in the foreword to the U.S. Army field manual on stability opera-
tions, “The greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism 
or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the 
most basic needs of their people.”3 Recognizing that it was involved in multiple “stability 
operations” and would be for a long to come, in November 2005 the Department of De-
fense (DoD) issued a directive that emphasized that “stability operations were no longer 
secondary to combat operations.”4 This was a major change in U.S. military doctrine, 
resulting from realities of the past decade, and one that has not yet quite been replicated 
by the PLA.
The roles and missions of the Chinese armed forces are defined in article 22 of the 1997 
National Defense Law. The law mandates the PLA is to be externally oriented but that 
as a secondary mission it may assist in maintaining public order. At the same time, the 
primary mission of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is domestic security. The militia 
supports both internal and external missions.
The Chinese military considers preparing to fight a local war under informationized 
conditions as its core mission, with preparation for and execution of “nontraditional 
security,” “nonwar,” or “nonmilitary” missions as an important adjunct but not with an 
equal priority, as in U.S. doctrine. As stated in a March 2010 article in the military news-
paper Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily): 
Our military’s historic mission for the new stage of the new century requires us not only 
to win local wars under the condition of informatization but also to carry out nonmilitary 
operations. . . . However, no] matter how the security situation changes, how the military’s 
functions broaden, . . . curbing [deterring] war, winning wars and maintaining peace are 
always the most fundamental duty of our military.”5 
The main nonwar military actions include a wide array of missions—for example, anti-
terrorism, domestic stability, border control, emergency response (such as for a public 
health crisis), disaster relief, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and nuclear, biological, 
and chemical (NBC) defense.6
As seen in this task list and from many recent actual deployments, all elements of the 
Chinese armed forces may be called on to perform both domestic and external tradi-
tional security and nontraditional security missions. For domestic stability requirements, 
such as handling “sudden incidents” (突发事件), and antiterrorist operations, the civil-
ian police and PAP are the government’s first and second lines of defense, respectively, 
with the PLA as a third line, providing support as required.
Perhaps the best example of civilian police–PLA–PAP–militia cooperation was seen in 
the 2008 Olympic security procedures implemented throughout China. Overall secu-
rity was the responsibility of the multiministry, civilian-led Beijing Olympic Security 
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Coordination Group. Within the Beijing Olympic Security Command Center, led by 
Beijing Municipality police chief Ma Zhenchuan, PLA participation was supervised 
by a Military Work (or Affairs) Bureau headed by Senior Col. Tian Yixiang.7 The PLA 
provided air defense and coastal security, as well as backup antiterrorist and NBC sup-
port, for all Olympic venues. In total, the PLA contributed “46,000 troops, 98 fixed-wing 
aircraft, 60 helicopters, 63 ships, and some ground-to-air missiles, and radar, chemical 
defense and engineering support equipment” to the Olympic security network through-
out the country. The PAP provided some 85,000 troops to the effort.8 Despite these large 
numbers from the PLA and PAP, civilian police forces nonetheless had primary respon-
sibility for site security and initial response.
Organization and Command and Control
Policies for peacekeeping and stability operations are formulated at the national level for 
both the United States and Chinese armed forces. Within the former, the Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Partnership Strategy and Stability advises “the 
Department’s leadership on all matters pertaining to stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping 
efforts and non-combatant evacuations.”9 In China, two offices share these same re-
sponsibilities in two ostensibly different headquarters in Beijing. Within the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND), a Peacekeeping Affairs Office (国防部维和事务办公室) was 
“established in 2001 to oversee the strategic management and coordination of the PLA’s 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations.”10 Unlike in the United States, the Chinese 
defense minister is not in the chain of command for the armed forces (though he is a 
member of the Central Military Commission). The role of the Chinese MND is related 
mainly to “exchanges in the military field with foreign institutions”;11 it also exercises 
oversight of peacekeeping (through the Peacekeeping Affairs Office).12
(Currently the director of the MND Peacekeeping Affairs Office is Maj. Gen. Shi Zhengbo.13 
The MND website has a “Peacekeeping” webpage [eng.mod.gov.cn/Peacekeeping/index 
.htm] that includes introductory information, photographs, and links to recent articles 
about Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping missions.) 
Primary responsibility for handling day-to-day tasks for most other nonwar or nontradi-
tional security missions, including antiterrorism, disaster relief, and support to internal 
security missions, resides in the General Staff Department (GSD) Operations Depart-
ment Emergency Office (解放军总参谋部作战部应急办). (The office director is Senior 
Col. Tian Yixiang—the same Senior Colonel Tian who was in charge of PLA support to 
Olympic security.)14 
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The Emergency Office was established in 2003 and is a division-leader-grade-level 
organization, with about twenty personnel. During emergencies, such as the Wenchuan 
earthquake, and for scheduled support to internal security missions, such as the Olym-
pics, Senior Colonel Tian is a major player in coordinating with other Chinese govern-
ment organizations and supervising military actions. Senior Colonel Tian executes the 
decisions made by the Leading Group Office for Responding to Emergencies established 
within the GSD when needed.15 The exact composition of this leading group varies ac-
cording to the crisis at hand.
In January 2006, a Chinese “national plan on emergency response,” complete with 
color-coded alert system, was announced. This plan outlines government preparation 
for unexpected incidents, social stability, natural disasters, accidents, public health, and 
social safety. The plan designates a State Council “office in charge of emergency response 
management to collect information on various incidents and co-ordinate response 
work.” In particular, “the army and police will provide major task forces dealing with 
emergencies,” responding to civilian, not military, authority. For incidents outside China 
involving Chinese citizens or organizations, such as commercial companies, “Chinese 
embassies and relevant State Council departments and regional governments should or-
ganize emergency relief work.”16 This last clause specifies that Beijing prefers that local for-
eign governments take the lead in emergency actions involving Chinese citizens in their 
countries, including reacting to terrorist incidents. At this time, the Chinese government 
is not anxious to deploy its security forces overseas to resolve hostage situations.
In the event of terrorist activities inside China, national-level coordination will be 
headed by a small group in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
with its headquarters in the Ministry of Public Security, where the National Anti-
Terrorist Command Center has been established. The civilian police would provide the 
primary antiterrorist response force, backed up by PAP antiterrorist units and supported 
by appropriate PLA forces as necessary.17 The preference for civilian police forces to be 
used to control domestic security situations is consistent with the national emergency 
plan and is also explained in other official government documents.
For example, in the 2006 defense white paper the PAP’s chain of command for internal 
security operations is described as follows: “In terms of conducting public security opera-
tions (执行公安任务) . . . the [PAP] General Headquarters is under the leadership and 
command of the Ministry of Public Security, and the [PAP] units at and below the con-
tingent level are under the leadership and command of the public security organs at the 
same level.”18 This quote specifies civilian command for public security functions, such as 
crowd-control or antiriot operations, at both the national and local levels, in routine and 
emergency situations. Left unstated by the white paper is the fact that PLA units may as-
sist or provide support to such operations, as defined in the National Defense Law. In the 
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years since 1989 such assistance has been limited, with the most visible example occur-
ring in March 2008 in Lhasa, where local PLA units were deployed to man checkpoints 
and conduct patrols—after the police and PAP had restored order.
In general, the Chinese chain of command for responding to terrorist incidents inside 
and outside China parallels the American system. Inside the United States, the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, along with local jurisdictions, 
have primary responsibility for responding to terrorism, while in the case of terrorist 
incidents overseas, the U.S. embassy and Department of State take the lead. 
In September 2009, Senior Colonel Tian wrote an article for Jiefangjun Bao about the 
PLA “emergency command mechanism” responsible for the deployment of PLA and 
PAP units during “emergency rescue and disaster relief operations.” In it he notes that 
the mechanism was established in March 2005 as a “coordinated military-civil joint 
action mechanism,” which includes information sharing.19 In order to respond to 
MOOTW requirements, on 5 January 2009 the GSD issued the “Plan on PLA’s Capac-
ity Building in Military Operations Other than War,” specifying guidelines, principles, 
and objectives, as well as the size and strength of and measures for building MOOTW 
forces.20 Five types of dedicated emergency-response and peacekeeping units (not in-
cluding antiterrorist units) were later identified:21
 • Nineteen flood relief units from the PLA engineering force 
 • An earthquake emergency rescue force, consisting of PLA engineering troops and 
medical workers from the PAP, known as the China International Search and Rescue 
Team and China Emergency Fire Rescue Team22
 • Emergency rescue forces for nuclear, chemical, and biological disasters, consisting of 
chemical defense troops from the military regions and medical rescue workers from 
the Academy of Military Medical Sciences
 • Ten transportation and communications emergency relief groups, consisting of engi-
neering units from the army engineering force and the Second Artillery
 • International peacekeeping force amounting to at least “one UN standard engineer-
ing battalion, one UN standard medical team and two UN standard transportation 
companies.”23
These emergency-response units have been issued special equipment for their mis-
sions and receive special training. Their expertise will be augmented with manpower 
and logistics support from units in the local area, as well as by civilian support. In many 
cases, the first units responding to natural disasters will be from local PAP and militia 
or reserve units. Reports of civil-military training in all these missions throughout the 
country are common.
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In the wake of the Yushan earthquake of April 2010, Senior Colonel Tian said, “The 
armed forces have done better and acted quicker than they did during the Wenchuan 
quake relief.”24 He also announced that eight “state-level [national-level] specialized 
emergency rescue units,” with a total of fifty thousand personnel, would be formed 
and become operational by the end of 2010. “Regulations of the PLA on Emergency 
Command in Handling Contingencies” will also be issued soon.25 This appears to be a 
centralization of emergency response units under GSD control, which could eliminate 
several levels of command, while likely maintaining their decentralized distribution 
throughout the country.
For counterterrorism operations, every military region, the navy, and the air force’s 
15th Airborne Army each have a special operations group with subordinate elements 
trained in antiterrorism tactics. Any of these units could cooperate with a variety of PAP 
antiterrorist units and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) antiterrorist squads found in 
most major cities. There is no indication at this time that the PLA intends to consolidate 
these decentralized special operations units (each of about a thousand personnel) into 
a national-level command organization. So far, no dedicated air units (fixed-wing or 
rotary-wing) have been assigned in full-time support to special operations.
As in the PLA, a number of U.S. forces are tasked to be contingency forces for a va-
riety of stability-related missions. However, they are much more centrally controlled 
and organized than in the PLA. On 1 October 2002 the U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) was established to provide command and control over DoD’s 
homeland-defense efforts and to coordinate Defense support of civilian authorities.26 
In addition to having responsibility for aerospace warning and control, USNORTHCOM 
commands a dedicated drug-interdiction task force, forces guarding the national 
capital, a U.S. Army brigade on call for emergencies, and a task force dedicated to the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction.
In contrast to the long experience of the U.S. armed forces in expeditionary, joint war-
fare, the Chinese armed forces have only about ten years of training and organization as 
“modular, versatile, and rapidly deployable” forces and minimal experience in operat-
ing beyond China’s borders. To date, their experience has mostly been in conducting 
exercises and operations within China or just outside. The 2008 deployment of 146,000 
active-duty PLA and PAP personnel, plus 75,000 reservists and militia, in response to 
the Wenchuan earthquake was the largest deployment of Chinese armed forces since the 
1979 border war with Vietnam.27 As for overseas deployments, in addition to the PLA 
Navy’s antipiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden, small units of PLA and PAP forces 
from all over the country have had the opportunity to be tested in real-world peace-
keeping operations in Africa, Asia, and North America. They provide benefit to the 
UN PKO missions to which they are assigned, as they gain experience in long-distance 
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deployments, logistics support, command and control, and operations in foreign  
countries.
Current Chinese Peacekeeping Operations
China has deployed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions since about 1990. As of 28 
February 2010, China ranked fourteenth among all contributors to UN PKO missions, 
with 2,137 military and civilian police personnel deployed to ten missions (see figure 1). 
Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China contributes the larg-
est number of personnel. In comparison, France ranks sixteenth, with 1,673 personnel; 
Russia is forty-second, with 362; the United Kingdom is forty-sixth, with 275; and the 
United States ranks number seventy-one, with eighty-six personnel deployed to seven 
UN PKO missions.28 The United States and China both contribute personnel to missions 
in Haiti, the Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and the Middle East. 
Approximately 115 countries make available over a hundred thousand personnel for 
sixteen UN missions. Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India are the three largest contributors 
Figure 1. Chinese and U.S. Participation in UN PKO Missions (February 2010)
Source: “UN Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country,” United Nations, 28 February 2010, www.un.org/.
* “Individual police” are Ministry of Public Security police.
** “Formed police units” consist of MPS antiriot police and PAP border-defense antiriot police personnel. 
Mission Experts on 
Mission
Individual 
Police*
Formed 
Police Unit**
Contingent 
Troop
Total 
Chinese
Total 
U.S.
MINURSO 11        11
(Western Sahara)
MINUSTAH 16  126  142 53
(Haiti)
MONUC 16   218 234 2
(Congo)
UNAMID 2   322 324
(Darfur)
UNIFIL    344 344
(Lebanon)
UNMIL 2 14  565 581 19
(Liberia)
UNMIS 12 11  444 467 6
(Sudan)
UNMIT 2 22   24
(Timor-Leste)
UNOCI 7    7
(Côte d’Ivoire)
UNTSO 3    3 2
(Middle East) 
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of personnel, with over ten thousand each for Bangladesh and Pakistan and over eight 
thousand for India. China is in the second tier of twenty-two countries, each provid-
ing from one to five thousand personnel. About eighty nations contribute fewer than 
a thousand personnel. Thus with about 2 percent of the overall personnel, China is a 
significant contributor but is still a long way from the top of personnel providers.
As seen in figure 2, when each mission is examined individually China provides from 
0.1 to over 5 percent of the personnel total. In no case does China provide the largest 
number of personnel per mission, and it usually trails the leading contributing country 
by a wide margin. As such, China’s participation is useful but not crucial to the missions. 
The PLA contributes battalion-sized units to five missions, and PAP border-defense 
units contribute antiriot police personnel to the mission in Haiti. For the PLA, deploy-
ments are centered on an engineer battalion, with medical support, and often a trans-
portation unit. As seen in figure 3, units from all over the country provide forces. So far, 
in contrast to the United States, the PLA has not committed infantry or armored combat 
forces to UN PKO missions. 
Units undergo predeployment training and then are deployed for eight months at a time. 
Often they deploy in batches, with half the force arriving for an overlap period with the 
Figure 2. Percentage of Chinese Personnel Compared to Mission Total 
Source: “UN Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country,” United Nations, 28 February 2010, www.un.org/. 
MINURSO 11 224 4.9 Malaysia/20 29
(Western Sahara)
MINUSTAH 142 9,087 1.6 Brazil/1,282 48
(Haiti)
MONUC 234 20,573 1.1 India/4,552 57
(Congo)
UNAMID 324 21,800 1.5 Nigeria/3,843 48
(Darfur)
UNIFIL 344 11,504 3.0 Italy/2,236 31 
(Lebanon)
UNMIL 581 10,427 5.6 Pakistan/3,109 60
(Liberia)
UNMIS 467 10,541 4.4 India/2,706 68
(Sudan)
UNMIT 24 1,521 1.6 Malaysia/216 40
(Timor-Leste)
UNOCI 7 8,544 0.1 Bangladesh/2,345 53
(Côte d’Ivoire)
UNTSO 3 153 2.0 Finland/14 23
(Middle East) 
Mission Total 
Chinese
Total 
from All 
Countries
Percentage 
Chinese
Largest 
Contributor/
Number of 
Personnel
Total 
Number of 
Countries 
Contributing
96 china maritime studies
force it relieves. All of these missions have seen multiple deployments and redeploy-
ments of forces, and it is not unusual for individual soldiers to have served multiple 
tours, perhaps on multiple missions.
As much as two months of predeployment training is conducted at unit garrisons before 
personnel go to formal PAP and PLA peacekeeping training facilities. The PAP estab-
lished the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center (CPCTC) in August 2000 
in Langfang, Hebei Province, where it trains both Chinese and foreign civilian-police 
peacekeepers. The center has been expanded since its founding.29 PLA troops train at 
the Nanjing Political Academy (for language and general skill training) and at the newly 
established MND Peacekeeping Center at Huairou, in Beijing Municipality.30 It appears 
that PLA and PAP personnel do not train together.
For the Haiti mission, PAP border-defense antiriot police work in conjunction with MPS 
antiriot police from different parts of the country. Individual antiriot-police personnel 
are selected from their larger units and deployed as “formed police units” for the length 
Figure 3. Major PLA and PAP Contributions
Source: Multiple news articles; “Backgrounder: Main Distribution of Current Chinese Peacekeepers,” Xinhua, 19 January 2010, 
news.xinhuanet.com/.
Mission Number of 
Deployments/
Start Date
Source of Troops Type/Size Units 
(# of personnel 
may vary)
MINUSTAH 8/Oct. 2004 PAP Yunnan and Antiriot police (125)
(Haiti)   Guangdong Border Defense units;
  Xinjiang Border Defense unit;
  Shandong Border Defense unit;
  Fujian Border Defense unit
  (some units have provided
  troops more than once;
  sometimes deployed with MPS 
  antiriot police)
MONUC 11/April 2003 Lanzhou MR; Beijing Engineer battalion
(Congo)   MR Engineer (175); Medical (43)
  Brigade (2004)  
UNAMID 3/Nov. 2007 Jinan MR; Engineer battalion
(Darfur)  Beijing MR (315); Medical (7)
UNIFIL 6/March 2006 Chengdu MR/13th Engineer battalion
(Lebanon)    Group Army  (275); Medical (60)
UNMIL  10/Dec. 2003 Beijing MR  Engineer battalion
(Liberia)   Engineer Brigade, Inner (275); Transportation
   Mongolia MD, and battalion (240);
  unidentified group army; Medical (43)
  Shenyang and Nanjing MRs
  (2004)
UNMIS  6/Sept. 2005 Jinan MR (including Engineer battalion
(Sudan)   personnel from an armored  (275); Transportation
   division)  company (100);
   Medical (60)
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of their rotations. Haiti represents the only deployment of PAP forces on UN PKO mis-
sions. Following the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, ten Chinese peacekeepers and 
two squads from the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division conducted at least one joint patrol, in 
conjunction with the Haitian special police in Port-au-Prince.31
So far only one UN PKO mission has been commanded by a PLA officer. In August 
2007, Maj. Gen. Zhao Jingmin was designated force commander for the United Nations 
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). (Prior to that assignment 
Zhao had served in MINURSO from 1991 to 1992, in the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission from 1996 to 1997, and in the MND Peacekeeping Affairs Office 
from 2003 to 2007.)32
With regard to funding, the UN PKO budget for 2010 is about $7.9 billion. The leading 
contributors are the United States, with 27.17 percent, and Japan, with 12.53 percent. 
The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy form a second tier, contributing 
between 5 and 8 percent, while China is at the top of the third tier, with 3.94 percent.33 
This amounts to about $311 million for China, up from $270 million in 2007. Given 
the size of China’s GDP, it would seem that an increase in this number should not cause 
excessive strain on the Chinese government’s budget. Equally, there is little doubt that 
were the Chinese political and military leadership to determine it to be in its interest, the 
PLA could greatly increase the number of troops deployed to UN PKO missions, includ-
ing the addition of combat forces. An important question, though, is how a decision to 
deploy PLA combat troops on overseas peacekeeping missions would be received by 
foreign governments.
Conclusions
There is no question that the Chinese armed forces have embraced nontraditional 
security measures as a major mission and a factor in force building and training. Still, 
preparing for and deterring local war remains the PLA’s core mission, unlike the U.S. 
armed forces, where stability operations have the same priority as combat operations. 
Just as equipping the large PLA active-duty force with sufficient modern weapons and 
information technologies to prosecute integrated joint combat operations is a challenge, 
the tasks of adequately equipping the force with the specialized equipment necessary for 
disaster-relief operations and stockpiling supplies in dispersed locations reasonably near 
areas of need are also problematic. Likewise, conducting realistic training for war and 
nonwar missions will continue to be time-consuming, expensive, and difficult. Because 
of different technological levels among units within the forces, it is likely that, for both 
war and nonwar missions, relatively small numbers of highly trained, advanced units 
will be integrated with much larger numbers of less well equipped forces to work in 
tandem to accomplish the mission.
98 china maritime studies
In the event of emergencies and war, units from all the armed forces will work closely 
with civilian counterparts, who in many nonwar scenarios will actually be in the lead. 
Similarly, high technology will be combined with massive manual labor to perform 
many tasks. A recent example of this in the Chinese context was modern Il-76 transport 
aircraft flying into remote disaster regions only to be unloaded by chains of men lugging 
cargo on their backs, instead of by palletized cargo systems found in other militaries.
With regard to terrorist and hostage situations involving Chinese citizens and interests 
overseas, the record is clear that in fact Beijing pursues a policy in which “Chinese em-
bassies and relevant State Council departments” work with regional governments to “or-
ganize emergency relief work.” A quick review of several incidents of Chinese nationals 
taken hostage in recent years reveals that nearly all have been released after the Chinese 
dispatched government officials to work with local governments and civic organiza-
tions to negotiate terms of release. These terms are usually not made public. The only 
armed rescue attempted by a foreign government resulted in a dead hostage. There is no 
evidence in any of the nine incidents reviewed for this study of the Chinese government 
threatening to use force to free its people.34
Chinese People’s Armed Police patrol in the northwest frontier province of Xinjiang. The Chinese 
armed forces, including the PLA, continue to view domestic security as well as disaster relief 
missions, such as operations related to the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, as core duties.
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Beijing is driven to follow this policy in part because of the limitations of its antiterror-
ist forces, the lack of strategic mobility to get its forces in place rapidly, and shortfalls in 
collecting the detailed intelligence necessary for a successful hostage rescue or antiter-
rorist mission. The Chinese government’s acceptance of these realities appears generally 
to have resulted in the successful release of its citizens.
In the summer of 2009, during the visit of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to Beijing, 
the Chinese suggested the prospect of conducting bilateral humanitarian-assistance and 
disaster-relief training.35 However, the overall political climate between the countries 
did not permit agreement on the topic for two years. After a period of cool military-to-
military relations, in July 2011 the U.S. and Chinese armed forces agreed, during the 
visit of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to China, to conduct several combined 
humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief exercises in 2011 and 2012. A press release stated 
that “hospital ships of the two navies will conduct exchanges and carry out joint medical 
and rescue drills [but no date for the exercise was given] . . . armed forces from both 
sides will conduct joint humanitarian rescue and disaster relief drills in the third quarter 
of 2012 . . . [and] the two navies will also carry out joint anti-piracy drills in the Gulf of 
Aden in the fourth quarter of [2011].”36 Such exercises likely will be very simple at first, 
but potentially could expand to more complex operations. 
Despite the disruptions in the China-U.S. military-to-military relationship, as Chinese 
armed forces continue to engage in peacekeeping and stability-related operations over-
seas it is increasingly likely that they will come in contact with U.S. forces. As demon-
strated in Haiti on the smallest of scales, professional military and paramilitary person-
nel can cooperate and execute operations that benefit the overall mission and contribute 
to improved relations between the two armed forces. The United States and China will 
often share national interests in contributing to peacekeeping and stability operations in 
foreign lands. Increased knowledge and awareness of each other’s doctrines and capabili-
ties will help realize those mutual interests. 
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China-U.S. relations seem to have come across troubles again. This time, the clear drivers for the new round of tussles between the two powers are the recent high-
profile demonstrations of American military muscle in East Asia, which were unmis-
takably targeted against the so-called rise of China. But to many Chinese pundits, the 
eagerness of the Obama administration to demonstrate its tough hand is also a reflection 
of a sort of strategic anxiety of the United States over its predicaments both at home and 
abroad, whether real or imagined. 
To be sure, as he looks around the world, President Obama has enough reasons to be 
unhappy with himself. He has been overburdened with so many thorny domestic issues 
and frustrated with so many setbacks in carrying out international commitments. When 
the country is engulfed in an overwhelming pessimism about its future, the United States 
tends to be defensive, desperate to want to take measures to consolidate its dominance 
over global as well as regional affairs. Mishandled, this sentiment could be one of the sig-
nificant factors that will bear on the evolution of the China-U.S. relations in the future. 
The present paper seeks to elaborate on what the two powers should do to overcome 
this unhealthy psychology to keep their bilateral relationship on the right track. Among 
many other suggestions, the paper highlights one point—that is, while the two powers 
continue to be constrained in the traditional security field, promoting nontraditional 
security cooperation could be very conducive and timely to the maintenance of a stable 
and cooperative relationship between the two great nations. 
I
The China policy of the Obama administration has taken a strange course. Unlike his 
predecessors, President Obama seemed to demonstrate unusual enthusiasm for a more 
cooperative relationship with China at the very outset of his presidency. Under his 
guidance, and thanks to joint efforts, the two countries seemed immediately to enter a 
warm period, in which the two sides expanded their engagement and cooperation in 
almost all political, economic, and security fields in the first year of the Obama admin-
istration. In Washington, there was even a whisper of a prospect of “G-2”—meaning 
China-U.S. cooperative governance of global affairs. Although that prediction has never 
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been appealing to the Chinese side, the two powers did succeed in reaching a joint 
statement when President Obama visited Beijing in November 2009. The document was 
the culmination of an extensive new consensus between the two state leaders and was 
supposed to provide a set of new guiding principles and a roadmap toward building a 
sustained, cooperative China-U.S. bilateral relationship in the post–Cold War era. The 
two countries agreed on the nature of this most important bilateral relationship as they 
reiterated that “they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehen-
sive China-US relationship for the 21st century, and will take concrete actions to steadily 
build a partnership to address common challenges.”1
The joint statement also explicitly recognized the importance of strengthening mutual 
confidence and trust for China-U.S. relations in the new era. There is a particular para-
graph that stresses the right approach to that end: 
The two sides reiterated that the fundamental principle of respect for each other’s sover-
eignty and territorial integrity is at the core of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués that 
guide China-U.S. relations. Neither side supports any attempts by any force to undermine 
this principle. The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is extremely 
important to ensure steady progress in China-US relations.2
To many Chinese, the joint statement would constitute a document of milestone signifi-
cance if truly implemented. In their view, it has not only provided a strong political basis 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff General Ma Xiaotian 
share a light moment. Nevertheless, the bilateral security relationship is still plagued with mis-
trust, unfortunately. Active cooperation in the domain of nontraditional security could help to 
build more constructive relationships and thus help to alleviate this persistent problem.
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for a sound China-U.S. cooperative relationship in the future but, more importantly, 
recorded American acceptance that “respecting each other’s core interests is extremely 
important to ensure steady progress in China-US relations.” This meant to many Chi-
nese a virtual acceptance for the first time on the part of the United States of China as a 
partner on an equal basis and a respect for China’s national core interests in the bilateral 
interaction. The perception led to an expectation in China that the major obstacle to 
bilateral cooperation between the two great nations had been removed and that a new 
vista would open up for the China-U.S. cooperation.
That expectation soon fell apart. After his return to Washington from the Beijing trip, 
President Obama seemed immediately to show the other side of his face. He announced 
a $6.4 billion weapon sale to Taiwan. As if that were not enough to offend the Chinese, 
he decided to meet with the Dalai Lama at the White House when the latter visited 
Washington in February 2010. From Beijing’s perspective, both acts amounted to wan-
ton trampling on China’s core national interests, virtually a stab in its back, particularly 
given the just concluded joint statement. The Chinese government angrily responded 
with a strong protest and cut off all the intended military-to-military contacts. The in-
dignant Chinese public felt betrayed by Obama, whose credibility in China plummeted 
almost overnight.
One plausible explanation for Obama’s abrupt about-face is that he may well have been 
hijacked by the Washington establishment. Despite his wish for better cooperation in 
China-U.S. relations, he could not resist the great pressure of those from the Pentagon, 
State Department, and Congress, not to mention the anti-China media and think tanks, 
among many others in Washington who believed that his visit to Beijing had been a 
humiliation to the United States. These people were particularly disappointed at China’s 
unwillingness to cooperate on a number of vital issues like Iran, climate change, and 
North Korea; angry at China’s alleged arrogance and assertiveness; and alarmed at what 
they perceived as the eroding status of the United States as a result of the increasing 
influence of a rising China.
In the meantime came the bizarre claim of the Obama administration to want to get 
“back to East Asia.” Since this superpower has never left the Asia-Pacific, the “return” 
could only mean the determination of Washington to take substantial steps to reconsoli-
date its position in the region, a position that had been perceived to be greatly eroded 
owing to the negligence of the previous administration. These steps include redeploying 
the U.S. military in the region, making the Asia-Pacific now the most concentrated place 
of its sophisticated military assets abroad; strengthening old military alliances and seek-
ing new security partners in Southeast Asia; enhancing its military presence in the form 
of conducting joint military exercises with local countries and port visits of its warships; 
and seeking other forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
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The “China threat” has been conspicuously used to justify these efforts. It has become 
almost an unwritten central theme that has run through all the recent dramas played out 
in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.
In Northeast Asia, the Cheonan incident appeared like a God-given opportunity to the 
Americans, who seemed to want just such high tension in the region to justify Ameri-
can military presence and to arrest the centrifugal trends of its allies. In Southeast Asia, 
the Obama administration has noticeably been seeking to strengthen its position in 
the region by making use of China’s territorial and maritime disputes with a number of 
ASEAN countries. In this regard, the State Department and Pentagon played a particu-
larly active role in insinuating the “China threat” and portraying the United States as 
“the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability in South Asia.” 
U.S. initiatives in both domains seemed to have two goals. One was to emphasize that 
the United States was back and would act as the protector of all the other East Asian 
countries in the region who may have apprehensions about the uncertain impact 
on their security of the fast development of China. But most of all, they seemed also 
intended to be a message to Beijing that the United States would firmly respond to any 
challenges by a rising China.
The major flaw of this U.S. strategy, however, is that Washington seems to address a 
vital security issue with a major tool that was efficient in the Cold War but is evidently 
outmoded in the post–Cold War era. Times have changed. Most of the security issues in 
East Asia today are political and economic in nature. American military forces or secu-
rity alliances would hardly seem relevant to their resolution. 
A Chinese soldier on exercises with Pakistan Army troops. Beijing has relied on nontraditional 
security missions to improve security ties with various key international partners. More robust 
China-U.S. cooperation in nontraditional security could help to ease anxieties in crucial but 
troubled regions, such as South and also Central Asia.
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Despite deep-seated mutual suspicion among states, East Asia is characterized by 
dynamics for sustained economic development, witnessing the fastest economic growth 
as well as global trade increase since the end of the Cold War. This economic devel-
opment in East Asia has also become a driving force for the nations in the region to 
strengthen cooperation among themselves, to seek peaceful solutions of numerous 
regional disputes, and to strive for a new regional security architecture that would ensure 
the security interests of all the states, not only one state or a group of states. Against that 
backdrop, mutual interdependence and mutual constraint among nations in East Asia 
have become the hallmarks of the situation in the region. In this sense, East Asia is a 
region that sees the most evident development of a trend of multipolarization: no single 
power or a power group is able to dictate the security affairs in the region without taking 
into account the interests of other countries; all the countries are more determined to 
be treated as equal partners in the regional, as well as global, affairs that involve their 
interests; and even U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea no longer wish to bind them-
selves blindly to the U.S. war machine, although they continue to regard their respective 
alliances as the bedrock of their national security.
Under such circumstances, East Asia is now in the process of reshaping the balance 
of forces. It does not necessarily mean the decline of the absolute power of the United 
States, particularly in the military field. But the region has definitely seen the emergence 
of new economies, with rising roles in the political and security fields. China is just a 
case in point. The country reportedly became the second-largest economy last year, 
surpassing Japan in terms of the GDP. Just six years ago China’s gross domestic product 
was about half of Japan’s. As China is still a developing country, it has a lot of room to 
grow in the future. To imagine that the East Asian countries would be willing to join the 
United States in confronting China’s rise is but wishful thinking. 
Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo of the Philippines, for example, explicitly stressed 
that “Southeast Asian nations don’t need Washington’s help in solving territorial disputes 
with China over the potentially resource-rich South China Sea” and that “negotiations 
should be strictly between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
China, without the U.S. or any other party involved.” He refused to support the state-
ment of Hillary Clinton hinting at greater U.S. involvement in the South China Sea.3 An-
other illustrative example is that despite the fact that Vietnam showed some enthusiasm 
for strengthening its economic and defense ties with Washington, Hanoi has been out to 
make it clear that “Vietnam will never join a military alliance with the United States.”4
II
Washington’s unhappiness also seems to derive from misperceptions about China. Quite 
a number of myths play a very negative role in forging Washington’s mind-set toward 
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China-U.S. relations. Misperception always gives rise to excessive fear, miscalculation, 
and overreaction. 
Myth One: China Has Already Become a World Superpower 
It is true China has achieved remarkable progress in terms of economic development 
over the past three decades, thanks to the opening to the outside and reform policy 
launched since 1978. For all these impressive figures, however, China is still a developing 
country, and the largest one in the world at that. Despite the fact China has become the 
second-largest economy in the world recently, the quality of its economic growth is yet 
to match its pace of expansion. In addition, China remains far behind many countries 
when per capita GDP is taken into account. In 2009, China reported a per capita GDP 
of $3,687, as compared to $37,800 for Japan and $46,436 for the United States. China 
ranked 103rd worldwide in terms of per capita GDP, according to the World Bank.5 
Thus, it is important to bear in mind that China’s rise is more a process than a reality. As 
Deng Xiaoping once put it, China would have to make enormous efforts by generation 
upon generation to become a well-to-do country by the mid-twenty-first century. 
Myth Two: China Is an Expansionist Power 
China’s numerous territorial and maritime disputes with its neighbors are often cited 
to showcase China’s “expansionist” or “irredentist” ambition. Nothing indeed could 
wrong China more in that respect. If one examines each of these disputes closely, none 
was created by the People’s Republic of China. They have all been left over by history. 
Moreover, since its founding the new China has been making consistent efforts to bring 
all these disputes to a peaceful solution. Not all of them were successful, as, the disputes 
having involved sovereignty and territorial integrity, each of the national governments 
concerned has found little room for compromise. China is no exception. That is why 
even military frictions or conflicts occurred between China and its neighbors, such as 
India and Vietnam, on a few occasions along the land or maritime borders. But even so, 
Beijing was always on the defensive, in each of these events, always showing great re-
straint to return to the status quo and working to stabilize the situation pending the final 
solution. Meanwhile, China has also succeeded in resolving many of the land-border 
disputes with almost all its neighbors, except with India, through peaceful negotiation 
in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual compromise. In many cases, it is Beijing, not 
the other sides, who made even greater concessions in order to clinch a deal. In conse-
quence, China’s territory has shrunk somewhat rather than expanded since 1949, when 
the People’s Republic was founded.
In a more profound sense, China is in fact an inward-looking country. As Chinese 
leaders have often stated, the greatest challenges or threats to China’s security come 
from within rather than from outside its boundaries. Given a most complex domestic 
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environment, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that most of the time, energy, and 
interest of Chinese leaders has been focused before, and will be focused in the future, on 
domestic rather than international issues. 
According to Zheng Bijian, one of the most prominent scholars in China, China has en-
tered a critical, bottleneck period in its development. “China is now facing in particular 
five great challenges down the road: the shortage of energy resources; the degradation 
of its ecological environment; a series of issues as a result of the loss of economic and 
social balance during the course of development; massive natural disasters nationwide; 
and various international economic, political, scientific, cultural and military pressures 
as well as the existential and potential crises in the world China is confronted with.” 
To meet all these challenges, and to ensure its sustained development, Zheng believes, 
China has no previous experience to learn from. 
China must act in a way fundamentally distinct from three types of approaches that rising 
world powers tried as they emerged in history: 1) the old Western powers accomplished 
their industrialization by relying on colonialist plunder of world resources in modern 
history; 2) Nazi Germany and militarist Japan sought to divide the world by unleash-
ing wars in the first part of last century; 3) Soviet hegemony pursued a competition with 
another superpower in the scramble for spheres of influence during the Cold War. China 
can follow none of those formulas, and must define its own way of peaceful and civilized 
development characterized with seeking peace internationally and harmony at home.6 
In short, what China has been trying to do is a grand economic and social experiment 
that is unprecedented in scale in human history. Not much time, indeed, has been left 
for China to harbor so-called expansionist ambitions. With regard to its foreign affairs, 
Beijing largely acted only to respond to what the other powers had done that was per-
ceived to have implications for its security.
Myth Three: China Will Become More Bellicose When It Develops
Many Western pundits fear that China will become more aggressive when it finds its 
national interests expanding overseas, particularly when it requires precious energy and 
mineral resources to sustain its economic development. But this is also a mispercep-
tion that largely derives from Western security culture. Based on their own experience 
of seeing the rise of one major power after another, always accompanied with the rising 
assertiveness of the newly rising power for more rights and prerogatives at the expense 
of other powers, people in the West simply do not understand why China will not follow 
the pattern. But the truth is perhaps just the opposite—that is, the more China develops, 
the more cooperative China will be as a responsible member of the international  
community. 
China is keenly aware that it must rely on its own strength as well as on a more scientific 
mode of development to sustain its economic dynamics. If China were to follow the way 
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of development in the West, by consuming energy in such an extravagant manner as 
we see in the United States and Europe today, even if all the world’s energy were under 
the control of China, Beijing would still find it inadequate to meet its insatiable require-
ments. Obviously, China cannot follow that road. China must define a way to develop its 
own market by relying on its efforts and, moreover, endeavor to change its development 
mode, dramatically enhance the efficiency of energy consumption, and realize economic 
development based on the creation of green energy. To try to get a due share of the world 
market does constitute one solution. But that is only supplementary. In short, China 
must sustain its development in a more scientific way. Instead of becoming a cause of an-
archic competition, energy is most likely to become an area of international cooperation.
A more fundamental reason for China to insist on cooperation is that its sustained de-
velopment has already been imbedded in the health of the world economy, and its secu-
rity within the security of the world. China sincerely wishes the United States to pull out 
of the economic recession as soon as possible, because the health of the U.S. economy is 
also in the best interests of China. Growing economic interdependence makes it futile 
for any major power, be it the United States or China, to resort to a confrontational 
approach in pursuit of narrowly defined national interests. That explains why China is 
strongly opposed to the shortsighted protectionist measures often seen in the developed 
countries, including the United States, in the name of protecting their national interests 
during the financial crisis and world recession. 
China is in good faith in the hope of building up a long-term stable and peaceful 
international environment so as to concentrate on domestic development and develop 
cooperation at different levels. When international or regional disputes emerge, China 
hopes to solve them through peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect, mutual 
benefit, equality, and mutual compromise. Military force is essential to defending the 
national interests of each nation. But it can only be employed as the last resort and must 
not be abused. 
Myth Four: China Wants to Change the Rules of the Game
It is true that China is not a country satisfied with the existing political and economic 
world order. In China’s conceptualization of a better world, there should be a new 
international order, which, based on sincere respect for the purpose and principles of 
the United Nations Charter, sees the greater democratization in international affairs and 
the assurance of peace and development of all nations. China thus does wish to see the 
modification of the existing world order to a certain extent in order to realize a more 
balanced world structure, as well as a more just and fair world order.
But the more important question is what China sees as the best approach to achieving 
that goal. The following are the highlights of China’s position. First, China hopes to 
not congruent but quite complementary 111
build up the new world order by reform, through the concerted efforts of all nations and 
in an evolutionary way. Reform means retaining the best part of the old systems while 
introducing new elements. Second, China holds that a new world order is possible only 
through the best understanding and cooperation between the developed and develop-
ing countries. It is feasible only when it can take into account the interests of all nations. 
Thus, changing the rules of game is going to be a long process, the process of coordinat-
ing and accommodating various interests in the world. 
Third, China believes that the two most influential powers in the world, China and the 
United States, need not come into conflict on the issue. On the contrary, they share 
many common interests in seeing the emergence of such a new world order and in 
working together in this long process. The close consultations between the two countries 
during the debate concerning United Nations reform and the creation of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) and current efforts for the restructuring of the world financial monetary 
and regulatory mechanisms are just a few good examples among many others to show 
that China and the United States have actually already cooperated on this issue. Fourth, 
in East Asia, China has consistently expressed its wish to see a change of the game to 
promote greater peace and stability. The role of the U.S.-led military alliance in the 
region, for example, has never been viewed by China as a positive and stabilizing factor. 
However, China has also made it clear that since the American-led military alliances 
are all bilateral in nature, China would respect the decision of the national govern-
ments concerned if they continue to think the alliance is necessary for them, as long as 
no country wants to use the alliance for military interference in China’s internal affairs, 
thereby undermining China’s security interests.
Misgivings and mistrust do emerge over the rules of game. In China’s view, they come 
mainly from mixed feelings in Washington—while acknowledging the inevitability of 
the emergence of a new world structure and the efforts of all nations to adapt to the new 
situation, the United States seems to continue to harbor an unrealistic wish not to lose 
its dominance over the world and a fear that the rising China would become potentially 
the greatest challenge to its world hegemony. Much, therefore, depends on perceptions 
regarding the need to change the game and an effective approach to accomplish this 
change.
III
While the two countries are constrained in the traditional security field, nontraditional 
security cooperation between China and the United States can help facilitate better un-
derstanding, foster common interests, and promote mutual confidence and trust. At the 
very least, this concept can serve as useful ballast for the ship of the bilateral relationship, 
for the stabilization of the ship in rough seas. 
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Obviously, all these myths in Washington will not disappear in the foreseeable future. 
They will likely continue to feed American disquiet and even alarm over China and gen-
erate a poisonous atmosphere in the evolution of China-U.S. relations. But one need not 
be overly pessimistic. This bilateral relationship has never seen a linear pattern. While 
constrained in the traditional security fields, the two countries continue to see a grow-
ing number of overlapping interests in their cooperation in the nontraditional security 
fields. 
Incentives for cooperation in the field of nontraditional security have become even 
more pronounced, for three reasons. One is that the post–Cold War years have seen a 
noticeable rise of nontraditional security threats, which have not only brought devastat-
ing effects impacting the security of individual nations, as shown by the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the United States, but become the major cause of regional, as well as interna-
tional, instability, violence, and turmoil. They have become the common scourge in the 
international community. Secondly, as nontraditional security threats are often trans-
national or transregional, no country alone can effectively cope with them. Thus, China 
and the United States together confront a long list of issues like terrorism, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, HIV/AIDS, piracy, illegal migration, envi-
ronmental security, economic security, food security, information security, and energy, 
among many others, that call on the two countries to work together. This trend will not 
abate even when the two capitals continue to be burdened with heavy misgivings about 
China’s President Hu Jintao offers condolences to a relative of a Chinese peacekeeper killed by 
the massive earthquake in Haiti. Other Chinese peacekeeping missions have also suffered fatali-
ties, such as the mission in Lebanon.
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each other. Last but not least, when the two countries are seriously constrained in the 
traditional security field, enhancing nontraditional security cooperation could facilitate 
better understanding of the two sides, foster common interests, and promote mutual 
confidence and trust. 
The first area of feasible cooperation concerns many vital issues that are closely related 
to the economic security of the two countries. The two sides have an ever-stronger 
interest in expanding cooperation in this respect. This common understanding was also 
reflected in the China-U.S. joint statement signed in November 2009. The document 
devoted much attention to defining areas of bilateral economic and trade cooperation. 
Cooperation essentially requires that the two countries continue to advance China-U.S. 
economic and trade ties, strengthen macroeconomic policy coordination and their 
cooperation in the framework of the G-20 to push for further recovery in the world 
economy, and work together to better address such issues as climate change, energy 
security, food security, and technology cooperation.
The second area of cooperation includes issues related to political as well as social secu-
rity and stability. Antiterrorism, nonproliferation, and the fight against ethnic separatism 
and religious extremism belong to the field of political security, while issues like illicit 
drugs, HIV/AIDS, illegal migration, environmental security, and food security belong to 
the realm of human security. In both fields, China and the United States need to support 
each other, as these types of threats know no boundaries or limitations in terms of the 
cause of problems and their disastrous effects. What happens in New York today could 
happen in London, Moscow, or Beijing or any other city tomorrow. Among all these 
issues, how to wind down the war in Afghanistan and ensure sustained stability based on 
the efficient governance by the Afghan government could be crucial to the success of the 
international effort in combating terrorism. Equally important, seeking solutions to both 
the Iran and North Korea nuclear crises, in ways acceptable to all the parties concerned, 
would also be essential to strengthening the nonproliferation regime. China and the 
United States continue to share the same fundamental objective on both accounts. 
The third area that is particularly pertinent, and perhaps carries some practical ur-
gency for China-U.S. cooperation, is maritime security. As China sees an increasing 
stake in the oceans, its interests in cooperation with the United States are mounting. 
One important driver for better communication and cooperation in the maritime field 
between China and the United States is the fact that the two sides share the belief that 
a better mechanism to ensure good governance on the oceans would be in their best 
interests. The oceans have long seen growing complexity owing to the increasing interest 
in maritime issues among the national priorities among many powers, the buildup of 
naval capabilities, the prospect of competition for maritime resources, and the rise of 
piracy, among other reasons. As a result, both China and the United States would like 
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to see the prevention of the expansion of ungoverned maritime space, on one hand, and 
of a looming maritime arms competition, on the other. China’s decision in 2008 to join 
the counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa is indicative of Beijing’s willingness to 
participate in the international cooperation in the maintenance of maritime peace and 
stability. So far, cooperation in that field has been going well. In the meantime, however, 
competition among major powers in the maritime domain seems also to be rising, and 
that trend has already produced a good deal of uncertainty.
There are, of course, risks in cooperating in nontraditional security. It could easily be-
come hostage to the deep-seated suspicion between the two countries, as demonstrated 
in the traditional security field. After all, nontraditional security issues tend to crop up 
in the traditional security context, one way or the other. Whether Washington considers 
Beijing a truly strategic partner or as a potential threat, for example, would be decisive as 
to the extent to which China-U.S. cooperation in the nontraditional security cooperation 
could develop in the future. 
As in the traditional security field, it is imperative that cooperation in nontraditional 
security be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual benefit, and on an equal 
footing. Often the Chinese feel frustrated at the high-handed manner expressed by 
Washington, as if cooperation simply means that China should do as the United States 
dictates. Otherwise, China is invariably labeled “irresponsible” or “arrogant.” This at-
titude is particularly offensive when the two sides have differences on the appropriate 
approach to a common objective. Sanctions against Iran are a case in point. China did 
not think extra sanctions beyond the request of the UN Security Council were conducive 
to the eventual solution of the nuclear crisis. However, Washington thought differently 
and then shoveled onto China all responsibility for the lack of progress on this issue. 
The Chinese sometimes also resent the double standards in bilateral cooperation with 
the United States in the nontraditional security arena. When the American administra-
tion refused to repatriate those terrorists of Chinese Uighur ethnic nationality captured 
in Afghanistan on the grounds that they could hardly be looked on as terrorists by the 
U.S. standard, it can be imagined how the Chinese people felt about it. Many, in their 
irrational emotion, even questioned the value for China of continuing to cooperate with 
the “ungrateful and treacherous Americans” in that respect. Countries must respect each 
other in their interactions. 
IV
The Obama administration is running the risk of making a mess of its China policy. It 
has unnecessarily pushed the bilateral relations to a new level of tension, dimming the 
prospect of cooperating with Beijing on many vital security issues. It is argued that all 
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this came out of the deep-seated mistrust between the two powers. That certainly makes 
some sense. But mistrust is only a symptom; behind it there seems a more fundamental 
cause for the misplaced China policy in Washington, driven by a poor appreciation in 
the United States of how fast the world is changing, by the inertia of stereotypical think-
ing developed in the Cold War, and by the excessive apprehension about a rising China 
as the major potential threat. 
The key test to the United States with respect to the future of China-U.S. relations, there-
fore, is whether Washington is able to come to terms with the development of the world 
situation, including the rise of China. That requires a new vision, accepting that China’s 
development is inevitable and that the rise of China is not necessarily detrimental to the 
core interests of the United States. On the contrary, a rising China could offer a unique 
opportunity to develop an overall, comprehensive partnership with Beijing, a great help 
to the United States in coping with current predicaments.
This is chiefly because China wants to be a friend and not an adversary of the United 
States. If history is any guide, the course of China-U.S. relations over the past half-
century or more should lead to three important conclusions: first, China and the United 
States both gain from peaceful coexistence and lose from conflicts; second, mutual 
interest serves as the bedrock of our cooperation; and third, China-U.S. cooperation is 
conducive to stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to peace and development in 
the world. Based on this understanding, the Chinese government has consistently held 
the view that “to strengthen China-U.S. cooperation is not only a mutual need but also 
a responsibility, which the two countries shoulder in the interest of world peace and 
development. In case of differences and contradictions, both sides should keep cool and 
be sensible, and try to increase communications, reduce mistrust and seek common 
ground while shelving differences with a view to properly handling these differences and 
contradictions.”7 
This does not suggest, of course, that the United States has the sole responsibility for the 
health of China-U.S. relations. The recent frictions between the two countries seem re-
vealing regarding excessive responses from Beijing also. To cut off all military relations, 
including dialogues, as a response to recent American policies that seriously undermine 
China’s core interests is understandable. But to use it as a means of retaliation against 
U.S. actions is hardly a wise strategy, because at the end of the day, keeping communi-
cation smooth is an essential part of the efforts of both countries to maintain working 
relations and therefore is in the interests of both sides.
More worrisome is the emergence in China of a school of thought that, rather like that 
of neoconservatives in the United States, seems to seek only confrontation with the 
other side. These people, amusingly, hold views so similar to those of their conservative 
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counterparts in Washington that I sometimes even suspect that they may have stolen 
these American views. Like their American counterparts, they bemoan the grave situ-
ation the country is faced with—in China’s case, as a result of the U.S. encirclement in 
the Asia-Pacific. They argue that since China has already become a world power, China 
should strive to be “second to none” and that now is the time to show its military mus-
cles, not least because of the need to protect ever increasing overseas national interests. 
They also hold that China, in particular, should be firm with respect to the provocations 
from the superpower by staging a tit-for-tat struggle. These views by no means represent 
the views of the Chinese government. They are not even the mainstream views of the 
Chinese public. They, however, have their own impact in confusing the minds of average 
Chinese citizens, as well as of people abroad. 
Realizing the dream of an enduring China-U.S. partnership will require concerted  
efforts from both sides. 
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Notes
The past decade has heralded significant changes in the maritime realm. Some of the most prominent of these changes have been driven by the reemergence of China as 
a full-fledged participant in the international order—economically, politically, diplo-
matically, and in security affairs. As China adjusts to its role as a power with widespread 
global interests, it must also come to grips with how to protect those interests. China’s 
reemergence and larger role in world affairs thus have been the primary impetus behind 
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) crosscutting military modernization pro-
gram and behind Hu Jintao’s 2004 announcement of the New Historic Missions, which 
ordered the PLA to develop the capabilities necessary to protect China’s increasingly 
global interests.1 
These are the capabilities that we see the PLA and the PLA Navy put to use today in 
nontraditional security operations. Recent examples of these new capabilities include 
China’s first noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), conducted in Libya in Febru-
ary 2011, wherein the PLAN dispatched a Xuzhou missile frigate to evacuate Chinese 
citizens; PLA disaster-relief teams who were ready to come to Japan’s aid after the March 
2011 tsunami; deployment of the PLAN’s new hospital ship, Daishandao (Peace Ark), to 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region and farther abroad; and, of course, the continuing 
counterpiracy missions off the coast of Somalia. 
These missions represent the first steps onto what is undoubtedly a critical path toward 
Chinese ability to protect its economic and security interests around the globe and to 
become a preeminent regional power, with increasing global presence. Many of the ca-
pabilities the PLA is developing for these nontraditional security missions are maritime-
related or have naval components, providing increased potential for U.S.-China naval 
cooperation in NTS areas.
This paper discusses the opportunities for U.S.-China naval cooperation in NTS areas. 
First, it examines two drivers of change in the maritime domain attendant on China’s re-
emergence as a major power. Second, the paper discusses the current state of U.S.-China 
cooperation in the maritime domain. Third, it analyzes future prospects for cooperation 
between the two navies in the NTS domain.
Kristen Gunness
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China’s Reemergence and Two Drivers of Change in the Maritime Domain
There are at least two key realities of China’s reemergence that are drivers of change in 
the maritime domain and that have implications for how the U.S. and Chinese navies 
will approach and pursue cooperation in the future.
Reality One: China today, more than ever before, has global economic interests that depend 
on the stability and security of the maritime domain. The stability and security of the 
maritime commons are increasingly important for China as its economic interests be-
come more global. China’s dependence on the oceans is quite tangible: 
 • Recent Chinese statistics published in the 2010 China’s Ocean Development Report 
state that in 2008 ocean commerce represented 9.87 percent of China’s gross domestic 
product, valued at approximately $450 billion. About 85 percent of China’s interna-
tional trade uses shipping lanes.2 
 • China is now the world’s second-largest economy, and some statistics state that by 
2020, the value of its maritime commerce will exceed a trillion dollars a year. 
 • According to the International Energy Agency, China will have to rely on imports 
for 79 percent of its oil needs by 2030.3 Eighty-five percent of these oil imports, from 
both the Middle East and Africa, flow through the Straits of Malacca before heading 
into the South China Sea, amplifying the strategic importance of this major choke 
point for China’s economy.4 
In addition, China’s coastline is eighteen thousand kilometers long; the nation claims 
over four million square miles of sea area, operates over 1,400 harbors, and has a mer-
chant marine of about 1,800 ships. Also, China has six of the world’s top ten ports by 
cargo.5 This is just what the PLA Navy must protect at home—never mind protecting the 
nation’s interests abroad. 
As China becomes more dependent on ocean-borne trade, its maritime concerns and 
perceptions of security threats, particularly in the nontraditional security arena, have 
become more complex. Some of these concerns include the following:
 • Energy insecurity, as China’s dependence on foreign energy sources and its inability 
to secure its sea-lanes leave it vulnerable. Recently, this concern has led to increased 
tensions in the South China Sea as China attempts to enforce territorial claims that 
would give it access to natural resources in the area.
 • Piracy that threatens China’s merchant fleet, in the South China Sea, in the Straits of 
Malacca, and most recently in the Horn of Africa. 
 • Nonstate actors and terrorist organizations, which could disrupt key shipping lanes 
and the maritime flow of commerce. 
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A Dual-Track Approach
China has so far responded to these concerns with a dual-track approach—building legal 
foundations for access, and rapid military modernization. On the legal front, China has 
attempted to build the foundations in international law necessary to ensure its access to 
critical areas of the high seas. This includes trying to garner support for its interpretation 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), one differing from 
that of the majority of coastal states. 
Under its interpretation of UNCLOS, China primarily objects to the conduct of mili-
tary research activities in its EEZ, insisting that these activities are unlawful and that 
they constitute abuses of freedom of navigation.6 Tensions between the United States 
and China over the EEZ issue rose in March 2009 when USNS Impeccable, an unarmed 
military research ship operating in the South China Sea, was harassed by Chinese fishing 
vessels. Since then, safety at sea has been a top priority for the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. 
and Chinese navies have held discussions on this topic. However, the larger issue of ac-
cess to the maritime commons remains. In particular, right of access to EEZs and what 
activities one is permitted to undertake in those waters remain points of contentious 
debate between the United States and China. 
Developing New Maritime Capabilities. On the military modernization front, China is 
attempting to address its maritime security concerns by building up the PLA/PLAN’s 
capabilities, resulting in increased ability to project force; the ability to conduct more 
complex missions outside China’s littoral waters;7 and increased ability to participate in 
what the PLA has labeled as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).8
The most obvious manifestation of this is the PLA Navy’s participation in the multina-
tional counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Since December 2008, the PLAN 
has dispatched naval escort task forces to that region. These missions represent numer-
ous “firsts” for the PLAN. To name a few: it is the first time PLAN ships have conducted 
operations in waters other than Chinese littoral waters; the first time the PLAN has 
operated forces over a long period of time away from home port; and the first time the 
PLAN has had to operate for an extended period of time as part of a multinational ef-
fort.9 So far the PLAN has shown a remarkable ability to learn and adapt quickly, and the 
task forces have successfully executed their missions. All indications are that the Chinese 
navy will continue to support the counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for the 
foreseeable future.
As China’s expanding regional and global interests create broader requirements for 
military capabilities, the PLA and PLAN will increasingly be called on to prepare for and 
take part in activities such as the counterpiracy missions, or other MOOTW activities. 
For China’s leadership, involvement in such activities enhances the country’s image as a 
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constructive player in global security affairs, and for the PLA these activities offer valu-
able operational experience that enhance its ability to conduct the full range of opera-
tions. In addition, given China’s growing stake in the security of the maritime commons, 
it is not far-fetched to think that another mission the Chinese leadership might envision 
for the PLA in the future would be the protection of key sea lines of communications 
(SLOCs) to safeguard China’s maritime energy and trade routes if necessary. 
Reality Two: China is now proactively shaping the international security environment, not 
merely reacting to it. China has reemerged as a full participant in the larger international 
order after almost two centuries. As a result, the PRC is engaging internationally on 
every front—politically, economically, diplomatically, and in security affairs.
China is using all of the elements of national power to shape proactively the regional 
and international security environment. This includes being a more active participant 
in international and regional organizations, such as the Six-Party Talks and the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization. It includes using its economic clout to collect resources 
overseas and invest in other countries’ markets. Finally, it includes conducting military 
diplomacy and, significantly, using the PLA as an operational asset to support China’s 
larger national objectives.
Building “Soft Power” Capabilities
In the maritime domain, China is shaping regional perceptions and promoting its 
“peaceful rise” by building up soft-power capabilities. As a growing regional power, 
China’s hospital ship, Peace Ark, passes close to a Chinese destroyer in the Indian Ocean. 
China’s improving capabilities for humanitarian aid and disaster relief suggest the possibility of 
closer coordination with the U.S. Navy in this area. Then-CNO Admiral Gary Roughead visited 
Peace Ark in 2009 and promoted professional exchanges between the U.S. and Chinese naval 
medical establishments.
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China clearly wants both to assuage concerns about how it will use its capabilities and 
to play a larger role in regional affairs befitting a regional power. In particular, the PLA/
PLAN is strengthening its ability to respond to relief after natural disasters and humani-
tarian crises. 
This effort began in earnest after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where the PLA’s pres-
ence was either lacking or conspicuously limited in the disaster-relief efforts, especially 
in comparison to the U.S. military.10 Since then, the PLA has participated in more HA/
DR efforts beyond the domestic natural disasters it has already supported, such as the 
2008 Sichuan earthquake. For example, the PLA had a significant presence in the earth-
quakes in Pakistan and Haiti, and it was ready to offer assistance in the Japan tsunami 
disaster. The PLAN has followed suit, recently commissioning its new hospital ship, the 
two-thousand-ton, five-hundred-bed Daishandao, which first deployed in October 2009 
and has since made several deployments as far abroad as Africa and, most recently, even 
to the Caribbean.11 
In addition to the hospital ship, the PLAN has taken some steps to develop its search-
and-rescue capabilities. According to the 2008 white paper on China’s national defense, 
China has conducted joint maritime search and rescue training exercises (SAREXes) 
with Australia and New Zealand in the Tasman Sea.12 In addition, in 2006 the U.S. and 
Chinese navies conducted a search-and-rescue exercise, in conjunction with a port visit 
by the PLAN to San Diego. 
Increased Power Projection
China is also proactively shaping regional perceptions by building up its power-
projection capability through its aircraft carrier program, which could potentially 
deploy the nation’s first aircraft carriers in the coming years. While this development, 
in and of itself, is not unexpected, given China’s rising status as a regional power, it has 
compounded the uncertainty of other countries in the region as to China’s intentions. 
Chinese leaders seem well aware of this: in November 2008 the director of the Foreign 
Affairs Office in the Ministry of National Defense, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua, said that 
“having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power,” and “the question 
is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.”13 
Analysts still maintain that China has a long way to go before it can successfully operate 
an aircraft carrier. However, the idea that the PRC is building such a maritime capabil-
ity is already shaping perceptions of China’s role in the region, not just because it will 
increase China’s ability to get to more places and project power farther afield but also 
because it advances the perception of a reemergent China that is a major participant in 
regional and global security affairs.
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In sum, these realities indicate that as China’s interests become global, the reasons for 
China to care about the stability and security of the maritime commons have increased. 
Also, China is taking a much more proactive approach to shaping the security environ-
ment around it, including the development of more soft power and power projection in 
the maritime domain. In addition, China is building capabilities that will enable it to be 
a greater participant in nontraditional security areas—including humanitarian disaster 
relief and multinational operations like the Horn of Africa counterpiracy mission. 
Implications of These Realities 
What are the implications of these realities, and how are they significant to the future of 
U.S.-China naval cooperation?
First, China will continue to invest in the PLAN and develop the capabilities necessary to 
protect its interests abroad. Given that China is dependent on a stable and secure mari-
time environment in order to safeguard its economic growth, one can attribute at least 
some of China’s investment in its navy as a sign that it is uncomfortable with continu-
ing to depend solely on the United States to provide this security. Thus, as we look to 
the future and ask how China will pursue its national interests, we can expect to see a 
desire to establish self-reliance when it comes to such issues as ensuring ability to gain 
Chinese nationals line up to evacuate from the intensifying civil war in Libya in February 2011. 
The Chinese navy sent a frigate to monitor the evacuation, which also relied heavily on char-
tered civilian vessels such as the one shown here. As a global power, Beijing will likely be drawn 
more frequently into complex contingencies around the world. This trend underscores the impor-
tance of nontraditional security for future Chinese foreign and defense policy.
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and maintain access to energy resources, protecting key SLOCs, and ensuring maritime 
security and unfettered shipping.
Second, as the PLA goes farther abroad, there will be more interaction between the U.S. 
and Chinese navies. The counterpiracy missions are likely the first of many the PLAN 
will conduct outside China’s littoral waters. The PLAN’s new hospital ship will also put 
American and Chinese naval forces in contact with each other should a natural disaster 
occur. Also, of course, as the PLAN increases its operational tempo around the Asia-
Pacific region—particularly in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Yellow 
Sea—the U.S. and Chinese navies will encounter each other more. The goal is to ensure 
that these interactions occur professionally and safely and that they are viewed as op-
portunities for the two navies to learn from each other.
Of course, there also will be an increase in unplanned interactions in unexpected places 
around the globe. For example, as access to the arctic becomes more viable, it is conceiv-
able that American and Chinese maritime forces might find themselves encountering 
each other more often in that part of the world. 
Third, China’s maritime reemergence will continue to result in a mixture of areas of 
cooperation and contention. In many areas, China is being a constructive participant in 
resolving international maritime security issues, and this is greatly welcomed by the U.S. 
Navy. The counterpiracy missions and the PLAN’s participation in the Shared Awareness 
and Deconfliction (SHADE) group are examples of constructive cooperation between 
the navies of the world, ones in which China is playing a significant role. In some areas, 
however, there has been tension as China challenges existing maritime norms—the ten-
sion over lawful military activities in exclusive economic zones is an example of this, as 
is increased tension in the South China Sea. It is likely that this dynamic of cooperation 
and contention will always exist, and the more the United States and China can maintain 
an open dialogue—at high levels as well as with lower-level cooperative efforts—the bet-
ter we will be able to make our way through the rough patches. 
Fourth, the reasons to cooperate are increasing. The realities discussed above suggest that 
the United States and China have more reasons than ever before to cooperate in the 
maritime domain. China’s reemergence, its increased reliance on the maritime com-
mons, and its greater stake in ensuring their stability and security provide a broader 
foundation on which our navies can cooperate than existed in the past. Additionally, 
while some aspects of China’s naval modernization have caused concern for the United 
States, the PLA is developing capabilities that will allow it to cooperate better with U.S. 
forces in other regions around the globe, which is in both nations’ interests.
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The New Maritime Strategy and U.S.-China Naval Cooperation
In 2007, the maritime forces (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) of the United 
States published a unified maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower.” This new strategy lays the groundwork for future naval cooperation in NTS 
areas.
The maritime strategy is about security, stability, and sea power. It rests on three key 
principles: 
 • Securing the United States from direct attack
 • Securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action
 • Strengthening existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establishing 
favorable security conditions.
The maritime strategy emphasizes that the prevention of war is as important as winning 
war. It thus focuses on collective security—maritime forces will be employed to build 
confidence and trust among nations through efforts that focus on common threats and 
mutual interests in an open, multipolar world. It elevates humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief to core elements of maritime power; whereas in the past U.S. maritime 
forces have participated in these efforts, now they will integrate them into their plan-
ning processes. This strategy reaffirms the need for regionally concentrated, forward-
deployed combat power while also taking a “global view” and placing a new emphasis on 
globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces. 
So what does this mean for U.S.-China naval cooperation? The new maritime strategy 
contains a variety of elements that provide a basis for enhanced maritime cooperation 
with China. First, the emphasis on conflict prevention is a shared interest, one that 
both sides can agree on. Second, the strategy’s objective of securing the global maritime 
commons is highly compatible with China’s strategic interests as a power with global 
economic and security interests, as discussed above. Third, the new emphasis on hu-
manitarian operations, especially, offers opportunities for bilateral cooperation to build 
mutual trust without participating in activities that Beijing may deem objectionable. 
Current U.S.-China Cooperative Maritime Security Efforts 
The United States and China are already cooperating on a number of maritime security 
activities, many of which are in the NTS domain. They include:
 • Global Maritime Partnership (GMP): China has been invited to cooperate more 
broadly with the U.S. Navy under the framework of the Global Maritime Partnership, 
as set forth in the new maritime strategy. The GMP, also known as the “Thousand-
Ship Navy,” was proposed by Adm. Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations. 
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The vision was to create a “partnership” of like-minded countries to combat common 
threats at sea. Under this vision, nations participating in the GMP program seek op-
portunities to assist one another in using the sea for lawful purposes and legitimate 
commerce, while limiting its use by those who threaten national, regional, or global 
security.14 
 • PLAN doctors on board USNS Comfort: In June 2009, four PLAN doctors visited 
USNS Comfort (T-AH 20), one of the U.S. Navy’s hospital ships, for a week to observe 
medical procedures. This was the first time such an exchange of medical personnel 
had occurred between the two navies. 
 • Counterpiracy and SHADE: China’s counterpiracy efforts have been welcomed by the 
United States and the other international participants. The PLAN recently deployed 
yet another task force to the region. So far, cooperation between the U.S. Navy and 
the PLAN has been limited, but it has been happening. In particular, we have seen 
some notable cooperation on ship-to-ship communications between the United States 
and China in the Gulf of Aden, particularly in sharing relevant intelligence. The 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction group, based in Bahrain, provides a working-
level opportunity for the forty-plus navies participating in the counterpiracy opera-
tions off the Horn of Africa to come together to share information and deconflict 
their efforts. Reflecting China’s willingness to take a larger role in multinational coun-
terpiracy operations, in January 2010 the PRC committed itself to supply one warship 
to the Horn of Africa to patrol a sixty-nautical-mile stretch along the Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). This commitment makes China eligible to 
lead the coalition, the chairmanship of which is rotated every three to four months.15 
Until recently, China has mainly escorted its own merchant ships and has not taken 
part in the larger coalition.
 • MMCA: The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement was established in 1998. The 
agreement provides for operator-level exchanges to discuss issues of maritime safety 
and communication, as well as for expanding cooperation in areas such as search and 
rescue and humanitarian assistance. It provides a forum to discuss issues over inter-
national maritime regulations and to develop a common understanding of operating 
procedures when encounters between American and Chinese naval forces occur. It is 
the only “official” venue for dialogue between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN.
 • Coast guard cooperation: The U.S. Coast Guard has established a working relationship 
with its Chinese counterparts. In May 2006, the cutter Sequoia became the first U.S. 
cutter to visit China. In August 2007, USCGC Boutwell continued these exchanges 
with a visit to Shanghai during the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, East Asia’s only 
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maritime security organization, in which China and the United States both played 
substantive roles. 
 • The Container Security Initiative (CSI): In 2002, China joined the Container Security 
Initiative, which aims to safeguard the global maritime trading system from ter-
rorism. So far, China’s participation has been limited to the ports of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. 
The Future of U.S.-China Naval Cooperation in Nontraditional Security Areas
Of course, it is difficult to discuss the future of U.S.-China naval cooperation without 
first addressing the elephant in the room. That elephant is the reality that U.S.-China 
naval cooperation—and indeed the whole military-to-military relationship—is a hostage 
to the larger bilateral political relationship, and that imposes limits on what the two 
navies can do cooperatively at any given time. The on-again, off-again dynamic of the 
U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, which is often “shut down” following 
American decisions to move forward with arms sales to Taiwan, illustrates this dilemma. 
Additionally, renewed tensions in the South China Sea have the potential to derail coop-
erative efforts, as U.S. and Chinese naval forces operating in the region must adhere to 
the political realities that the bilateral relationship faces as a result of rising tensions and 
competing interests.
On the other hand, it is precisely because such tensions exist that we should take advan-
tage of the opportunity to cooperate when and where we can, in the hope that even small 
cooperative efforts can help manage tensions, create mutual understanding, and avert 
larger crises. As discussed above, the expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities cre-
ates, possibly for the first time, the basis for real cooperation. This is particularly true for 
cooperation in the NTS realm.
Despite the constraints, U.S. and Chinese naval forces are in a unique position to 
cooperate, in that there are many areas where our navies are already working together 
and where they will continue to work together. For example, U.S. Navy–PLAN coopera-
tion in the counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia will not cease because of 
bilateral political issues. The move by China to take greater part in the multinational 
counterpiracy efforts by joining SHADE is welcomed by all. The deployment of the 
PLAN’s hospital ship will undoubtedly create more opportunity for exchanges like the 
one aboard USNS Comfort. Also, as Chinese citizens live abroad in greater numbers, op-
portunities exist for our two navies to cooperate on future NEOs should the need arise.
In April 2009 Adm. Gary Roughead, then Chief of Naval Operations, met with Adm. 
Wu Shengli, commander of the PLAN, to discuss specific opportunities for coopera-
tion in the maritime domain. In October 2009 then–secretary of defense Robert Gates 
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and Gen. Xu Caihou agreed on concrete and practical measures to work on in the years 
ahead (dubbed the “Seven Points of Consensus”), and in July 2011 Admiral Mullen, then 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated U.S. desire for cooperation with China. 
Ultimately, the overarching long-term goals of U.S.-China navy-to-navy cooperation 
should be to help build cooperative capacity, foster institutional understanding, and 
develop common views on the international security environment and related security 
challenges. All of the initiatives listed above support these overall goals. 
As the U.S. and Chinese navies look to the future, we should pay attention to position-
ing ourselves better to be able to seize cooperative opportunities when they arise. This 
means continuing to maintain an open dialogue when and where we can, including in 
the MMCA and in “track two” (informal and working-level) venues, to enhance mutual 
understanding and discuss differences. This type of ongoing interaction and dialogue, as 
demonstrated by this volume itself, will pave the way for future cooperative efforts in the 
maritime domain.
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 Abbreviations and Definitions
A  APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
 ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
 ASW antisubmarine warfare
 AU African Union
C C4ISR command, control, communications, computer,   
  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
 CCP Chinese Communist Party
 CIVPOL UN civilian police
 CMATS Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea
 CMC Central Military Commission
 CNAS Center for a New American Security
 CPCTC China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center
 CSI Container Security Initiative
 CTF Combined Task Force
D DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
 DoD Department of Defense [U.S.]
E  EEZ  exclusive economic zone
  EU European Union 
F  FOCAC Forum on China and Africa Cooperation
G G-20  Group of Twenty
 GDP  gross domestic product 
 GMP Global Maritime Partnership
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 GoTL government of Timor-Leste
 GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative
 GPS Global Positioning System
 GSD General Staff Department
H HA humanitarian assistance
 HA/DR humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
 HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune   
  deficiency syndrome
I IHA international humanitarian assistance
 INTERFET International Force for East Timor
 IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
 ISF International Stabilization Force [East Timor]
 IW indication and warning
K KFOR Kosovo Force
L LHA amphibious assault ship
 LPH amphibious assault ship (landing platform helicopter)
M MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western  
  Sahara
 MMCA Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
 MND Ministry of National Defense
 MOOTW military operations other than war 
 MPS Ministry of Public Security
N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
 NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
 NGO nongovernmental organization
132 china maritime studies
 NSG National Security Guard [India]
 NTS nontraditional security
P PAP People’s Armed Police
 PKO peacekeeping operations
 PLA People’s Liberation Army
 PLAN PLA Navy
 PRC People’s Rebublic of China
R R2P responsibility to protect
 RECAMP Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities
S SAREX search-and-rescue exercise
 SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
 SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
 SDRA Swedish Defence Research Agency
 SHADE Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
 SLOC sea line of communications
U UN United Nations
 UNAMET UN Mission in East Timor
 UNAMID African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
 UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
 UNPKO UN peacekeeping operation
 UNSC UN Security Council
 UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
 USCG U.S. Coast Guard
 USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
W WMD weapons of mass destruction
 WTO World Trade Organization
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